Cambodia in China-US Spotlight with Austin Visit
Cambodia in China-US Spotlight with Austin Visit
Plus great power tilt reject; supply chain shocks; new trilateral birth; coming cross-regional pact; quiet maritime expansion; currency crash and much more.
Greetings to new readers and welcome all to the latest edition of the weekly ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief! If you haven’t already, you can upgrade to a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year below to receive full posts by inserting your email address and then selecting an annual or monthly option. You can visit this page for more on pricing for institutions, groups as well as discounts. For current paid subscribers, please make sure you’re hitting the “view entire message” prompt if it comes up at the end of a post to see the full version.
For this iteration of ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief, we are looking at:
Assessing the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of a key defense visit amid ongoing U.S.-China competition;
Mapping of regional developments, such as great power tilt reject; a coming summit test and new Indo-Pacific pact inroads;
Charting evolving geopolitical, geoeconomic and security trends such as supply chains shocks; a new trilateral birth and quiet maritime expansion;
Tracking and analysis of industry developments and quantitative indicators including a coming cross-regional pact; flying EVs and digital restrictions;
And much more! ICYMI, check out our review of a new book that examines the role of regions like Southeast Asia in Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
This Week’s WonkCount: 2,067 words (~10 minutes)
Great Power Tilt Reject; Coming Summit Test; New Indo-Pacific Pact Inroads & More
New Drill Metrics; Measuring the Dragon’s Economic Shadow & Tracing Supply Chain Shocks
“China has grown its combined-military exercises…establishing regular exercises with Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam and ASEAN as a collective among others,” notes a chapter in the 2024 iteration of the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment published by the IISS. Overall, the chapter notes that the United States continues to be the most significant exercise partner of choice for Asia-Pacific countries, engaged in 1,113 exercises with regional countries from 2003 to 2022 — most of them more complex and better tested — whereas China executed nearly 130 in the same period (link).
Selected Key Indo-Pacific Military Exercises, 2018-2023
“As the Marcos Jr administration diversifies its relationship and distances itself from Beijing, future PRC investments will likely mirror dynamics observed previously under Aquino,” notes a new report by AidData examining two decades of China’s development financing in the Philippines. The report provides several metrics that shed light on the mix of opportunities and risks in Beijing’s financing, around 94 percent of which was issued as high-interest debt rather than aid. 43 percent of China SOE implementers in the Philippines had been directly sanctioned by international finance institutions for questionable financial practices, and just under 40 percent of China’s development finance portfolio in the Philippines is associated with at least one type of ESG risk (link).
China-Funded Development Projects in the Philippines, 2000-2022
“In recent years, a succession of global shocks has tested the resilience of maritime supply chains,” argues the introductory section of multifaceted edition on shipping supply chains across the Indo-Pacific region which accounts for about 60 percent of global maritime trade shipping. The articles in the edition focus on a range of areas including submarine cables; hydrogen and clean energy; fisheries as well as maritime workers, piracy and counterterrorism (link).
Cambodia in the China-US Spotlight with Austin Visit
What’s Behind It
Despite the hype around Austin’s trip to Cambodia, it is just the latest example of ongoing U.S. outreach to Cambodia and Cambodia’s narrative around diversification1. Austin’s June 4 trip was a cabinet-level one which placed a rarer focus on defense ties after the Shangri-La Dialogue security forum in Singapore covered on ASEAN Wonk. But close observers know it is just the latest in a recent string of visits by U.S. officials more generally, with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Dan Kritenbrink visiting in February and U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN Yohannes Abraham making a trip in April2. These visits come amid an upcoming transition where Cambodia will be the coordinator of U.S.-ASEAN relations starting next month3. Austin’s visit also came during an active period in China-Cambodia ties, with both sides having just wrapped up military drills4.
The visit is the latest development highlighting Cambodia’s place in U.S.-China competition. U.S.-Cambodia defense ties were strained by what an official once described to ASEAN Wonk as “hitting the U.S.-China switch,” most clearly manifested in the second half of the 2010s, when Cambodia’s ruling party canceled U.S. exercises and demolished U.S.-built facilities at Ream Naval Base even as it kickstarted drills with China and leaned on Beijing for Ream upgrades as part of a bid to counter unprecedented 2013 opposition election gains. U.S. concerns remain, with evidence of Beijing’s military presence at Ream and China fears spilling over into issues like the Funan Techo canal.5 But since Hun Manet assumed the premiership in August 2023, Cambodian officials have intensified a diversification narrative to counter notions that Cambodia is a static China client state6. Such diversification is often easier said than done. But recent cases of reinforcement in existing relations include elevation of ties with South Korea to a strategic partnership in May, which referenced a first port call by the ROK Navy7.
Select Related Developments in Cambodia’s Ties with the United States and China
Why It Matters
Austin’s visit is an early test of U.S. attempts to manage strained relations with Cambodia and Phnom Penh’s diversification quest under Hun Manet. One official described the state of ties as still being in a period of “testing”8. Thus far, both sides have signaled low-hanging fruit in security ties, including basic interactions around HADR, demining, unexploded ordnance clearance and UN peacekeeping9. This may not eliminate U.S. concerns about security inroads Beijing can have via its friends as Washington focuses on more like-minded partners and pivotal “swing states.”10 But it could begin to build a base of cooperation after growing strain. For Cambodia, better U.S. ties in this sphere and in an overall sense — Washington is by far its largest export market, even if Beijing is its top trading partner — offers calibration to counter potential overdependence on any one power including China. This is not just a talking point. Overdependence can not only reduce Cambodia’s leverage, but also complicate its relationships with bigger mainland Southeast Asian states like Vietnam which are cautious about Beijing and isolate Phnom Penh within ASEAN.
Cambodia’s geopolitical and geoeconomic trajectory is also better understood by looking at not just U.S.-China interactions that dominate the headlines, but the country’s active engagement across and beyond the Indo-Pacific (see table below summarizing major datapoints, along with more on future prospects in the “Where It’s Headed” section. Paid subscribers can read on to remaining sections of our weekly ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief).
Select Key Partnership Developments and Notable Details to Watch
