New China-Russia Trilateral at ASEAN Amid Laos Meeting Outcomes
Plus major flashpoint test; coming rare earth minilateral; new digital pact; growing cyber wall; gateway crackdown; sideline aviation deal and much, much more.
Greetings to new readers and welcome all to the latest edition of the weekly ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief! If you haven’t already, you can upgrade to a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year below to receive full posts by inserting your email address and then selecting an annual or monthly option. You can visit this page for more on pricing for institutions, groups as well as discounts. For current paid subscribers, please make sure you’re hitting the “view entire message” prompt if it comes up at the end of a post to see the full version.
For this iteration of ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief, we are looking at:
Assessing the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of a new China-Russia trilateral at ASEAN meetings in Laos and new regional outcomes;
Mapping of regional developments, including major flashpoint test; BRICS expansion chatter; security networking and hub hotspot;
Charting evolving geopolitical, geoeconomic and security trends, including coming rare earth minilateral; new digital pact and gateway crackdown;
Tracking and analysis of industry developments and quantitative indicators including big sector ban; growing cyber wall; sideline aviation deal and more;
And much more! ICYMI, check out our take on a new book on hidden dynamics of what is regarded as Asia’s biggest non-state army.
This Week’s WonkCount: 1,898 words (~ 10 minutes)
Flashpoint Test; BRICS Expansion Chatter; Upgrade Check & More

Security Networking; Hub Hotspot & Tracking War Fallout
“[J]apan should prioritize providing regular updates to ASEAN on developments in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly regarding minilateral initiatives,” notes a new commentary from the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. The piece focuses on Japan’s ties with Southeast Asian states and its growing security role in the region amid proliferating minilaterals (link).
Relative Dialogue Partner Strategic Relevance to ASEAN
“Southeast Asia has since become a hotspot for bilateral linkages,” argues a report on interlinking instant payment systems released by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The BIS study examines Project Nexus, a multilateral scheme which attempts to connect domestic instant payment systems (IPS) in select participating countries. Following the completion of a third phase, Project Nexus has moved to its fourth phase which will see BIS facilitate linkages between central banks and IPS operators of India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, with Bank of Indonesia as special observer (link).
Diagram of Actors and Relationships within Project Nexus on Cross-Border Payments
“The war the United States waged in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos did not end for the people living there when the shooting stopped in 1975,” notes the introduction to a new Stimson Center-led War Legacies Data Dashboard. The dashboard aims to provide geospatial data on how the legacies of the Vietnam War continue to impact Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam today (background here; link to dashboard here).
Depiction of New War Legacies Map
New China-Russia Trilateral at ASEAN Amid Laos Meeting Outcomes
What’s Behind It
China and Russia played up a new trilateral mechanism with ASEAN amid a series of meetings convened by Laos July 21-27 as the grouping’s chair this year. The development was a rare spotlight into the coordination of new touted minilateral inroads by China and Russia, with their formalized partnership networks far thinner than the United States which is seeking to build a “latticework” across the Indo-Pacific region in part via minilateral proliferation. Beijing and Moscow played up the first trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting between them and Laos as a notable first and as part of a broader “new Russia-China+ASEAN chair” format1. They also referenced growing links between ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the expanding BRICS which initially grouped Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. As noted previously on ASEAN Wonk, Laos just applied to join the SCO after Myanmar and Cambodia, and a few ASEAN countries have expressed interest in the BRICS.
The trilateral hype and meeting outcomes came amid an active week for twin intraregional flashpoints in the South China Sea and Myanmar as well as other regional developments. After public differences aired by China and the Philippines on the specifics of a new bilateral deal disclosed on July 21 that played out alongside the ASEAN meetings, Manila announced on July 27 it had carried out its first resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal2. The Philippines also separately said it had gained support for deescalation efforts during the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum meetings, explicitly naming some countries3. Meanwhile, key ASEAN states like Indonesia continued to express concerns at the lack of progress on the Myanmar issue in terms of concrete areas like humanitarian assistance and agreed mechanisms like the “troika” between the current, past and incoming ASEAN chairs4. This is despite optimism publicly conveyed by the junta on potential normalization with the grouping5.
Key Regional Developments Alongside ASEAN Meetings Convened by Laos as 2024 Chair
Why It Matters
China and Russia both view Southeast Asia and ASEAN as battlegrounds in major power competition where they can build influence and relationships. Both countries are increasingly candid about this agenda. In their bilateral meeting, they said the trilateral was part of an effort to develop platforms given that “certain countries” had set up “restricted bloc-based” mechanisms6. To be sure, this understates lingering disagreements between them and exaggerates gains. For instance, ASEAN Wonk understands that a separate trilateral was held when Indonesia chaired ASEAN last year but messaging was distinct in nature and tone7. Nonetheless, the drive by both Beijing and Moscow to developing such mechanisms matters in a context where more ASEAN members will be engaged in institutions like the BRICS and SCO. It was no coincidence that Beijing and Moscow capitalized on optics to note that all three members of the trilateral were current rotating chairs of three groupings where alignment is sought: ASEAN (Laos); BRICS (Russia); and SCO (China)8. Russia Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also stopped by Malaysia which chairs ASEAN in 2025.
These developments feed into continuing anxieties within ASEAN about the geopolitical context under which outcomes are being shaped (see two originally generated ASEAN Wonk tables below on future geopolitical inroads to watch on specific areas and outcomes that are developing within the region under Laos’ chairmanship. Paying subscribers can also read on for more on what to expect and future implications in the “Prospects” section, as well as the remaining paid-only sections of the newsletter).