[Note: This is the free preview within the dedicated podcast section of the ASEAN Wonk website, with the full version in a post published on June 12, 2025 available to our paying subscribers. This is not meant to serve as new content and is part of our free preview content within the dedicated website podcast section].
INTRODUCTION
ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the ASEAN Wonk Podcast where we bring you expert insights and regional perspectives on Southeast Asia and Indo Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics. I'm your host, Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. If you haven't already, do subscribe to the ASEAN Wonk Platform at www.aseanwonk.com. Our guest today is Andrew Goledzinowski, who previously served as a senior career Australian diplomat with several posts within Southeast Asia, including as ambassador to Vietnam, high commissioner to Malaysia, as well as the first assistant secretary at the Southeast Asia regional division in Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
We will start our conversation talking about recent developments in Australia's ties with Southeast Asia. Be sure to tune in as we go through a range of other subjects, including the future of Australia's strategy in Southeast Asia, the role of China and minilaterals in diplomatic engagement as well as the shifting regional geoeconomic landscape.
Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always!
GRADING AUSTRALIA SOUTHEAST ASIA ENGAGEMENT TODAY
Welcome to the podcast Ambassador and let’s get started. We've seen Australia record some notable wins in its engagement with Southeast Asia. There was a second special summit held last year, as well as upgrades with countries including Vietnam which you were involved in as well. At the same time, there are some limitations as well and challenges within Australia's wider approach. For example, on economic ties, there was a government commissioned report on investment in Southeast Asia that noted that Southeast Asia is just over three percent of Australia's investment stocks abroad, and there needs to be a lot more work to be done in that domain. I guess we can start with how you assess or grade Australia's Southeast Asia strategy? And you can use any sort of scale you want, whether it's a letter grade or a scale of one to ten.
Ambassador Andrew Goledzinowski: Gosh, that's a good question, Prashanth. I haven't been asked that one before. Well, look, from my point of view, our relations with Southeast Asia are as good as they ever have been. So from that point of view, I guess the relative trajectory and performance is very good. And you would have to say that the student is improving. But in absolute terms, it's not good enough, to be honest. I think I would give Australia a solid B. And the reason is that it's increasingly obvious that our future lies in the region, and our engagement has been successful but insufficient, I would say. And there are a lot of datapoints that suggest this.
I mean, politically, we're doing very well. You referenced the second special summit. And, you know, the fact that we can convene these, that the leaders come, that they all recognize that Australia is an important player in the region, is valuable, is worth engaging. Those are all positives. And I would say the sort of the less tangible atmospherics – the vibe, if you like – is also very good. The relationship is respectful. There are no major irritants, and all that is positive.
But as I say, it's not really enough. You referenced the fact that three percent of our overseas investments are in Southeast Asia. That is a damning data point, I think. For a country that is as open as Australia is, we're a trading nation. We rely very much on open communication and commerce. We have been sort of skipping over Southeast Asia for far too long. And there are some good reasons for that. Our institutions that invest are generally the big ones. It's our pension funds, which are ginormous: they have something like four trillion dollars in assets under management. Our big publicly-listed companies – the big four banks, for example –and the others, they tend to be very conservative investors. They prefer to invest in Australia or in North America, and they are not looking for big returns. They would prefer to be safe rather than get rich fast.
And that holds us back a little bit. Because in Southeast Asia, you have to be prepared to take a little bit of risk. And most importantly, you have to be prepared to get involved. You know, we tend to sort of do things from over here and then eventually make an investment decision and then move over into Southeast Asia in a cautious way. But as I sometimes say, investing in Southeast Asia is a bit like crossing the road in Hanoi. And if you've been to Hanoi, you know that you can't plan it from the curb. You have to step out into the traffic and have confidence that you will navigate your way across. And invariably, you do. But it does require that first step, and we in Australia tend to be just a little bit chary of that.
“[A]s I sometimes say, investing in Southeast Asia is a bit like crossing the road in Hanoi. And if you've been to Hanoi, you know that you can't plan it from the curb. You have to step out into the traffic and have confidence that you will navigate your way across. And invariably, you do. But it does require that first step…”
DIRECTION OF TRAVEL IN BILATERAL AND SECTORAL ENGAGEMENT
ASEAN Wonk: Right. That's a great analogy on the sort of leap of faith amidst the motorcycles in Hanoi. You mentioned this notion of the vibe or the atmospherics or the narrative, which I actually think is a really important point. And for Australia, there have been a whole host of announcements in the past couple of years – a new green and digital shipping corridor with Singapore, work that was done with Vietnam to upgrade the relationship, and you just saw the Australian prime minister in Indonesia just after being elected in his first foreign trip talk about some of the economic opportunities with the Prabowo government. Given your perspective of having served in several of these different countries and also looking at the region regionally, what would you say about some of the notable movements on direction of travel, whether it's with respect to countries or sectors for Australia strategy in Southeast Asia?
Ambassador Andrew Goledzinowski: Well, I would say government is leading the way. You've referenced some of the initiatives. You've referenced that the prime minister himself has chosen to focus on Southeast Asia. The thing is, you know, it can't just be the government. We need the business sector. We need civil society. We need universities and others to also engage. And I think that's going to happen. It's beginning to happen. Of course, it's been happening for many years at one level. But as I said, I think it's inadequate given our geographic circumstances and the historical times we live in. Inevitably, we need to focus more on Southeast Asia.
Now we've been a bit distracted with the Pacific for good reasons. The Pacific is our backyard. It's the region where we feel that we can make the biggest impact. And the sort of strategic competition that has been developing in that part of the world has engaged us very strongly. So a lot of political capital, a lot of resources, money, but also people. The number of people that DFAT now has in our office of the Pacific compared to when I was working in the Pacific is quite extraordinary. And that comes at an expense, right? Because it's almost a zero-sum game. The more effort and attention you pay to one region, the less you have for the rest. I think that'll rebalance over time. And I've always believed that our fundamental strategic interests as well as our economic interests do lie in Southeast Asia.
And so the direction of travel, as you put it, I'm starting to see some small, not shifts, but accelerations. So in the university sector, a number of universities are now talking about either establishing or reviving or refreshing their Southeast Asian think tanks – the centers that they have focusing on Southeast Asia. I'm beginning to see more interest from the superannuation community. When I was in Vietnam just middle of last year, we hosted a big delegation of superannuation players who also went to Indonesia and elsewhere. It was kind of a very preliminary testing of the waters because their mandates are very restrictive. And Vietnam isn't yet even considered an emerging economy in terms of its ratings as an investment destination. But they're starting to show interest, and I think that will continue to accelerate.
The other way also is positive. Southeast Asia kind of knows us better than we know them, and partly because we have a huge alumni community there. I mean, Malaysia, we were just talking about, it's somewhere north of four hundred thousand people have studied in Australia or studied at Australian universities in Malaysia. That creates an enormous body of goodwill and interest in Australia. You know, I'm hoping that our more restrictive student policies now in Australia don't impinge negatively on that because it's that kind of people-to-people knowledge, confidence, and familiarity which then does enable other things like investment to happen.
VALUE PROPOSITION AND STRATEGIC NARRATIVE
ASEAN Wonk: You talked there about a very important component, which is the multistakeholder and multidimensional nature of Australia's engagement. And I think we've seen that even in some of the special summit engagements: Australia clearly messaging this about being not just about things like maritime security, for example, which are really important, but also students and bringing in the business sector. So there is clearly an attempt to do that. At the same time, as you're aware, in the region, there are pockets or circles where Australia is still perceived as either having a foreign policy and an approach that still is weighted too much towards the U.S. alliance, or perhaps having interests that lie elsewhere in other parts of the Indo-Pacific, like the Pacific, as you mentioned. How would you assess how Australia is doing with respect to articulating its value proposition and strategic narrative in the region? Because this is something that all of the countries are facing. It's a very crowded region where a lot of actors are trying to be involved. But it does also put more pressure on governments to define what exactly they're contributing relative to others.
Ambassador Andrew Goledzinowski: Yeah, that's a really good question. And it's true. I think the Southeast Asians sometimes scratch their heads a bit about Australia. But that's okay. You know, Dick Woolcott, former distinguished ambassador to Indonesia and elsewhere, the UN and secretary of foreign affairs, he once put it like this. He said, Australia is not the odd man out in Southeast Asia; we're the odd man in. And I like that.
And remember too that Southeast Asia is probably the most diverse subregion in the world. You know, religion, economic models, political traditions, it's really quite an extraordinary grouping of countries. And therefore, for us to be in there as well – not as a member of ASEAN, but as a sort of a member of the broader family – I don't think it's too odd a fit at all.
“Dick Woolcott, former distinguished ambassador to Indonesia, he once put it like this. He said, Australia is not the odd man out in Southeast Asia; we're the odd man in. And I like that. And remember too that Southeast Asia is probably the most diverse subregion in the world…for us to be in there as well – not as a member of ASEAN, but as a sort of a member of the broader family – I don't think it's too odd a fit at all.”
In terms of our value proposition, it's often been said that our sort of Western political culture and our ties to the US are a net asset for the region and seen as a net asset by those who engage with us. I think that has by and large been true. That might be changing now somewhat. But I think by and large, that sort of element of our strategic personality has long been accepted, and it's understood to be part of the package. But we are genuinely a first world country with first world offerings in services and technology, education, etcetera.
So those things are valued. The fact that we are committed to the region, I think, is valued because the United States, although it's important and seen as important, it's not been seen as a reliable ally. Whereas Australia, you know, we're not going anywhere. We're in this region for the long haul, and I think that's understood as well. So those are all positives. And I think people realize too that we mean no harm. That sounds a bit sort of maybe faint praise, but, you know, by and large, I think people do understand Australia and understand that our intentions are good even if occasionally the way we express ourselves may not always be, you know, ideal.
FUTURE ENGAGEMENT AREAS TO WATCH
ASEAN Wonk: I wanted to move the conversation forward a little bit in terms of where Australia's engagement and strategy may be headed in Southeast Asia. As we both just alluded to, we've seen a new Australian government that was just sworn in last month after the elections. And now that you're out of government, I'm wondering what you see as some of the specific next steps that Australia could prioritize in Southeast Asia – whether it's perhaps in your view unfinished business or new areas – in the coming years within, as you say, very dynamic and diverse region like Southeast Asia?
Ambassador Andrew Goledzinowski: Well, I mean, I think the political platforms are all in place. You know, we are a member in good standing of all the different groupings within the region that we might possibly want to join, and that's good. So we have the channels for dialogue and communication, etcetera.
Where we need to do more, I think – and, again, it's sort of consistent with our trajectory, but it needs to continue – is in the geostrategic defense security engagement. And I think there's a big market for that because the world and the region is becoming less certain and more complex and more dangerous, and also in the economic space for the same reasons. You know, the previous coalition government, I think, had an entirely appropriate and effective engagement with Southeast Asia. I think the current Albanese government is continuing that, but maybe with just a little bit more, I don't know, a bit more warmth. I think there's a different sort of style, which, maybe it's Penny Wong as our foreign minister, who's number three in the government and, of course, was born in Malaysia and knows the region very well. I don't know what it is, but I think it's very positive.
And so we've had this initiative as you referenced. It's called “Invested,” and the idea is for the government to actively lead Australian business to investing in Southeast Asia. There are several difficulties. One is that we have another initiative of this government, which is called Made in Australia, which predates the new US administration's current obsessions. But it does reflect the fact that we slightly overdid the offshoring of manufacturing and the deskilling of that sector in our economy. We became effectively a resource country and a services country, and the manufacturing sort of fell away. And that has to be rebalanced. But you have this difficult dichotomy now where, at the same time, we're urging companies to invest in Australia, but also to invest offshore. And different agencies of government have the job of promoting these two sometimes inconsistent policy impulses. So we'll see how that goes. But those are the important areas.
Going back to the geostrategic again, you know, we are a growing military entity. You've seen the commitments to grow our defense budget to 2.4 percent of GDP by 2030, and we've seen the US urge us to go further than that. The prime minister has said that he's not that interested in the sort of percentage numbers. He thinks that's kind of artificial. His point is you decide what capabilities you need, and then you fund them rather than sort of working towards a number. Either way, it means that we will become an even more useful and valuable potential partner for the region than we have been. And it's not just hard power like military platforms. It's also intelligence. It's situational awareness. It's the training and cooperation we provide in areas like maritime domain awareness and maritime law. All of that, I think, is increasingly interesting for the region because they're interested in hedging. They're interested in maybe mitigating their reliance on the US, which maybe is less certain than it has been in the past.
So there's a lot of different bits and pieces there. I mentioned the universities. You know, I'm more and more convinced that the Australian university sector has a huge role to play in Southeast Asia. I think we're only just beginning to scratch the surface of what is achievable there. And it's not just the traditional model of selling education services, attracting students to come to Australia, spend three or four years here, drop a bit of money into the university coffers, and then leave again. I think it's more. It’s going to be deeper than that, and it'll include technology.
So Vietnam. I was recently in Vietnam to receive an honorary degree, and the speech I made was around the fact that Vietnam's ambition is to train 50,000 software engineers by the end of this decade and to create a genuinely competitive and viable semiconductor industry. To do that, they need a lot of help. Prime Minister Chinh has always said that there are three major hurdles for Vietnam to attain high income status. One is infrastructure, and they're working on that now. You've seen some very ambitious announcements on infrastructure, including high speed railways, etcetera. The second is technology. And, you know, one of the last important people I met in Vietnam before I left was Jensen from Nvidia [CEO Jensen Huang]. And, you know, those sorts of companies are now looking to Vietnam as a serious option. So technology can come quite fast if you've got the enabling environment. But the third obstacle, and that's where the universities come in, is training the people, and that takes years. You cannot fast track that. You know, high quality education is something which needs to be planned and rolled out over a period of time.
And I think that the answer for Vietnam, for example, to kind of make that transition into a high technology future is to create an even stronger university environment where technology universities in particular come together with industry and government and create new pathways for research and training and exchange and partnership. I'm going be doing some writing about that in the next little while, but I honestly think that there are new ways to do this which have not yet been fully explored. And Australia, unless we really drop the ball, we should be at or near the front of that.
CALIBRATING REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT AND DIPLOMACY
ASEAN Wonk: Great. You mentioned the geostrategic picture and the defense realm. And I did note that when Australia released its national defense strategy last year, one of the pillars there was partnerships, and Southeast Asia was placed as one of the priority regions within that. I'm wondering how you think about this notion of how Australia calibrates between the various ways in which it engages in the security space: bilateral relationships like with the Philippines, ASEAN relationships and minilaterals institutions like AUKUS and the Quad. I’ve long said there doesn't necessarily have to be a zero-sum perception between all of these. But there are some challenges as you know in making sure you're messaging, prioritizing, resourcing all of these mechanisms. And sometimes I feel like officials in some countries are running to all of these proliferating meetings. How do you think about this notion of how Australia calibrates all of these partnerships and developments in the region in the security space?
Ambassador Andrew Goledzinowski: Well, I think….
[Note: This is the end of a free preview podcast, with the full version in an earlier post published on June 12, 2025 available to our paying subscribers. This is not meant to serve as new content and is part of our free preview content within the dedicated website podcast section].
Share this post