Podcast: Will Iran Derail Trump Asia Defense Strategy?

Former US defense official talks Quad, China, Southeast Asia and effects of Middle East contingencies on coming Trump defense strategy and Indo-Pacific outlook.

INTRODUCTION

ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the ASEAN Wonk Podcast where we bring you expert insights and regional perspectives on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics. I'm your host, Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. And if you haven't already, do make sure you're subscribed to the ASEAN Wonk platform at www.aseanwonk.com so you don't miss any of our full posts.

Our guest today is Dr. Ely Ratner who served as assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs under the Biden administration. We will start our conversation talking through contemporary developments in U.S. security relationships in the Indo-Pacific. Be sure to stay tuned as we go through a range of other subjects, including the the new administration’s coming U.S. defense strategy, datapoints to watch in 2026, Taiwan and the South China Sea.

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GRADING TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S EARLY INDO-PACIFIC DEFENSE APPROACH

ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the podcast, Ely, and I wanted to start with your take on where U.S. defense policy is under the second Trump administration. We just saw Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth out at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. And to be fair, if you look more at what he did rather than what he said, you could make the case for a lot of continuity with the building out of the security latticework that we saw under the Biden administration. But as one Southeast Asian official said to me, the key challenge seems to be to what extent is this new administration going to be able to build out the so-called latticework even as it does seem like – from some of the headlines and some of the experiences of some of the countries in the region – the aperture of U.S. engagement seems to be narrowing or changing when it comes to other non-defense aspects of U.S. policy, whether it's through tariffs or U.S. assistance and focus and so on and so forth. So as a practitioner yourself and somebody who has thought about U.S. defense policy both in and out of government for a long time, how would you go about grading the new administration's approach with respect to defense policy in the Indo-Pacific?

Dr. Ely Ratner: Well, Prashanth, thanks for the opportunity to be here. It's great to talk with you today. I think your prompt laid down a number of the issues in early assessment, which is in terms of activities, in terms of messaging, I think we have seen a decent degree of continuity. Secretary Hegseth’s first trip out to the region to the Philippines and then Japan, both in terms of the types of deliverables that were announced as well as the messaging around U.S. commitment to the region, U.S. commitment to allies and partners that did represent a good amount of continuity.

Where we have seen some particularities related to the Trump administration, we have seen a much stronger push toward allies and partners to spend more on defense and to do more and contribute more. I think some of that had started under the Biden administration. And frankly, I think up to a point, that's actually quite a good direction to take our alliances and partnerships. So that has been much more forward as a central priority. And then, yes, of course, as you mentioned, the changing nature of U.S. foreign assistance in the region as well as the economics on tariffs have created, I think, political headwinds, diplomatic headwinds. And the question is to what degree are those going to interfere with the ability – both the political space and the ability – of countries in the region to continue forward on deepening defense and security partnerships.

So I think we are at a little bit of a inflection point here where – yes, you are seeing continuity; you're seeing good messaging – we also haven't necessarily seen the full fruition or development of a clear regional strategy from the new administration. There's a national defense strategy, which by all reporting is underway and may be released as early as the end of the summer, and that'll give a good indication on the defense front where the administration wants to head. And that appears to be quite focused on the on the China challenge, also focused on the U.S. homeland, and that has a certain degree of implications for how the administration approaches the region, how the administration approaches allies and partners from a defense perspective. But, obviously, as you said, it's a broader aperture of economic and diplomatic initiatives as well that affects all of that. So I think mostly continuity so far with some potential disjunctures based on some of the external factors.

EVOLUTION OF LATTICEWORK AND REGIONAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS

ASEAN Wonk: Right. I wanted to ask a broader question about the security latticework or network of US alliances and partnerships. Because as you're aware, this is something that's been in process really since the end of the Cold War – this idea of transitioning from wheels to webs; hub and spokes to more networked forms of alliances and partnerships. I'm wondering for Southeast Asia where you see U.S. engagement having proceeded there? Because I do sense that even though there's a lot of focus in the headlines around the Philippines, for example, there was an effort by the Biden administration to really broaden out how to think about defense – not just integrated deterrence, but also looking at opportunities like East Timor for example, and Indonesia with Super Garuda Shield exercises. Where do you see key partnerships and direction of travel regarding Southeast Asia’s place within the broader U.S. Indo-Pacific defense architecture in the past ten, fifteen years?

Dr. Ely Ratner: Yeah. It's a great question. Look, maybe I'll answer it in a couple different ways. I mean, in the first sense, I think what you're describing of an aspiration to try to mature the regional architecture beyond just the hub and spoke model or beyond just a set of U.S. bilateral alliances has been around as long as you and I have been in the business. You can go back ten, fifteen years, and there are think tanks writing about the Asia power web or this networking. But up until pretty recently, I think it had been mostly fits and starts and aspiration, maybe dialogue at best. I think what we saw during the Biden administration was a real transition from the latticework or the networking being theory or at best dialogue to moving toward no kidding activities that can have a real impact on operational cooperation, and, at the higher end, combat credible deterrence. So we saw that with AUKUS, obviously; in the “Squad” arrangement with the Philippines, Australia, and Japan; and the US, Japan, South Korea arrangement; to a degree, the Indo-Pacific Quad with India; and continued U.S. engagement with ASEAN, including plans for another U.S.-ASEAN exercise upcoming in the coming years.

You know, sometimes as new opportunities and institutions emerge, particularly in Southeast Asia, there is concern that it is crowding out attention toward ASEAN or somehow diminishing how we think about ASEAN centrality as the role of ASEAN as sort of the lone convener of the region together. I guess I understand those concerns, but we all consider these – both in the way we spoke about them, but in practice – as complementary and overlapping. That the idea was not that one institution would move in and push aside all the others, but that the combination of them – different partners addressing sort of fit for purpose, different issues – that that was the right way to think about the overall regional architecture, and I continue to believe that.

I have written a piece in Foreign Affairs arguing that when it comes to combat credible deterrence, it will be important to move beyond just some of the ad hoc arrangements into a more formal collective defense arrangement, starting with the United States, Japan, Australia and the Philippines. That's really of the belief that, look, the latticework as it currently exists serves a lot of important functions. I think it strengthens the region. It's a good thing. It's the right thing to be doing. But in terms of real military cooperation – we can talk about sort of how it affects economics and diplomacy and foreign assistance and other issues – but when it comes to no kidding, militaries operating together in a way that strengthens deterrence, the ad hoc and informal nature of a number of these latticework institutions leaves them maybe where the whole isn't really more than the sum of the parts when it comes to command and control and exercises and operations and planning. And that you do need a more formal mechanism to get to a future where the power of the alliances together is really leveraging all of the capabilities.

Because as much as we are working together in these different constellations and we can work together to do exercises and it sends an important signal regionally about the degree to which we're cooperating and we're aligned, it's not always trending toward, again, no kidding ability to operate during crises and contingencies. So I think a part of the latticework needs to formalize. That doesn't mean the rest of it doesn't matter or the rest of it should go away, but a part of it does need to formalize.

Now moving to your question about Southeast Asia in particular, you're right that the Philippines has been at the center of those. That's because, frankly, the Philippines has been much more aligned on the China challenge than much of the rest of Southeast Asia, at least publicly. So I think that makes sense from an alliance perspective. But the United States does – and certainly the Biden administration did – view its defense partnerships with other countries in Southeast Asia as quite important, and again, ASEAN as a whole with really the value in bringing the region together. And having sat through a number of the ADMM plus meetings, it really was my perspective that those were vitally important to having that holistic conversation in a way that it really doesn't happen anywhere else. And also the convening power of bringing all those leaders together to be able to meet.

You know, Southeast Asia is very far from Washington. That's no secret. You travel out there all the time. It takes, you know, a good day to and a half plus to get there. So it's not easy for the U.S. secretary of defense or senior officials to be constantly in the region. But those types of forums allow the senior officials and the secretary to engage at senior levels with all of the relevant players there. And so those opportunities are incredibly valuable. So the convening part is really important.

And then the work with the Southeast Asian partners continues. A lot of it not always on the front pages, but working closely with partners around some of the issues that they're concerned about, whether it's the sovereignty issues in the South China Sea, whether it's illegal fishing, other kinds of transnational crime issues, maritime domain awareness. I think there's a lot of it even if at the strategic level, there is not perfect alignment among the United States and all of the Southeast Asian partners. I think when it comes to elements of what's articulated as the free and open Indo-Pacific and the types of norms and principles that come along with that, there actually is a good deal of alignment in terms of the kind of behaviors that we want to see. So it's a long answer to your question, but the answer is that I think there are still opportunities to continue building these relationships. And I think we see that happening sometimes a little bit below the radar, but in an important way, and that ought to continue.

ASSESSING CHINA’S REGIONAL SECURITY NETWORKING INROADS

ASEAN Wonk: That’s a useful perspective on both the U.S. strategy and also the regional dynamics. I would encourage listeners to read the full Foreign Affairs piece because even though there’s been some reaction to the headline on the Pacific Defense Pact, you clarify quite clearly in the piece that there isn’t really necessarily a need for a pan-regional organization like a NATO equivalent in in Asia. We can actually do this with a number of partners with some full participation, some participation in some aspects or some activities rather than sort of talking about this notion of an Asian NATO.

One other aspect I wanted to ask you about is, if China is to be read as the pacing challenge for the United States – as both the first Trump administration and the Biden administration, and so far what we've seen from the second Trump administration have seemed to recognize – we also do need to think about how China is thinking about its own security latticework and architecture in the Indo-Pacific region, including in Southeast Asia. And I think there is maybe a tendency for some folks to sort of dismiss this as, “oh, it’s a kind of a low value exercise” or “it’s a single partnership.” But my conversations with Chinese interlocutors is that they're very well aware of the fact that China is building from a very fragile foundation, so to speak, on the security aspects. But they're also aware that a gain here and a gain there eventually adds up over a period of time. And I would argue the things we're seeing in Southeast Asia – some of the defense sales that China is pursuing, a sort of naval base that Cambodia is characterizing as not being a naval base – a lot of these things, twenty years ago, you may not have foreseen in Southeast Asia, and they are now happening. So I wanted to get your sense as well as to how would you characterize the inroads that China is making in the region relative to what the United States is doing as well because this is a relative competition.

Dr. Ely Ratner: Yeah. It's a great set of points, and I think you've articulated well some of the challenges that we're facing. And, look, the PRC and the PLA are building up their defense and security relationships throughout the region. I would apply much of what you said to the Pacific Islands as well. It's a different set of dynamics, but we're seeing a similar level of ambition there. And there are multiple elements to it. There are arm sales, as you described, where China – either through cheaper manufacturing or just frankly subsidization – can provide capabilities at cost that is very difficult to compete with for the United States or other advanced militaries that are producing weapons domestically for domestic militaries at a quite substantial cost. So I think there are opportunities for inroads if left unfettered on security assistance. Certainly, the basing aspirations of the PLA have not waned, and the fact that they don't have more bases in places in the region and around the world is only because the supply has been less than they had hoped for, not because the demand is not there in Beijing. I think they're pressing very hard for opportunities.

Countries understand, I think, some of the downside risks of that. So Beijing hasn't found as many willing partners as maybe they would have expected. But an absent United States or a distracted United States, you're right, could turn around and find out that things are emerging that have accumulated to effect. So I think that's exactly right to be a concern. And the way that Beijing is going about some of its defense and security partnerships is fusing also some of the domestic security concerns with the external security concerns. And this is where China's defense and security relationships may not look exactly like our formation of sort of external defense arrangements, but rather working with regimes through policing, surveillance, other types of regime security arrangements that are coming through PRC security agencies. But also deepen relationships and lead to openings for the PLA training and other activities that – again, I think you're right – over time, all of those things together accumulate.

I think maybe one thing to say about the U.S. strategy here is that when it comes to the vast majority of partners in Southeast Asia, the United States is not aspiring to somehow flip them into a U.S. ally like Japan or Australia. And I think the moniker of the United States is not asking Southeast Asia to choose between the United States and China is both true and a recognition of some of the economic and geopolitical realities. What we want in the affirmative case is to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific where there's room for U.S. access and global access to commerce, ideas, people, technology, militaries. And the flip side of that is avoiding a situation of Chinese domination or Chinese hegemonic control. So, again, I don't think the adroit strategy here is looking at Indonesia or Malaysia or other partners in Southeast Asia and saying: “Okay, how do we flip them to be anti-China and pro United States?” I don't think that's realistic.

I think what we want to do is maintain sufficient relationships with these countries that we can continue to work with them on what we think is in many instances from a defense and security perspective, our shared aspiration. Because as much hostility as one finds toward the United States in Southeast Asia or towards certain things associated with the U.S. military, I don't think capitals in Southeast Asia are interested in becoming satellites in a China-dominated region, which I don't think would be in their interest in the short term or in the long term. So, again, I think this is about understanding that China is a cultural and historical and economic and geopolitical reality for Southeast Asia. And in that context, maintaining sufficient relationships so that we can continue to work together. And that's really the aspiration. So when we look at the kinds of PRC activities that you're describing, I think ensuring understanding that, yes, these countries are going to have some degree of military and defense cooperation with the PLA, and that is natural. And that should be okay. And the United States needs to operate within that and achieve its objectives within that. So very serious concern about them tipping into a direction of effective control, hegemony and domination in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia, but not an aspiration for U.S. primacy or dominance as the U.S. objective.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S COMING DEFENSE STRATEGY AND INDO-PACIFIC DATAPOINTS TO WATCH OUT TO 2026

ASEAN Wonk: Right. And as you point out, China is known to use some of its nondefense levers for security gains. Southeast Asian countries also have agency to reject or shape those in ways that might be more beneficial for their own strategic interests. I wanted to move our conversation forward to the first national defense strategy of this administration, which as you noted we could see in the next few months, and the implications for U.S. defense policy heading into 2026. There are lots of uncertainties around aspects of policy – some of this is administration-specific, others relate to the churn you see in the first year of any administration. As we think about this national defense strategy and its release, what are you going to be looking for in terms of how we might define success in this new defense strategy, particularly its implications for the Indo-Pacific and U.S.-China competition?

Dr. Ely Ratner: Yeah…

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