Malaysia China-US Imbalance in Focus After Li Qiang Visit
Plus BRICS-OECD twin bids; widening great power gaps; Russia defense pact talk; new power plan; finance contagion risks; growing debt burden and much more.
Greetings to new readers and welcome all to the latest edition of the weekly ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief! If you haven’t already, you can upgrade to a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year below to receive full posts by inserting your email address and then selecting an annual or monthly option. You can visit this page for more on pricing for institutions, groups as well as discounts. For current paid subscribers, please make sure you’re hitting the “view entire message” prompt if it comes up at the end of a post to see the full version.
For this iteration of ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief, we are looking at:
Assessing the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of touted inroads in China-Malaysia relations following a long-speculated visit;
Mapping of regional developments, such as South China Sea fallout; BRICS-OECD twin bids and cross-subregional sector spotlight;
Charting evolving geopolitical, geoeconomic and security trends such as widening great power gaps; Russia defense pact talk and growing debt burden;
Tracking and analysis of industry developments and quantitative indicators including new power plan; finance contagion risks; coming Mekong tech and more;
And much more! ICYMI, check out our post evaluating the wider significance of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Vietnam and its implications for Russia’s influence in Southeast Asia and Hanoi’s bamboo diplomacy.
This Week’s WonkCount: 2,103 words (~ 10 minutes)
South China Sea Fallout; BRICS-OECD Twin Bids & Cross-Subregional Sector Spotlight

New Aid Warning; Changing Pacific Perceptions & Widening Great Power Gaps
“After a pandemic-related surge in support, total official development finance to the region fell to a new low of $26 billion,” according to a new iteration of the Southeast Asia Aid Map published by the Lowy Institute. The report notes that funding volumes to Southeast Asia have fallen to the lowest level since 2015, and that apart from the World Bank, top development partners including China, Japan and South Korea have all decreased spending (link).
Official Development Finance by Select Major Development Partners (Spent in Constant 2022 $US)
“New Zealanders continue to have stronger self-assessed knowledge of North Asia than of Southeast Asia or South Asia,” notes a new report published by the Asia New Zealand Foundation. Just over half (53 percent) say they know at least a fair amount about North Asia, compared with 39 percent knowing at least a fair amount about Southeast Asia and 30 percent knowing at least a fair amount about South Asia. That said, Southeast Asia did see an 8 percent increase on this front relative to 2022 (link).
Percentage of New Zealanders Who Know At least a Fair Amount About Asia Sub-Regions
“Thai people perceive a widening gap between China and the U.S. in the future…the only other country that is seen to be growing in influence is Japan,” per report findings on Thai public views on international affairs released by the Asia Foundation, drawing on survey findings with 1,650 urban adult Thai citizens throughout the country from July to November 2023. Among other notable powers, India, the United Kingdom and South Korea have small increases of one percent each, while the European Union sees a slight decline. The report includes a range of other questions, including on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and priorities for the Thai government (link)
Comparison of Most Influential Powers: Today and 10 Years in Future
Malaysia China-US Imbalance in Focus After Li Qiang Visit
What’s Behind It
Malaysia’s ties with China took center stage this week with the official visit of Chinese Premier Li Qiang June 18-20. This was a step short of a trip by President Xi Jinping that had earlier been speculated, following Anwar’s two visits to China in 2023. During his trip to Malaysia following stops in Australia and New Zealand, Li met top Malaysian officials and both sides signaled inroads on cooperation amid the symbolism of the 50th anniversary of China-Malaysia diplomatic ties1. This comes just as Malaysia is set to assume the role of ASEAN-China dialogue partner coordinator in a few weeks and transitions to ASEAN chair for 2025, as we have been noting on ASEAN Wonk. Ahead of the visit, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who has been vocal on the subject of U.S.-China competition, made headlines when he disclosed the country’s intent to join the BRICS named after initial members Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa2.
Notable Quotes on China and the United States by Malaysia Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in June 2024
Li Qiang’s visit came as Malaysia continued to refute allegations that it is leaning towards China amid U.S.-China competition (see the above ASEAN Wonk graphic). In remarks at a China-Malaysia business event tied to Li’s visit, Anwar refuted “the basic question” he often heard in the West as to whether closer ties with China “would be at the expense of Malaysia as a small nation,” even though he acknowledged unspecified “more contentious” issues that existed between the two countries3. As we have been noting on ASEAN Wonk, though China has been Malaysia’s top trading partner for 15 years and is a rising investor, issues such as China’s involvement in the past 1MDB scandal and participation in Malaysia’s evolving 5G ecosystem have drawn scrutiny on the country’s position as a relatively loosely aligned middle power amid U.S.-China competition. There are also lingering concerns about China’s conduct in the South China Sea, though ASEAN Wonk is aware that some officials believe the country is still able to realize its narrower interests such as energy extraction via its current approach.
Why It Matters
The visit reinforced Malaysia’s perceived U.S.-China imbalance amid new inroads with Beijing. In addition to China’s acknowledgement of participation in Malaysia’s 5G network that followed Anwar’s BRICS comments, Li pointed to the role the previously paused Belt and Road Initiative East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) project could play in China’s long-delayed goal of a pan-Asia railway given that Malaysia is the only country that can connect Beijing’s rail advances in mainland Southeast Asia into maritime Southeast Asia via Thailand4. Though inroads are still unclear, Malaysia has been unable to realize major strategic gains with the United States — its largest investor and a key albeit quiet security partner — amid the Israel-Gaza war, despite what ASEAN Wonk understands are high-level engagements floated on both sides behind the scenes beyond public rhetoric. As Anwar has implicitly acknowledged, 2024 is a golden opportunity on this front narrative-wise, with twin anniversaries of 50th anniversary of China-Malaysia relations and 10th anniversary of the U.S.-Malaysia comprehensive partnership5.
The shape of Li Qiang’s engagements provide a window into some key priority areas to watch in the future in China-Malaysia relations (see two originally generated ASEAN Wonk tables below for key touchpoints in areas on the country’s approach. Paid subscribers can also read on for more on what to expect and future implications in the “Prospects” section).