How Thailand BRICS Bid Fits Into Its Future Foreign Policy
BRICS expansion hype and Russia-China buzz belies the wider foreign policy challenges and opportunities for Thailand under Srettha Thavisin.
Thailand’s BRICS bid highlights what to watch as the country forges its foreign policy outlook amid a challenging environment at home and abroad.
WonkCount: 1,423 words (~7 minutes)
How Thailand BRICS Bid Fits Into Its Future Foreign Policy
Background
Thailand’s BRICS bid moved a step further this week amid a focus on the grouping’s membership expansion. On May 28, the Thai cabinet approved an official letter of intent for the country to become a member of BRICS, initially comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa1. As noted before on ASEAN Wonk, among ASEAN states, much of the BRICS expansion focus has been on Indonesia, which held off joining last year due to various reasons including what officials privately characterize as U.S. scrutiny amid shifting bilateral ties amid ongoing political transition. But Thailand has also been in the mix, even though it is at times overlooked given its status as a U.S. treaty ally (see snapshot graphic on related developments below). Officials have indicated previous offers made to Thailand to join the grouping, and Bangkok has also expressed interest, including attending engagements as the membership expansion push gained momentum2.
Key Recent Geopolitical Developments Related to Thailand’s BRICS Bid
The bid’s movement is not surprising given recent developments on this score. Much of the focus is often on Thailand’s U.S.-China maneuvering, which, as we have noted on ASEAN Wonk, has continued under Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin as evidenced by the flurry of U.S.-Thai interactions a few months ago and shifts on issues such as a protracted Chinese submarine deal.3 But close observers of the country’s wider foreign relations will note that BRICS membership has also factored into this larger picture, alongside Thailand’s parallel pursuits including membership in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with cabinet approval last December4. Earlier this year, leader of the ruling Pheu Thai Party Paetongtarn Shinawatra reaffirmed Thailand’s desire to join the BRICS during a January call with Russian officials, an interaction which received little global attention5. Last August, Thailand’s then-foreign minister outlined Bangkok’s interests amid BRICS expansion in an engagement at the BRICS Summit in South Africa6.
Significance
Thailand’s BRICS bid captures its wider foreign policy dilemma. Thailand has tried to couch its foreign policy moves as part of wider proactive diplomacy approach that emphasizes engaging institutions like the BRICS and OECD not just as a great power balancing act, but also to advance Thailand’s economic interests and cultivate ties with a broader circle of developed and developing countries7. It is worth noting that three of the five BRICS are among the target countries Srettha has identified to realize his ambitious sectoral global hub vision for Thailand; and that all five BRICS are countries Thailand has officially prioritized in its foreign policy as powers to engage8. At the same time, precisely because Thailand is a treaty ally, such moves will be viewed through the narrower prism of U.S. competition with China and Russia and efforts by these powers to influence Bangkok. It is no coincidence that Chinese and Russian media outlets have been crowing the loudest about this BRICS-related development while downplaying Bangkok’s simultaneous OECD pursuit, just months ahead of Russia’s hosting of the BRICS Summit in October9.
Thailand’s recent foreign policy engagements provide a window into what to expect in the future on both its BRICS bid as well as other upcoming key engagements with major powers and notable partners (see table below for key touchpoints in areas that reveal the country’s approach. Paid subscribers can also read on for more on what to expect in the “Prospects” section).