Podcast: Asian NATO Hype Belies Japan's Southeast Asia Realities
Deteriorating security environment and disruptive technologies among the complex realities facing Tokyo after it completes election cycle and heads into 2025.
INTRODUCTION
ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the ASEAN Wonk Podcast, where we bring you expert insights and regional perspectives on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics. I'm your host Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. If you haven’t already, do subscribe to the ASEAN Wonk platform at www.aseanwonk.com so you don’t miss our full posts.
Our guest today is Dr. Ken Jimbo, a professor at Keio University and a renowned commentator on Japan's foreign security policy as well as wider Indo-Pacific geopolitics. He's been a policy advisor to various parts of the Japanese government, including the Ministry of Defense and the National Security Secretariat.
We'll start our conversation talking about Japan's evolving approach to the Indo Pacific and Southeast Asia amid its ongoing election cycle and the future agenda for the ASEAN-Japan comprehensive strategic partnership. Make sure you watch, listen, or read the full episode as we go through a range of other subjects, including hype around an Asian NATO, Japan’s growing regional security role, South China Sea dynamics and the future of the US-Japan alliance amid emerging minilaterals.
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JAPAN’S ELECTIONS AND EVOLVING INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY IN CONTEXT
ASEAN Wonk: So let's get into it Professor Jimbo. We are speaking at a very interesting point as we were just talking about earlier in Japanese politics with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba just having won the election race of the Liberal Democratic Party or LDP and Japan having an election on October 27. I wanted to come back to that a little bit later on specific policies because you've commented quite extensively on some of them. But if we could start with the subject of continuity and change of Japan's Indo-Pacific approach and the implications for Southeast Asia because you've been a longtime adviser to various parts of the Japanese government over time as we've seen a lot of changes in the Indo-Pacific landscape. Now there'll certainly be some continuity in aspects of Japan's approach between administrations. We saw this conversation a little bit when we had the transition from Prime Minister Abe to Prime Minister Kishida. But I wanted to ask, what would you say in particular about any places that we might see some change or perhaps even additions or unique features in Japan's approach to the Indo Pacific and Southeast Asia – in particular when we're talking about the latest elections, including the upcoming general elections – that could take shape in late 2024 as well as early 2025?
Dr. Ken Jimbo: Well, thanks, first of all, for kind invitation to this program. And answering your question, I would like to mention that there have been two major trends that Japan has been pursuing in past five to ten years. One is the increasing awareness of the severe security environment surrounding Japan and the rise of Chinese military power, but also the nuclear missile developments in North Korea that pull Japan into the immediate kind of threat perception in the Korean peninsula. And as well the reassertive Russia in the Far East, especially after Russia's invasion to Ukraine. And seemingly, those three fronts of the Japanese defense policy, you cannot really have (one-size-fits-all) type of approaches because each of them needs to be customized in a way to prepare the different nature and characterization of the risks and threat.
And that came to the major decision which was decided in December 2022 when we adopted the National Security Strategy with three so-called strategic documents [National Security Strategy; National Defense Strategy; and Defense Buildup Program] where we have decided to double the size of the defense budget and procure the new weapon systems – which was unprecedented in Japan's post-war configuration – including the adoption of the long-range strike missiles or the counterstrike capability. And I think that that really creates Japan's new phase in our defense reorientation and commitments, and that also leads to the new configuration of the US-Japan security relations. So that we are now discussing about the new command and control structure that there are so many domains that we need to work together. Not only the extension of so-called gray zone issues. You know, ten, fifteen years ago, we were talking about Senkaku and how the gray zone dispute will evolve into much serious conflict. But now, we're talking about a much higher end of escalation, which presumably looks at the Taiwan Strait as a potential contingency that we need to prepare for. So this is one set of trends, which you can see as a continuity, of the Japanese security policy.
But another perspective, which may I think resonate with what we're going to talk about today is the wider spectrum of the Indo Pacific engagements. And that has started since the Abe administration when Abe promoted this concept on the free and open Indo Pacific starting from 2016. It has once been viewed as like a “how to counter China” balancing type of context and how we can really develop the “like-minded states coalition” type of the concept. But Abe himself transformed in how to engage China in 2018 and 2019, a time frame where FOIP – free and open Indo Pacific concept – has been moderated into much more, I think, a collaborative concept with Chinese international outreach including BRI [Belt and Road Initiative] and many of their concepts. And that has been inherited by Suga and Kishida to [a great] extent. And especially during these days, when you look at Kishida's New Pan for FOIP, which was, you know, addressed in India in March 2023, that he has emphasized more on the inclusive perspective of how Japanese FOIP through the Japanese overseas development assistance and connectivity projects and how to encourage the private sector to be involved without too much kind of Western ideologies attached. And this is, I think, Japan's more nuanced approaches with the increasing awareness that the world is bound to be divided, especially after the Ukraine war. And then Japan should be the one who needs to bridge such kind of gaps between the Western approaches [and] the growing notion of the global south.
“And then Japan should be the one who needs to bridge such kind of gaps between the Western approaches [and] the growing notion of the global South.”
ASSESSING JAPAN’S COMPETITIVENESS AMID GROWING MAJOR POWER INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND US-CHINA RIVALRY
ASEAN Wonk: That's a very rich perspective there. And you noted, in addition to the Indo-Pacific, some of Japan's own domestic security trends and changes in its approach. I'm wondering if we could talk a little bit about, building off of that, Japan's own competitive position in Southeast Asia and the Indo Pacific. And I think in Southeast Asia, one of the most sort of commonly cited insights in the annual Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute) survey that comes out every year is the fact that Japan consistently ranks as the most trusted power in that report when they analyze major powers. At the same time, I think even policymakers in countries like Japan, the US, are also noting that even as there is sort of distrust of China, there is a very clear recognition over the past few years that irrespective of how much China is trusted or not, it is becoming a more and more influential power in Southeast Asia.
And in particular, one of the things that we're also seeing in this domain is the fact that as we have these perceptions about trust and distrust, we had events last year and developments in the Japan-ASEAN relationship, including the commemorative summit that was held in Tokyo in December last year. And this notion of “trusted partners” again came to the fore between Japan and Southeast Asia. And I think in the region there was very much a recognition that Japan was capitalizing on this, but also the other phrase that was really used that was interesting was the notion of “co-creation.” That Japan and ASEAN and Southeast Asia would jointly embark on this journey rather than something being, you know, Japan sort of imposing a vision, which sometimes we see with respect to other powers – perceived or real – with respect to the United States, for example. So that was noted on the positive side.
On the challenges front, we are also seeing even some Japanese officials and diplomats saying that Japan needs to step up its own game in Southeast Asia. Japan's former ambassador to Indonesia, Masafumi Ishii, has talked about the fact that Japan's mechanisms like ODA have added a lot of value to the region, but there needs to be a little bit more sort of creativity, flexibility, responsiveness with respect to that. And then there are the sort of realities that you talked about, which is when we talk about the security environment, there's been a massive deterioration over the past few years. And as we think about first island chain strategies, we also have to slowly start thinking about contingencies in the second island chain and what we're doing there as well and so on. How would you sort of frame Japan's competitiveness in Southeast Asia as a major power? And what are some of its strengths if we're thinking about this sort of US-China competition or great power competition versus its limitations or challenges there?
Dr. Ken Jimbo: Well, firstly, I think you have covered quite a bit comprehensively about what is at stake in Japan ASEAN relationship. Certainly, we need to take full advantage of the high level of the trust that we earned in past decades. And since the Fukuda doctrine in 1977, Japan's own approach to ASEAN has been, I think, well-coordinated in a way to how to overcome the World War Two legacies into the fully trusted relationship. And Japan's own approach to ASEAN – which I would say we are not always bringing in the US, Japan, or Western perspective into ASEAN, but ASEAN as autonomous independent actor to be trusted through the expansion of the economic interest, you know, like widen supply chains throughout Southeast Asia. And then [much] of Japan's own approach is to support ASEAN's own agenda, like building of the more resilient ASEAN political foundations, its own economic development, and not bringing in too much ideological, I think, screening processes into this. So in that sense that, you know, ASEAN might think that Japan understands more than some of those external powers in a major power relationship. And that is, I think, a comparative strength that Japan has earned in in the past decades.
But as you mentioned there has been a lot of challenges that both sides need to, I think, adjust. First of all, ASEAN is growing and ASEAN is not really that single unit that has been exposed to the outside world. Indonesia has its own preferences as a G-20 member. And Malaysia is now applying for the BRICS. And so they do have multiple faces of the identity issues which are involved. ASEAN divide is still a huge issue that is taking place. But I think that what Japan is preferring for ASEAN to be is ASEAN being strong, vibrant, and also has its own strategic autonomy, which is preferential for the countries like Japan to the extent that Western powers can be conducive in engaging in ASEAN. And so that in that context, Japan needs to nudge many of those ASEAN agenda items to coexist with Japan's so-called Indo-Pacific plans. So we are encouraged by ASEAN adoption of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific several years ago. And so it created lots of platforms. Although we do have slightly different priorities in the concept, but it is the matter that ASEAN has committed to this concept which is the great news.
“[A]SEAN is growing and ASEAN is not really that single unit that has been exposed to the outside world. Indonesia has its own preferences as a G-20 member. And Malaysia is now applying for the BRICS. And so they do have multiple faces of the identity issues which are involved.”
But secondly, what I found in the last Commemorative Summit is that there has also been ASEAN's request for Japan to accommodate to the ASEAN's new reality. And that is rapidly-changing ASEAN industrial structures and the political priorities into it. Because if Japan tried to play, you know, same old game that it created since 1990s and 2000s, you will lose in the new economic structure that ASEAN is now cultivating. For example, electric vehicles. I don't think that we are competitive enough in Southeast Asia. Digital economy solutions and e-commerce, I don't think Japan is very visible in those arenas as well. So…we also have to upgrade and adopt into the new ASEAN reality as well. But overall, as you mentioned Japan and ASEAN have a lot of potential to move things forward, and we also have to take advantage of the relative, I think, preferences of ASEAN's perception towards Japan.
ISHIBA’S ASIAN NATO, JAPAN’S ELECTIONS AND CALIBRATING MINILATERAL, BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT
ASEAN Wonk: Yeah, that’s great. There was an ASEAN Japan experts panel last year with respect to the 50th anniversary and they flagged a lot of the issues that you mentioned, including supply chains, economic resilience and so on and so forth. It is really encouraging to see Japan take a very comprehensive approach to understanding Southeast Asia and ASEAN because, as you noted, there are very complex realities including changing dynamics within Southeast Asia and ASEAN that feed into developments including the BRICS conversation you mentioned. I'm wondering if we could turn to the security side. We were chatting about this a little bit earlier. We are seeing a lot of attention in the headlines to Ishiba's notion of an Asian NATO, which is, of course not a new concept. He has a former defense background, so it's not surprising that he has views on this. And I think he's also mentioned in parliament for example that this is not something that he expects himself to take off anytime soon. Obviously, in the Southeast Asian context, even though there are many minilateral mechanisms that the Philippines is engaging with, it is more of an outlier than the sort of the mainstream position in the region where the region is mostly comfortable with looser alignments rather than tighter ones. That said, I wanted to ask you if you could comment a little bit on that. More broadly beyond this concept of an Asian NATO, I do think we are in a very interesting time in the security environment. We're seeing a proliferation of mechanisms like AUKUS, US-Japan-ROK, US-Japan-Philippines, Quad elevation to a leaders level, and so on and so forth. And at the same time, as you mentioned, Japan is taking a much more active security role through mechanisms like Official Security Assistance. So how do you see this notion of collective security fitting in with Japan's configuration of engaging with minilateral institutions, but also bilateral institutions like US-Japan alliance and the multilateral context, ASEAN, which you talked about as well?
Dr. Ken Jimbo: Sure. We have experienced quite an interesting period of time immediately after Prime Minister Ishiba was elected….