Prabowo and Indonesia Defense Policy: What Change in Continuity?
Plus major diplomatic reshuffle; new defense hike; flashpoint hypocrisy allegations; data localization wars; cross-continental payment networks and much more.
Greetings to new readers and welcome all to the latest edition of the weekly ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief! If you haven’t already, you can upgrade to a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year below to receive full posts by inserting your email address and then selecting an annual or monthly option. You can visit this page for more on pricing for institutions, groups as well as discounts. For current paid subscribers, please make sure you’re hitting the “view entire message” prompt if it comes up at the end of a post to see the full version.
For this iteration of ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief, we are looking at:
Assessing the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of Indonesia’s likely defense policy contours under incoming president Prabowo Subianto and its regional implications (Note to Readers: ASEAN Wonk was on the ground this week in Indonesia for a conference as part of the latest regional swing through Southeast Asia. Most of the conversations we had on the ground were confidential and for a couple of separate projects, but we provide below in the latest WonkDive a snapshot of what we found by way of strategic significance);
Mapping of regional developments, such as Gulf connectivity spotlight; transition summitry; diplomatic reshuffling and more;
Charting evolving geopolitical, geoeconomic and security trends such as new defense hikes; data localization wars and cross-continental payment networking;
Tracking and analysis of industry developments and quantitative indicators including new artificial intelligence chatter; global energy anxieties and more;
And much more! ICYMI, check out our exclusive interview earlier this week with the Philippine coast guard commandant who is a leader in Manila’s transparency war against China in the South China Sea on where things stand and what lies ahead.
This Week’s WonkCount: 2,261 words (~ 10 minutes)
Gulf Connectivity; Stormy Waters; Transition Summitry & More
Defense Hike; Flashpoint Hypocrisy Allegations & Growth Bright Spots
“Total military spending in Asia and Oceania in 2023 [was] up by 4.4 percent…the regional increase was primarily driven by China and its neighbors: military spending rose in all countries in East Asia as well as in India,” notes the latest statistics on military spending released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The report notes that the rise is part of an uninterrupted upward trend dating back to at least 1989 and the end of the Cold War. Southeast Asia was among the subregions that saw a slight dip in spending, with the top 40 spenders featuring three countries all of which registered ranking drops: Singapore (23rd); Indonesia (27th) and Thailand (38th) (link).
Defense Spending by Region and Subregion
“In practical terms, this aid was just a drop in the ocean...however, this gesture carried great symbolic value for the people of Indonesia and for me as their president-elect,” defense minister and president-elect Prabowo Subianto wrote in a by invitation piece in The Economist touching on the significance of the April 9 Gaza humanitarian aid airdrop by the Indonesian Air Force right before the end of Ramadan and what he termed as Western double standards on Ukraine vs. Gaza. Though Prabowo’s arguments are not new, they will be closely read by those trying to decipher what his presidency may mean for Indonesia’s foreign policy on the international stage (link).
“Business leaders see the most growth potential in Southeast Asia,” notes a new report by Forbes and FedEx. 68 percent of business leaders surveyed across 250 firms based in the Asia-Pacific said Southeast Asia was the areas of greatest growth potential for their companies, outperforming other subregions within the Indo-Pacific including China (23 percent); Australasia (23 percent); and the North Pacific (9 percent) (link to summary; full report requires first providing personal information).
Forecasted Growth Potential By Region
Prabowo and Indonesia Defense Policy: What Change in Continuity?
What’s Behind It
Speculation has continued about Indonesia’s future defense policy under incoming president and current defense minister Prabowo Subianto, who will preside over a decisive few years in the fourth-largest country’s trajectory as an Indo-Pacific power. As noted previously on ASEAN Wonk, boosting Indonesia’s credibility as an Indo-Pacific power rests not just on its ability to sustain high growth rates or calibrating major power ties, but also developing its defense capabilities strategically. Or as one official put it to ASEAN Wonk on the sidelines of a Jakarta security conference last week, for all the talk of “fireworks” a Prabowo presidency may bring, how it will shape Indonesia’s “firepower” remains to be seen1. Meanwhile, Prabowo’s international engagement has continued, as we have showcased in this week’s BulletBrief. Prabowo joined outgoing President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo for the Indonesia-Singapore leaders’ retreat and met with Malaysia’s defense minister, spotlighting the state of ties with two important neighbors. His by-invitation article in The Economist also referenced Indonesia’s previous Gaza aid airdrop2.
Key Recent Indonesia Defense-Related Developments
Despite the focus on Prabowo himself, Indonesia’s defense policy challenges are longstanding and deeply structural. Prabowo has been an active defense minister given his tenure under a domestic-focused, economic-first president and constraints posed by COVID-19. He stepped up Indonesia’s security engagements and inked defense deals with a range of foreign partners, despite some hiccups as we saw with the embattled Mirage fighter jet deal from Qatar3. At the same time, periodic headline-making developments like a 20 percent defense budget increase last year conceal more deeply-rooted and well-documented challenges Prabowo will confront. These include downward revisions to targets Indonesia initially set for itself in its military modernization program known as the Minimum Essential Force or the inability to consistently spend even over 1.5 percent of its GDP on defense amid other economic priorities and fiscal concerns4.
Why It Matters
Despite the focus on Prabowo’s military past and record as defense minister, how policy will be implemented under his presidency remains an open question. Prabowo has both military experience and a record of holding the defense minister post. At the same time, even if he appoints close associates to key posts including in the defense ministry as speculation suggests, how his priorities are translated into policy will depend not just on his own networks or his classic temperamental style, but how this is fed through Indonesia’s sprawling defense bureaucracy5. Speaking to Indonesian defense watchers on the sidelines of a Jakarta conference last week, there are also outstanding policy questions, including how Prabowo’s projected strong hand will affect longstanding issues such as civil-military relations and inter-service competition in the context of traditional army dominance6. Strategic questions also remain. For instance, has Indonesia lacked an anchoring strategic vision over the past decade, with an initially promising candidate of Indonesia as a “global maritime fulcrum” between the Indian and Pacific Oceans losing momentum7.
A Prabowo presidency also raises the question of where we may see change and continuity in Indonesia’s defense policy trajectory. A closer look at some of these areas and metrics provides at least a sense of where we can expect areas of continuity and change (see table below, along with more on future prospects in the “Where It’s Headed” section. Paid subscribers can read on thereafter to the remaining sections of our weekly ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief, and free subscribers can subscribe anytime to receive full posts).