Southeast Asia in 2025: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics FuturePoints
Looking ahead to five critical 2025 items to watch in Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific, with trends, datapoints, trendlines and much, much more.
Dear Readers - Today, we at ASEAN Wonk are pleased to launch the 2025 iteration of “FuturePoints,” our annual assessment of the top five geopolitical and geoeconomic datapoints and trendlines to watch impacting Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific region. This iteration looks at the top five developments for 2025. If you have not already, do consider subscribing below to receive full posts and support our work! And if you have already done so, do consider forwarding this to others who may be interested. Thank you for your support!
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WonkCount: 2,893 words (~13 minutes).
1. MURKY MINILATERAL FUTURES
Line of Sight
2025 will be a key marker in the evolution of minilateral partnerships within the broader Indo-Pacific institutional landscape. While there is often greater focus on U.S.-driven minilaterals like the U.S.-Japan-Philippines trilateral as part of what the outgoing Biden administration has termed a “latticework”, this is only one facet of a broader Indo-Pacific trend including in Southeast Asia where more countries are seeking new flexible arrangements in addition to bilateral or multilateral channels such as ASEAN1. This trend continued in 2024. Non-U.S. examples involving Southeast Asian states include the development of China’s Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Framework amid other regional mechanisms as well as South Korea joining the expanding Digital Economy Partnership Agreement initially grouping Singapore, Chile and New Zealand2.
Select Recent Major Minilateral Mechanism Developments in the Indo-Pacific Region
Over the Horizon
Looking ahead, the state of play across key geoeconomic and geopolitical minilaterals through the rest of the year will be a theme to watch. Geoeconomically, one key non-U.S. datapoint will be the evolution of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which comprises more than an eighth of global GDP and includes four ASEAN states in Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. Beyond China’s pending membership request to join a previously U.S.-led mechanism, the CPTPP’s quest to advance the pact amid trends ranging from rising digital connectivity to economic coercion risks will continue in 2025 with Australia hosing the next commission meeting after Canada this year3. Geopolitically, there will be scrutiny on changes in how an incoming Trump administration manages minilaterals linked to the U.S.-Philippine alliance and builds out partnerships in sectors like critical minerals where Southeast Asian states play an important role. This is despite the point made by seasoned U.S. officials that partnership networking has been a largely bipartisan strand of U.S. post-Cold War strategic thinking.
Under the Radar
Key institutional developments beyond new minilaterals will also be critical to monitor. The evolution of the BRICS in 2025 is one case in point. While several Southeast Asian states have already engaged with the expanding grouping, regional officials also privately acknowledge there are still major gaps between its soaring rhetoric as a platform for more inclusive multilateralism and messier realities including deep geopolitical divisions. Dynamics are expected to evolve somewhat when the presidency switches to Brazil in 2025 from Russia in 2024. As one official memorably told ASEAN Wonk after the recent BRICS meeting in Kazan, Russia, an overly narrow China-Russia lens ignores the reality that complex BRICS dynamics are also about “the other letters in the acronym.” Of course, minilateral proliferation is also one of several trends that ASEAN will take into account as the Indo-Pacific’s default multilateral diplomatic convener officially unveils its next community-building phase known as ASEAN Vision 20454.
2. BLARING MARITIME MEGAPHONES
Line of Sight
Voices of key Southeast Asian states will be amplified in 2025 following key foreign policy developments and domestic transitions. A confluence of crises in recent years have both reinforced Southeast Asia’s centrality within Indo-Pacific conversations as well as its importance in global debates ranging from “China+1” strategies to the Israel-Gaza War. As this has occurred, we have begun to see more activism from Southeast Asia’s leaders, the majority of which have taken office within the past couple of years. 2024 saw a continuation of this. Malaysia Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim continued an active cross-continental travel schedule (see ASEAN Wonk graphic below), while Indonesia President Prabowo Subianto lived up to speculation about an active foreign policy by visiting key capitals even before officially being inaugurated on October 20. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. became the first Philippine leader to keynote the Shangri-La Dialogue, while Vietnam kicked off the first regional forum of its kind in mainland Southeast Asia5.
Select Recent Notable Developments and Details in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy Engagements
Over the Horizon
Much of the focus will be on two consequential countries, though others will also be in the mix as well. Malaysia’s chairing of ASEAN in 2025 will put even more of a focus on Anwar’s views. Hype has been building up with his comments on initiatives like a new cross-regional trilateral6. But the bigger question is the extent to which we will see greater coherence on Malaysia’s broader foreign and security policy outlook given the changes since reviews were undertaken in these realms. Some officials argue that Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship theme of inclusivity and sustainability gives it flexibility to address issues that fall under various interpretations of those twin words. 2025 will also see more of a fleshing out of Prabowo’s active foreign policy agenda for Indonesia after a decade of his predecessor Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s more domestic-focused outlook. Beyond this, transition dynamics will also continue to play out across the region. For instance, Singapore will hold its first general elections under newly-installed Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, while the Philippines will carry out midterm elections that will be a datapoint in ongoing Duterte-Marcos tensions.
Under the Radar
The focus on foreign policy activism should not detract from the role of shifting domestic politics or unexpected developments. Those close to foreign policy decision-making are quick to point out that activism abroad among Southeast Asian states can also intensify questions at home around domestic institutional dynamics. To take just two examples, there are still questions over how Prabowo’s system of multiple deputy ministers will play out within the wider system of foreign policy decision-making, or how Anwar’s views translate into concrete foreign policy initiatives and are tied to core domestic priorities7. These dynamics extend to mainland Southeast Asia, whether it be the balance of power among new faces occupying Vietnam’s so-called four pillars as it heads closer to the 2026 party congress or questions on the sources of influence under Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s tenure in Thailand.
3. BIG GEOECONOMIC RECKONING
Line of Sight
2025 will be a year of reckoning for regional geoeconomics (see table and implications below). Southeast Asia’s status as the world’s fifth-largest economy powers its collective importance regionally and globally, even if that weight is unevenly distributed8. But regional policymakers also privately admit that seemingly neat suggestions of “China +1” supply chain movements and surging sectoral investments also obscure the serious and complex challenges and tradeoffs that they actually face.