Podcast: Flashpoint Management in Philippine Foreign Policy

Former government official on what lies ahead on the South China Sea, the US-Philippines alliance, the rest of Manila’s ASEAN chairmanship year and much more.

INTRODUCTION

ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the ASEAN Wonk Podcast, where we bring you expert insights and regional perspectives on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics. I'm your host Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. If you haven’t already, do subscribe to the ASEAN Wonk platform at www.aseanwonk.com so you don’t miss our full posts.

Our guest today is Julio “July” Amador, who was a civil servant in the Philippine government for more than a decade and now helps lead various organizations, including Fulbright Philippines, the Foundation for the National Interest, and FACTS Asia. We’ll start our conversation talking through current developments, including the South China Sea arbitral tribunal ruling anniversary and major power developments during the Philippines ASEAN chairmanship. Be sure to stay tuned as we go through a range of other subjects, including the future of the U.S.-Philippine alliance, minilateral networking and evolving domestic political dynamics in the Philippines.

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SOUTH CHINA SEA AFTER THE RULING ANNIVERSARY

ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the podcast July, and let’s start, if we can, on the South China Sea with us having seen recently the July 12th tribunal decision anniversary on the Philippines’ South China Sea case. You convened one of several commemorative events, and if I’m not mistaken, this is the first Track 1.5 initiative of its kind focused on ASEAN perspectives on this question outside of the Philippines held in Jakarta. We spoke a little bit earlier and you were saying it’s really important to engage more on this topic with respect to other Southeast Asian states, and also view this from a little bit more of a comprehensive perspective, looking at this not just from a security prism – whether it’s the South China Sea or the first island chain or the Taiwan Strait. What is your sense of how the anniversary played out and the regional perceptions on the ground on that front based on your conversations?

Julio Amador: Well, first of all, Prashanth, thank you for the invitation to join your podcast, and, of course, hello to all the listeners of ASEAN Wonk. I’m really glad to be here and, of course, to answer all of these questions related to the arbitral tribunal anniversary. This is the tenth anniversary of a very important and critical ruling, not only for the Philippines, but for the Southeast Asian region in general and also, of course, for those of us who advocate for international law. And now the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is a very important framework for Southeast Asia because many of us are archipelagic and maritime countries, and as such, we need the rule of law to govern our occasionally feisty relationships not only within ASEAN, but also with our neighbors, including those neighbors that may not be directly within the boundaries of our region but have an enduring interest in the safety and the security of the maritime areas, and, of course, the sea lines of communication.

So we organized the conference in Jakarta because I personally believe that the Philippines needs to convince but even listen to its neighbors in Southeast Asia with regard to the arbitration. Because if you recall the history of it in Southeast Asia, the Philippines launched this initiative, these proceedings against China in The Hague. One of the common complaints that you would hear is that the Philippines did not consult its Southeast Asian neighbors. That, I think, was a legal strategy. But now that we have this award, it’s very clear from those who are experts on international law that, first of all, this award is binding particularly on the Philippines and China. But at the same time, the award can become normative for the region because its many rulings can apply to the various maritime boundary delimitations and features in the various contested maritime domains within Southeast Asia and their immediate neighbors. In fact, we know that Indonesia has been using the ruling for negotiations with its own neighbors for their boundary delimitation. So we believe that the Philippines has a special task in convincing the region about the righteousness of this award and how that is applicable as a way of peacefully settling disputes within ASEAN and within the wider Southeast Asia. So this is why we believe that the commemorative conference would have had more impact if it was held outside of the Philippines and if it would consider also views not only from ASEAN, but even from our other neighboring countries. So that was the reason behind this initiative.

THE PHILIPPINES ASEAN CHAIRMANSHIP YEAR SO FAR

ASEAN Wonk: Just to double click a bit on the point you made on the regional dimension of Philippine foreign policy: we’ve just seen the recent round of ministerial meetings playing out with the Philippines ASEAN chairmanship this week. Obviously, it’s one of several factors – as you know having served in government before – of Philippine foreign policy. How would you assess or what metrics would you use to analyze the Philippines ASEAN chairmanship so far?

Julio Amador: That’s a great question because we’re halfway there when it comes to the chairmanship. And some things to be remembered. First of all, the Philippines did volunteer to chair earlier because of Myanmar. So that has to be factored in when it comes to assessing whether the Philippines has been successful or not. But I think, in general, I would say that, facing a plethora of crises through its chairmanship – you have South China Sea, you have Myanmar, you have the Middle East crisis, including among others, the energy crisis that it has sparked – I think I sometimes wonder how the Philippine government is getting through all of this. Because, of course, you do not foresee crises happening, right, at the start of your chairmanship? But when this happens, you have to be agile enough to take them into account and that they have to be prioritized as well given the bigger and wider implications of those crises, not only on the Philippines, but on the wider region. And when all of these crises are hitting you, prioritizing becomes an issue.

So in that sense, also running government while chairing ASEAN I would think is a double challenge for those who are chairing ASEAN. And as you have seen, Philippine domestic politics is not the most boring in the region. With that being said, with those caveats, I believe the Philippine chairmanship is going as well as it could. Handling not only the daily concerns of ASEAN, but also the crisis moments that have been emerging that I have discussed earlier. But people forget that managing ASEAN is a very complex process. You’re looking at trying to balance some of the most powerful countries in the world, right? I mean, in many ways, in using many metrics, you have the United States, China, Russia, and then you have the European Union, of course, you have Japan, India, Australia, and so on. These are not easy tasks. The challenge of trying to bridge the gap or trying to convene great powers with various interests so to speak, and with differing purposes as to why they participate in Southeast Asian affairs is a daunting task for any country, and I don’t think the Philippines is an exception to that.

So having said all of that, the process has been going on well enough to be able to say that there have been some concrete accomplishments, right? On the ASEAN economic front, you have the adoption of the Digital Economy Framework Agreement, which is critical and which has been something that the Philippines has wanted to accomplish. Now on the political security front, despite the many challenges, I think the Department of Foreign Affairs has been doing some hard work, for example, on Myanmar. And, of course, there will always be disagreements on how it’s going to be done, but it’s not as if it’s the Philippines that holds the key to many of these problems. We don’t even want to talk about the Thai-Cambodian disputes precisely because both countries have different ways of approaching it. And this is a criticism of ASEAN. ASEAN doesn’t seem to be the first point of reference for trying to manage the disputes. Now I think the more important question is what happens to the proposed code of conduct? And I, for one, don’t foresee that coming this year. But I think we also have to appreciate the efforts being given by all of the negotiating states, including among others monthly meetings to try to come up with something solid on this front. Of course, I don’t think it’s going to happen – having an actual code – but I think the process is as important as the outcome in this case.

THE STATE OF THE US-PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE

ASEAN Wonk: The other piece you referenced a little bit earlier as well with respect to the conversation about major power dynamics is the U. S.-Philippine alliance itself. What is your sense of how the alliance is evolving thus far and the mix of inroads relative to challenges? In terms of the defense sites, in terms of foundational security agreements, in terms of traction on flashpoint management, I think we have seen progress. If you look at things like the Luzon Economic Corridor, if you look at minilateral security networking with Japan and other countries, they’ve moved slower than some alliance advocates would have liked. What’s your assessment of how the alliance is doing thus far beyond everyday flashpoint management and those narrower metrics?

Julio Amador: Oh boy am I going to get in trouble with some of the things I’m going to say, but what’s life without these things? Yeah. I mean, look. Some officials have described the alliance as something on hyperdrive right? I mean, it’s consistently going out there, strongest it’s ever been. And I don’t deny that particularly in the defense and military relationship – in those particular aspects, I don’t deny the strength of the alliance. And I agree that it’s the strongest that it’s ever been and that the coordination on that front has evolved to an extent that I couldn’t have imagined ten years ago. So I do believe that on the military relationship, things are very positive.

Now the question I’ve always had is about alliance management because there are no strong or concrete institutional aspects to alliance management, and some of these are quite nascent. The bilateral strategic dialogue (BSD) was put in place about a decade ago precisely to provide senior level management over alliance relations right? And the BSD was always a prelude to the two-plus-two ministerial meeting which provides the highest levels of alliance management – if you look at the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) itself, you don’t see any of those mechanisms because what we have in the Mutual Defense Treaty is a council of foreign ministers – but given the evolving character of the challenges that the alliance is facing, having a two-plus-two I would argue is a better mechanism. Please remember that if we look at the MDT strictly, the two-plus- two was never envisioned – but, you know, we deal with what we are given – having the BSD in place is quite important because that senior level management over alliance matters is quite critical. There was a joke before that the problem with the Philippine-US alliance that it was left to the hands of colonels because of the Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board. And these are very capable colonels, mind you. What has always been missing is the policy oversight, and the alliance has managed to create this in the process over the years to respond to the challenges. And slow to be sure, but, you know, it’s better organized than before, I would say.

WHAT TO WATCH AHEAD ON SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY INTO 2027

ASEAN Wonk: The point you made earlier about where the alliance is and where flashpoint management is on South China Sea and ASEAN leads to the question of upcoming datapoints. President Marcos is going to have his State of the Nation Address (SONA) in the next few days were he’ll outline a series of priorities for the rest of the year into 2027. But from more foreign and security policy lens, what are you watching in terms of datapoints for the rest of the year into 2027 beyond the headlines of the day?

Julio Amador: Yeah, and I think…

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