Assessing the New US-Indonesia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Between Aspirations and Limitations
New Indo-Pacific upgrade spotlights areas of future opportunities and challenges amid ongoing U.S. Southeast Asia engagement and Indonesia's evolving regional and global role.
The new U.S.-Indonesia comprehensive strategic partnership signed this week elevates a key relationship in the Indo-Pacific but also highlights some of the challenges it continues to face amid broader regional and global realities.
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Assessing the New US-Indonesia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Between Aspirations and Limitations
Background
While the imperative for greater U.S.-Indonesia cooperation in the 21st century has long been evident, the two sides have struggled to forge a relationship commensurate with a status of the world’s third and fourth largest nations and second and third largest democracies respectively. Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s domestic-focused, economic-centric vision when he came into office in 2014 has proven popular at home but also affected aspects of Indonesian foreign policy and narrowed the scope for regional and global cooperation with Washington, while aspects of the elevated 2015 strategic partnership forged under U.S. President Barack Obama were moribund under his successor Donald Trump even though episodic collaboration continued1.
The United States and Indonesia have made notable gains under the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden, but serious challenges remain. Some of the successes are important because they elevate bilateral engagements and facilitate wider regional cooperation, with cases in point including the multinationalization of the U.S.-Indonesia Garuda Shield exercises last year (now called “Super Garuda Shield”) and the first-ever “2 +2” dialogue in October (see a select list of recent developments in 2023 in the table below)2. That said, forging collaboration in some areas has proven difficult. Economically, momentum on the new Just Energy Transition Partnership has been slower than Indonesia would like, while aligning on areas like critical minerals has had its share of complications, including concerns on the environment and China in Washington3. The Israel-Hamas war has revived Middle East-related divergences which have historically complicated ties4.
Select Recent Developments in U.S.-Indonesia Relations in 2023
Significance
Viewed from this perspective, the elevation of U.S.-Indonesia ties to the level of a comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) this week constitutes a significant development in the relationship. Both sides had been publicly previewing the upgrade for weeks, and it was billed as the key deliverable of a summit meeting after Biden had missed the opportunity to visit Indonesia during Jakarta’s hosting of the ASEAN summit in September after its holding of the G-20 chairmanship in 20225. The CSP was finally signed on November 13 during Jokowi’s meeting with Biden ahead of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) engagements6.
Policy-wise, the new CSP is a boost for ties and the foreign policy outlooks of each side. The CSP, as such partnerships are often designed to do, updates and structures a relationship that has been in the headlines for single issue challenges over the past few months, giving both sides focus to help ensure the substance of ties matches its status over the next few years7. In both his remarks at Georgetown University — the first-ever speech at a U.S. university of its kind — and his remarks with Biden, Jokowi noted the importance of concrete action8. The partnership also holds significance for each side. For Indonesia, the CSP signals efforts at diversifying ties amid concerns in some circles of its overreliance on China, some of which has already begun to play out in campaigning ahead of February 2024 polls9. The new CSP follows an agreement for one with Japan, in addition to others Jakarta has had with Australia and China. For the United States, it builds momentum for the Biden team’s Southeast Asia approach after earlier inroads — including new defense sites with the Philippines in April; the double upgrade in U.S.-Vietnam relations in September; and a Singapore strategic tech pact in October. This is important optics-wise considering that Indonesia is seen as a relatively “less-like-minded” partner relative to the aforementioned countries, especially on issues such as China.
The CSP also provides a sense of where the two sides aim to take the relationship in the coming months and years. This includes not just a mix of new agreements and initiatives, but also workstreams and general priorities that could play a broader role in the future trajectory of ties (see table below with some key initiatives of focus with accompanying details)10.