SCO Mekong Expansion Hype Rises Amid Southeast Asia BRICS Bids
Plus new defense firsts; ASEAN major power scrutiny; largest EV hub talk; quiet vessel transfer; nuclear pact launch; trillion sector opportunity & much more.
Greetings to new readers and welcome all to the latest edition of the weekly ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief! If you haven’t already, you can upgrade to a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year below to receive full posts by inserting your email address and then selecting an annual or monthly option. You can visit this page for more on pricing for institutions, groups as well as discounts. For current paid subscribers, please make sure you’re hitting the “view entire message” prompt if it comes up at the end of a post to see the full version.
For this iteration of ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief, we are looking at:
Assessing geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of hype around how some Mekong states fit into expansion plans for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization amid China’s current presidency amid inroads for previously discussed fora like the BRICS;
Mapping of regional developments, such as twin Australia-Southeast Asia defense cooperation firsts and Mekong summit diplomacy inroads;
Charting evolving geopolitical, geoeconomic and security trends such as major power contribution rankings; key nuclear agreement launch; and evolving ground perceptions on South China Sea crisis;
Tracking and analysis of industry developments and quantitative indicators including largest EV hub talk; quiet vessel transfer; new cross-border rail datapoint; coming trillion Indo-Pacific energy opportunity and more;
And much more! ICYMI, check out our take earlier this week on how the new Japan-Philippines RAA defense pact matters and what to watch in the coming weeks and months.
This Week’s WonkCount: 2,189 words (~10 minutes)
Mekong Diplomacy; Pitch Black Boost; Insurgency Spotlight & More

Major Power Rankings; Coming ASEAN Deliverables & Bridging Regional Stability Perception Gaps
“Japan gets the highest median rating on its contributions…Australia’s highest ratings come from adults in Japan, the Philippines and Thailand,” in terms of major power contributions to global peace and stability by “a great deal or fair amount,” notes a new report from the Pew Research Center centered on perceptions of China across 35 countries. Of the four ASEAN countries included, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand all see China as doing so equally or more so than Australia, India and Japan (80 percent in Thailand; 76 percent in Malaysia and 73 percent in Singapore). The exception is the Philippines, where both Australia and Japan are seen as contributing more (72 percent and 81 percent respectively) compared to China (57 percent). Southeast Asia-specific findings emerge across other categories as well including on territorial disputes, contributions China makes to the economy and perceptions of Xi Jinping (link).
Views of How Australia, China, India and Japan Contribute to Peace and Stability
“Currently, the Lao PDR, as the ASEAN chair, is working closely with all…in maximizing these priorities to transform ASEAN into a more connected and resilient community in line with our chairmanship theme,” notes the contribution from Laos’ permanent representative to ASEAN in a special edition set of commentaries on ASEAN dynamics in 2024 published by CSIS Jakarta in Indonesia. The edition also includes a range of other pespectives, including from the ASEAN Secretary-General and other ASEAN diplomats (link).
Select Expected ASEAN Chair Deliverables Under Laos 2024 Chairmanship
“The United States needs to limit its expectations of ASEAN to specific, achievable goals [and]…work within ASEAN structures so that those structures develop capacities,” argues a new report published by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network. The report suggests that ASEAN’s role as a convenor and coordinator can support U.S. goals for the region and regional stability in specific areas like climate change or cyber security despite the grouping’s limitations and the realities of intensified major power competition. It also suggests several other recommendations, including a mapping exercise (see image below) to clarify a more limited and bounded understanding of regional stability for various actors including ASEAN and the United States (link).
Preliminary Mapping of Select Key Regional Stability Components with Relevance for ASEAN and the US
SCO Mekong Expansion Hype Rises Amid Southeast Asia BRICS Bids
What’s Behind It
Cambodia’s government set out its plans for expanded engagement at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) after China assumed the rotating presidency1. Beijing assumed the role following the SCO Summit in Kazakhstan July 3-4 (see ASEAN Wonk graphic below on recent developments)2. Cambodia and Myanmar were also present at the first-ever SCO green forum in China July 83. The developments highlighted China’s prioritization of the grouping despite lingering challenges, including integrating countries through other bodies we have explored on ASEAN Wonk like the BRICS and selectively cooperating with Russia to advance Beijing’s global vision and help Moscow offset its post-Ukraine war isolation. The SCO began as a grouping comprising China, Russia and some Central Asian states in 2001. But it has expanded to include other members like India and Iran as well as observers and dialogue partners4. Its members often tout its size as the world’s largest regional organization accounting for over 40 percent of global population and about a quarter of GDP, even though questions largely surround its heft rather than its weight5.
Key Recent Developments Related to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
The development comes amid the focus on wider SCO expansion which includes and has key effects for Southeast Asia. This year’s SCO summit was touted as the first-ever “SCO Plus” format meet to highlight expansion efforts. ASEAN as a grouping is technically already linked up with the SCO, including via a prior institutional pact6. But in terms of individuals states, links have shown signs of expanding within the past year. Myanmar became an SCO dialogue partner just last year, with Naypyidaw looking to offset perceptions of its post-coup isolation. Deputy junta leader Soe Win represented the military government at the Qingdao forum, though he also quietly made another stop before his return to Naypyidaw7. Earlier this year, Laos also formally applied for dialogue partner status in a notable development that largely flew under the radar8. Cambodia has also continued to publicize its preexisting SCO status upgrade bid following leadership transition and has been playing this up amid recent engagements9.
Why It Matters
SCO expansion is one pathway through which China exercises influence to promote its regional vision including in Southeast Asia, and Beijing holds the 2024-2025 presidency at a pivotal time. The addition of Laos as a dialogue partner is significant in that it means that the majority of the five mainland Southeast Asian countries would be linked to the SCO10. This comes amid worries about some of the impacts of China’s growing influence in the Mekong to varying degrees by both Thailand and Vietnam which have seen themselves as regional leaders, despite the limits of bodies like the SCO11. Chinese officials have outlined rather ambitious initiatives for Beijing’s presidency, including setting up new defense platforms, advancing space and green cooperation as well as expanding local currency settlement to check dollar hegemony12. ASEAN Wonk has also been made aware of conversations on how Southeast Asian states can factor into some of these initiatives as they upgrade their status within the grouping.
Future inroads on SCO expansion including in Southeast Asia will partly be contingent on developments across key realms and touchpoints that will be important to monitor (see ASEAN Wonk table below for the current state of play and what to watch in the future. Paying subscribers can also read on for more on what to expect and future implications in the “Prospects” section).