Episode 10: Deciphering Malaysia Foreign Policy Under Anwar Ibrahim

INTRODUCTION

ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the ASEAN Wonk Podcast, where we bring you expert insights on regional perspectives on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics. I'm your host, Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. And if you don't already, do subscribe to the ASEAN Wonk platform at www.aseanwonk.com so you don't miss all our posts. Our guest today is Dato Dr. Ilango Karuppannan, who has over thirty years of experience as a distinguished Malaysian diplomat, with posts that included a high commissioner in Singapore, acting ambassador in the United States, as well as ambassador in Lebanon, where Malaysia still maintains a role in the UN peacekeeping force amid escalating tensions in the Middle East.

We start our conversation talking about the role of Malaysia's Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in positioning the country geopolitically and geoeconomically amid US-China competition and the Gaza war. Make sure you watch, listen, and read the full episode as we go through a range of other subjects, including Malaysia's approach to flashpoints like the South China Sea and its coming agenda for the ASEAN chairmanship in 2025.

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ASSESSING MALAYSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the ASEAN Wonk Podcast, Ilango. Thank you for joining us, and let's get started with our conversation. I think a lot of ink has been spilled on Anwar's rhetoric and Malaysia's recent foreign policy moves, its rhetoric on the Israel-Gaza war and its interest in the BRICS. We were talking a little bit about this right before recording. Much of this is not really new, and it's a product of strands in Malaysian foreign policy. We saw coexistence, for example, during Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s time between Malaysia's non-aligned rhetoric and relations with the United States in some areas like security moving under the radar as well. So I guess the more interesting question to my mind is beyond Malaysia doing X or doing Y to benefit Power A or Power B, two years into Anwar's term, how do we really assess the Anwar government's ability to secure Malaysia's own interests in a more competitive and contested world? So we can go with individual metrics like how many trips has Anwar taken, which is quite a few. He's been very active after Malaysia's recent revolving door of prime ministers. We can look at foreign investment: there have been a number of tech investments that have been quite notable. But if we could just zoom out a little bit from these individual metrics and just ask the question, how would you assess Anwar's foreign policy so far? And if you could use a scale of one to ten or a letter grade as somebody who's been involved in Malaysia's diplomacy for decades and seen this firsthand, how do we go about assessing Anwar's performance on Malaysia's foreign policy?

Dr. Ilango Karuppannan: Thank you Prashanth for that question. Well, you're right. I've been a diplomat for over thirty-three years, and I'm also currently teaching a master's course at University of Malaya. So I think I shall use the grading system that they use at university to grade Dato Seri Anwar's performance. Well, in the University of Malaya they use seven out of ten or seventy percent as a passing mark for masters. So I will have to start by giving Dato Seri Anwar a passing mark, a seven out of ten. But seven out of ten is nothing to be really jumping about because you just basically cross the bar. You don't have to repeat the course. Now let me tell you why I think he deserves a seven upon ten. First, I think the effort. I think he's putting quite a bit of effort. Malaysia's foreign policy, I mean, has been there's been a display of active diplomacy under his premiership. You must also know that Dato Seri Anwar is actually now the longest serving prime minister in the last six years or so. It's very strange to hear that, but he is actually the longest serving prime minister. And therefore, that has given him the chance to be a bit more active on the foreign policies. I mean, we have seen Anwar actively engaging by visiting practically all the ASEAN countries. That's a good thing. He has visited China a few times. He has been active on the Middle East issue. He has spoken about some of the Global South issues as well. So I think on the part of active diplomacy he deserves quite good marks. So that's one.

Number two, I think there is a certain problem because it seems to be a little bit unbalanced, all these efforts that he's put in so far. There seems to be, of course, a lot more emphasis on China, which, of course, we can understand it because China is a very close neighbor, huge trading partner and so on and so forth. Plus it's easier to travel to China than to travel to America, for example. You know, there's a lot more ground to cover, a lot more issues, a lot more preparation. So he's not been to the United States except for the UNGA session. So I think that's a little bit unbalanced on that part. There seems to be a lot of emphasis on the Muslim world so that also adds to that notion that there is a bit of imbalance here. Thirdly, I think as far as strategic gains are concerned, one would be hard pressed to find whether there has been significant strategic gains. For example, we are still not out of the woods insofar as China is concerned. I mean, with all the effort that has been put with China, one would have expected a bit more smooth sailing with China, but, unfortunately, we are still not there. You know, the Chinese side still goes on to the same position. You are aware that they have issued protest notes against Petronas' explanation for gas and oil over the South China Sea issue and so on and so forth. So there is an impression that there is not so much strategic gains that we would have expected. So on these three grounds, I think I would give him a pass mark, a seven out of ten, Prashanth.

MALAYSIA AND REGIONAL STAKES IN INTENSIFYING MAJOR POWER COMPETITION

ASEAN Wonk: Great. Thanks. A lot there that you mentioned, and I like how you distinguish between the fact that there's a lot of activity – and Prime Minister Anwar deserves some credit for that – and the big issue, as you pointed out, which is the extent to which this is producing strategic benefits for Malaysia and to what extent this is producing those benefits across the various relationships that Malaysia has. And that's, China, the United States, but also, as you mentioned, the Global South, the developing world, and a lot of these major strands in Malaysian foreign policy that's very complex. I guess one more specific aspect of that is what you've mentioned already, which is this environment of US-China competition. I think part of it is US-China competition being much more intensified, but frankly, it's also a much more complex and fractured global order. So we're talking about more protectionist sentiment, a lot more pressure on multilateral organizations, including ASEAN and the United Nations. In this competitive environment, there's sometimes a tendency to try to place Southeast Asian countries on, you know, if there's a US China spectrum, where do you fall? Do you fall on this side or that side? I'm less interested in that and more interested actually in a conversation about how Malaysia is navigating this environment relative to its other Southeast Asian neighbors. And you kind of hinted at this earlier.

So for example, when we're thinking about the relationship with the United States, both Indonesia and Vietnam have been able to get upgrades with the United States and engage with a mix of diverse partners on ecosystems on emerging technologies. Malaysia has been able to get some of those technology related investments, uh, from companies, including US companies. But the high-level engagement with the United States, partly because of the Gaza issue, hasn't been in place. Right? So some might say, in terms of strategic positioning, Malaysia is losing out. Others have said, frankly, who cares? So as long as Malaysia is getting in some of these tech investments, and Malaysia can kind of reposition itself after U.S. elections in any case. But I guess the big question for me in all of this is, Malaysia's own strategic value. And you pointed to this earlier, which is if you're a naval planner, it's hard to miss that Malaysia is not strategically positioned next to the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. If you are a strategist sitting in Beijing, you would see Malaysia as being a vital part of your strategy in Southeast Asia because maritime Southeast Asia is not very hospitable historically towards China. So if China were to be able to get a toehold in Malaysia in maritime Southeast Asia, that would affect general strategic planning in the competitive landscape. And the other aspect that you would look for is what you talked about with Malaysia's engagements with China. If you're planning any kind of infrastructure or connectivity with railroads, Malaysia is a place where you get connectivity from Thailand and Malaysia, which connects mainland Southeast Asia with maritime Southeast Asia. So for me, my big question is how do we kind of define Malaysia's strategic value in this US-China competition? Because sometimes I feel like in the headlines, there's a lot of focus on Malaysia as a semiconductor hub, or one or two of these other focus areas. But given your diplomatic experience and expertise, including having served in in the United States, how would you see defining Malaysia's strategic value? And then how do we understand how Malaysia is leveraging that strategic value in this US-China competition for its own interest?

Dr. Ilango Karuppannan: Yeah, so what is our strategic outlook here and how are we leveraging all of them, right? Number one, well, honestly, I'm looking at it from a diplomatic perspective. I understand that the noises coming out from the media world is somewhat distorted because they have a certain audience that they want to project their views to. Right? So I think there's a little bit more of trying to oversell things rather than or rather put it up in a more sensationalist perspective. But I really haven't seen a great big shift in terms of our strategic outlook say from the times of Dr. Mahathir's time all the way now. Generally, we look at it this way. I mean, we, I think, are very strongly wedded to the idea that we cannot take sides. That's for sure. We understand the value of having excellent relationship with the United States. It's true. It's a bit unfortunate that I suppose timing is also part of the problem that we have not been able to engage as much as we should have with the United States right now.

I've been talking to some of my American colleagues here. I think there's been a missed chance for a telephone conversation early in the days of when Anwar became prime minister that would have sort of settled down. There are all these niggling questions here whether we are thinking differently about America or not. So that's not true. We are still in the same way with America. And I want to add that there is also a strategic dialogue at the senior officials level with Malaysia. I mean, between Malaysia and the United States. Because of COVID, it had been put on hold for a number of years. It is restarting. So that's actually a very strong indicator that we value the relationship and we intend to, you know, prep it up. So this is the way Malaysia has always been dealing with the United States. While it's very difficult for us to have very high-level engagement with the US because of many structural constraints, timing-wise and, you know, logistics etcetera, but we try to bolster this with high quality or good quality relationship at the officials level. With the defense ministry, I think there's a good relationship going on. I just read in the news the other day that the US has handed over a Coast Guard cutter to Malaysia, you know, to obviously to patrol its waters. And the reason why Malaysia has taken it up is I think quite clear too because we do not intend to allow China to push us off our rights of patrolling our territory. I mean, EEZ, for example. So I think in the past, we have been a bit lucky because this competition between the US and China has been rather benign, so it did not put us into the spotlight. The current problem really is not us. I think the problem is actually because of the intensification of this rivalry between the United States and China, and unfortunately the spotlight is also shining on us now. The question is how are we dealing with it? The problem is we are dealing with it exactly as we've been dealing with it for the last twenty, thirty years. The question is the spotlight is now shining on us and we are trying to explain it.

So with China, our relationship has also been the same, but it has become substantially difficult. The Chinese are also now very much aware that they also have to put up a strongman show out there to show that they are not seen as soft or being pushed over or being overly aligned with Malaysia. That's also to their interest. So there is a whole lot of things going on. Nobody wants to be seen as being aligned anywhere. At the same time, you need to balance things by showing that I'm still not giving up my right to work any of these claims or any of these things. So to cut short a very long rambling answer of mine, I think the way the Malaysia looks at things has not changed, number one. We are still keeping up the same methodology that we have always used. That is while in between high-level contact between the ministers and the prime minister, the leaders, we try to have good quality senior official level communication going on. And I have not seen any evidence – not a single piece of evidence – that that has gone wrong. That is still going on very well.

In terms of investments, as far as you said, I think the numbers show that the US is probably now leading as the long-term overall investor in this part of the world and that also seems to me is not changing when I talk to the chambers of commerce people. I think there's still the strong interest going on. Furthermore, with this interest of diversifying or moving away the semiconductors industries now back to this part of the world, Penang, for example, has become a sought-after destination. So from the strategic outlook, from the economic side, from the investments, they all are good. I think where there is a serious problem is because there is also a huge problem going on in the Middle East. And Malaysia, unfortunately, because of the very strong position that we have taken on the Middle East for the longest time, we just cannot remain silent. So Anwar is compelled to speak about it. Maybe he's spoken about it about a bit more than others would have done so. So that also adds to the optics that perhaps Malaysia has a certain different view with the American side. But I would want to assure your listeners that from my perspective, looking at it objectively as a diplomat, I do not see a great big divergence yet.

ASEAN’S TRAJECTORY IN 2025 AND BEYOND

ASEAN Wonk: I think that's very helpful, because, given your experience, you framed it as a very multilevel reality. At least the US diplomats that I talked to would agree that there were initial lost opportunities to engage the Anwar government early on. And then, obviously, the crisis took place in the Middle East last year in October. And that lost opportunity then made things a little bit more challenging, um, on that front. I think you also noted very clearly there that there is that recognition on both sides, it's fair to say. I think if you talked to diplomats on the Malaysian side as well as on the US side, there are a lot of things going on in the relationship. Maybe they're going on quietly, but it doesn't mean that if there aren't these sort of high level upgrades that there isn't anything going on. You mentioned maritime security, which is extremely critical, still going on. There was an exercise, Keris Strike, that the US conducted with Malaysia and Australia that took place a few months ago as well. So, you know, there are a lot of things that are happening irrespective. And as you pointed out as well, US engagement is more than just this high level or leader level engagement. US companies engage extensively in Southeast Asia, including Malaysia as well. So there's that dynamic as well to recognize. I also think it's hard to quantify, but I think there have been a couple of public instances where actually the Anwar government has sort of had to tamp down some of the Israel Gaza sentiment. For example, there was a defense exhibition and there was some Malaysian pushback or backlash against the involvement of US and US-linked companies and Israeli-linked equipment and so on and so forth. And the Anwar government came out quite clearly and said that we understand that there's Middle East sentiment issues here, but we also have very clear economic equities and defense equities in this relationship. And so I think you can't just focus on some aspects of the government where they're playing it up and then not focus on the aspects where they're tamping it down. It's also a bit of a balancing act domestically for Malaysia, but I think sometimes that's missed in the headlines as well.

I wonder if we could move on to talk a little bit about Malaysia's upcoming ASEAN chairmanship in 2025. And here, we're very fortunate to have you because you can talk about this from a very historical perspective because back when Malaysia was doing its chairmanship back in 2005, you were involved actually in some of the major deliverables and developments that happened during that chairmanship. One was the East Asia Summit, which was a very important mechanism through which ASEAN engages major powers, which has also given rise to some of the things we hear every year about whether the U.S. president is attending this meeting or not. But also, the ASEAN Charter, which is an extremely important mechanism. Malaysia played a role later in helping institutionalize some of these ASEAN mechanisms. So I wanted to get your perspective in particular because you were actually involved in this period. I think one view might be that this period was sort of the heyday of ASEAN, the 2000s where ASEAN was really active. There was this institutionalization agenda. It was actually ahead, you could argue, of this Indo-Pacific game because the East Asia Summit was about engaging not just, the ASEAN Plus Three, but also, you know, India, the US, so on and so forth. But then, I guess, even multilateralists today, like Indonesia's former foreign minister Marty Natalegawa, have argued that since then, it's become more challenging for ASEAN in the 2010s and the 2020s in this environment of intensifying US-China competition. I still remember Pak Marty was proposing this idea of an Indo Pacific Treaty in the 2010s, and it didn't really go anywhere unfortunately. And then ASEAN was behind the curve. And after all these Indo-Pacific strategies, it had to come up with the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific, for example. So help us set the context for Malaysia's ASEAN chairmanship. I mean, we're talking about this ASEAN vision twenty 2045 and so on and so forth. But from your perspective of somebody who's worked on these issues, where is ASEAN today, and what is the ASEAN that Malaysia is inheriting with the ASEAN chairmanship?

Dr. Ilango Karuppannan: Thank you. I can talk all day long about ASEAN because as you mentioned, I've been involved in this so deeply. You made also a very good observation…

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