What Did the Putin Vietnam Visit Achieve for Russia?

Between new outcomes and old ties, Putin's visit tested Vietnam's bamboo diplomacy and revealed contrasts between Hanoi and Moscow amid select shared interests.

The outcomes from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Vietnam reinforce the importance of parsing substance from the rich symbolism surrounding a key development in the traditional partnership and Hanoi’s bamboo diplomacy.

WonkCount: 2,012 words (~ 10 minutes)

Putin Vietnam Visit Spotlights Russia Role in Evolving Bamboo Diplomacy

Source: Russian Government Photo

Background

Putin’s long-speculated Vietnam trip had wider regional importance that is often missed — it is the first visit he has made to a Southeast Asian state since Russia's invasion of Ukraine (see our ASEAN Wonk table below of recent leader engagements with Putin). Thus far, while some ASEAN leaders have met Putin, they have done so in Russia or in other countries like China¹. Putin’s Vietnam state visit, paired with a North Korea stop and occurring weeks after he began his fifth six-year presidential term, signals Southeast Asia’s role in his more active search for partners to offset isolation amid Moscow’s inroads in the Russia-Ukraine war². Given this context, it is not surprising that warnings have surfaced to not “normalize” Putin’s past actions³. Beyond Putin’s Vietnam visit — which saw him meet top officials including its communist party chief, prime minister and president amid recent leadership changes — the region has factored into other aspects of Russia’s efforts, both on its own and with China. A case in point ASEAN Wonk has been noting is BRICS expansion. Russia is chairing the grouping this year which some ASEAN states have expressed interest in joining. The Kremlin’s hosting of the BRICS summit in October later this year presents Putin with another engagement opportunity⁴.

Select Recent Southeast Asia Leader Meetings with Putin Since Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Graphic by ASEAN Wonk Team

The visit reinforced an uneven relationship that remains important for Vietnam’s security despite consequential upgrades with other partners. For instance, during the press briefing with President To Lam, the fact that Putin had to cite an 8 percent bilateral trade increase in 2023 rather than the aggregate amount at just $3.6 billion — just over 2 percent of Hanoi’s trade with China at over $170 billion — spoke to the low baseline of aspects of ties in the economic realm, despite significance in sectoral areas such as energy investment⁵. Realities like these underscore the fact that as much as Russia has been a traditional partner for Vietnam and has sat atop Hanoi’s hierarchy of relationships along with China since 2012, Vietnam’s partners also vary in their significance across realms. This is even more the case now that Vietnam has been diversifying its ties as we have been noting on ASEAN Wonk, including most recently agreeing comprehensive strategic partnerships with the United States (September 2023); Japan (November 2023); and Australia (March 2024). That said, Russia does hold significance as the historically biggest source of Vietnam’s arms, which unsurprisingly received less publicity given sensitivities around sanctions after its Ukraine invasion, along with concerns on reliability amid closer Sino-Russian ties⁶. Indeed, beyond understandable public statements of concern we saw on the visit from some of Vietnam’s Western partners, the reality is that the most militarily capable state in the simmering South China Sea disputes partly deters China’s aggression with some key platforms sourced from Russia⁷.

Significance

The trip spotlighted the contrast between Russia’s attempt to leverage ties to boost its present isolated position and Vietnam’s cautious approach more focused on the traditional nature of ties and specific areas tied to its interests. In the public media briefing, Putin unsurprisingly held off on fierce anti-American sentiment that may have made his hosts uncomfortable⁸. As we have noted previously on ASEAN Wonk, as adroit as Vietnam has tried to be in balancing between major powers, intensified major power competition has tested Vietnam’s ability to both continue to develop ties with Western countries like the United States while also preserving relations with its so-called traditional partners China and Russia. The Russia-Ukraine war is a case in point, with scrutiny over everything from Hanoi’s UN votes to its absence — albeit unsurprising — at a peace summit last week⁹. Putin’s widely-circulated 20-paragraph op-ed tied to the visit was a case in point on the calibration required on Hanoi’s part: the piece paired seemingly logical functional areas of cooperation with strong language on the growing use of the Russian ruble and Vietnamese dong to phase out “widely discredited currencies” (read: the U.S. dollar)¹⁰. Russian state media also played up alignment on BRICS expansion and against interference in the Middle East, while billing Vietnam a “like-minded partner” in “equal and indivisible Eurasian security” —a contested term the Kremlin uses to characterize efforts by the West to strengthen its security at the expense of others.”¹¹

The visit also shed light on what to watch next in Russia’s ties with Vietnam and Southeast Asia more generally, and the evolving responses of regional states to Moscow’s engagement (see our four originally constructed ASEAN Wonk tables below on datapoints to monitor and key outcomes. As always, paid subscribers can also read on for more on what to watch in our “Prospects” section).

Stated Future Priority Areas and Initiatives Unveiled During Putin’s Russia Visit