Podcast: Big Powers vs. Small States in Hun Manet’s Cambodia
Former diplomat addresses naval base fears, China risks, border disputes, leadership dynamics, diversification and more in Cambodia’s foreign policy outlook.
INTRODUCTION
ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the ASEAN Wonk Podcast, where we bring you expert insights and regional perspectives on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics. I'm your host, Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. And if you haven't already, do subscribe to the ASEAN Wonk platform at www.aseanwonk.com so you don't miss all our posts.
Our guest today is Ambassador Pou Sothirak, who previously served in the Cambodian government since 1993 in various positions, including as Ambassador to Japan and Secretary of State at the Foreign Ministry. We'll start our conversation talking about Cambodia's current foreign policy trajectory and neighborhood ties in mainland Southeast Asia and the Mekong subregion. Make sure you tune into the full episode as we go through a range of other subjects, including Cambodia's relations with major powers and where the country and the region is headed geoeconomically and geopolitically.
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GRADING CAMBODIA FOREIGN POLICY
ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the ASEAN Wonk Podcast, Ambassador. Thank you for joining us, and let's get started. It's been around a year and a half since Hun Manat took over as Cambodia's prime minister in August 2023. We've seen some very interesting foreign policy developments beyond some of the developments that have made the headlines, such as Cambodia's withdrawal from the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle area. We've also seen some stepped-up cooperation with Japan on the security side. Cambodia was selected as the host of the Francophonie summit in 2026. Some high-level defense interactions as well with the U.S. As someone who's been a longtime practitioner, how do you assess how the government is doing with respect to foreign policy? And you can either go with a letter grade or some other metric, but more importantly. And more generally, what are the successes in your view and also what are the challenges that we're seeing for Cambodia?
Ambassador Pou Sothirak: First of all, thank you very much, Dr. Prashanth, for having me in your program. I'd like to congratulate you at the outset for being a window of knowledge for a wide range of issues that concern Southeast Asia, as your platform has been very popular here, and I'm a keen observer. Actually, I read quite a bit and learn a lot from you. So thank you for your questions.
With regard to the success and the challenges with the new government, I would like to say that Prime Minister Hun Manet and his young team are, to me, the next generation of leadership for Cambodia. They are very well educated. Many of them— in fact, more than 90%— have a higher degree from abroad, including the prime minister himself, who holds a PhD. They are very energetic. They come with fully charged batteries, if you may.
I think one of the things that stand out as far as success stories are concerned is that since taking office, it has been 18 months now. I observe that his priority is to reengage Cambodia with the world, particularly those countries that Cambodia classifies as important. So within the 18 months in office, he initially very quickly 18 state visits to meet with different heads of state or government. These included trips to Indonesia, China, UN General Assembly, France, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Japan, Switzerland, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, Laos, Thailand again, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore. With special attention, he visited China officially three times, the most, and twice to Indonesia. This highlights his preoccupation with re-engaging Cambodian foreign policy at the global level and also at the regional level.
“I observe that his priority is to reengage Cambodia with the world, particularly those countries that Cambodia classifies as important.“
Another success story, to me, is more of the pledges that he made. But as I mentioned to you, he represents a relatively new young generation with a lot of energy and vitality. However, it is too short to really give a scorecard on a scale of anything. But I think you need to include some of Cambodia’s achievements under him as his leadership continues. For example, Cambodia's pledge to global issues like climate change. Cambodia pledged to become carbon neutral by 2025. We want to transition to clean energy, including green energy—not necessarily just hydropower. There’s still a lot of debate here, particularly related to the Mekong. Digital transformation, I think, is also high up on his agenda. He wants to fast-track Cambodia toward that end as well.
On regional issues, I think under his leadership, he wants to make sure that Cambodia continues to viably contribute to ASEAN efforts and speed up regional integration. More specifically, operationalizing the Five-Point Consensus in relation to Myanmar. I can talk more about this if you wish. He also wants Cambodia to be a member of ASEAN whereby it can effectively manage the ASEAN way and ASEAN centrality amid this flux, particularly in big power competitions, to maintain the relevance of ASEAN and all ASEAN frameworks, including EAS, ADMM+, the ARF, APT, and more. I think issues related to the Mekong are also part of his agenda.
But again, like I said, this is a big task. Eighteen months is a short time to fully evaluate how much he has achieved. I think we need to give him a bit more time, so to speak. Now, scaling down to domestic issues, I think some of the challenges remain. So the pledge can also be a challenge, in my view. Domestic challenges include maintaining peace and stability, particularly political stability in Cambodia. Cambodia has a long history of having a loyal opposition. You know the term loyal opposition, that you're loyal to your country? We have some difficulty in there. So it becomes more of a challenge between personal and individual interests. I don't have to name names—you know what I mean.
That’s why I said Cambodia still considers peace, stability, and economic growth as its main challenges. And economic growth, needless to say, has been affected by the post-COVID-19 recovery. The post-COVID-19 rebound is not happening in the way Cambodia would like it to be.
As you may know, pre-COVID, we were experiencing double-digit growth—10, 11 percent. But now, in the past year, the World Bank rated Cambodia at 5.6%, I believe, or 5.8% growth. These are issues. Additionally, Cambodia has pledged to become a middle-income country by 2030 and a high-income country by 2050. He is full of aspirations, and I sincerely not only wish him well, but if I can do anything in any way possible, I would support him strongly. I like to see young generations take leadership in Cambodia, which is a new country emerging and trying to do its best to be a responsible member of the international community, particularly maintaining ASEAN’s relevance.
Maybe this is too weak of an assessment. If you want to have a follow-up, I can add some spice if you wish.
DIVERSIFICATION RHETORIC AND REALITY
ASEAN Wonk: That's a terrific overview about a very sort of long series of opportunities, but then also, as you say, some challenges as well in this very contested landscape. A lot of these challenges are also shared challenges. I wanted to follow up a little bit on something you said earlier in your comments. If I were to summarize the conversation about how Cambodia is talked about in a lot of the commentary over the past year and a half in a single word, it is this question as to the extent to which Cambodia is diversifying relationships relative to the opposing view, which is that Cambodia has become overly reliant or seemed to be overly dependent on China. That's a very short-term view of what's been happening over the past few years. But you've served in government in various capacities since basically Cambodia was transitioning away from the United Nations presence in Cambodia in the post-Cold War period, which we talked about briefly before we came on here. So you have this longer-term view of Cambodia's foreign policy. To the extent to which Cambodia's foreign relationships are diversifying or not, how much of this is continuity versus how much of this is change in your view?
Ambassador Pou Sothirak: Yeah, very good questions. You know, in Cambodian foreign policy statements, we aspire to be a friend to everyone, whoever wants to be friends in a state-to-state relationship. The question about the perceptions that Cambodia overly looks to kind of align itself more closely to China, as opposed to, as I mentioned to you, Prime Minister Hun Manet, a young generation leader who wants to posture his image as a friend to the world: in such a short time, I think it is astonishing to see he focuses very much on projecting himself in a regional and global arena. With regard to Cambodia, when we want to diversify foreign policy, not to put all the eggs in one basket.
The question you asked is very pertinent in my view, but you have to understand also, you know, there's a saying that it takes two to tango. Cambodia wants to, or it seems like Cambodia always goes to China for whatever reason. But it's because China also wants to come to Cambodia and offer something. So, you know, people, when you debate about this, say: “why you said you want to be friends with everyone, but you always, you know, a lot of Chinese in Cambodia?” Not so much so nowadays. But previously, it's the question about China also seeing Cambodia as a strategic partner in promoting Chinese footprint in this part of the world, and that has not been appropriately debated. It's always, "Why, Cambodia, you want to be friends with the U.S., but the Ream base and all these human rights issues and so on."
And why is it China? Because China gives a lot, gives almost – you know, we, in the Cambodian mindset – think that China has a long hand for Cambodia. That means the wish list that Cambodia has for China is a priority. Whatever we wish for, we almost get it, you know? But I'm not so sure whether this routine or this business as usual in terms of relationships is continuing at this level. If you have more questions, I can talk about how I see Cambodia engaging China. But just to focus on the comparison between foreign policy as a friend to everybody and, as opposed to an action that plays out that Cambodia keeps going to China. It's also because China has a strategy to engage Cambodia – such a small state, to be very honest with you – and with the kind of offer that China gives, I have to say Cambodia has made the right choice, you know, to take whatever China gives to us. I'm just hoping that my government – and with all due respect, they've done very well – but I'm just hoping that whatever the Chinese give to Cambodia is not about short-term gain at the expense of the long-term benefit of Cambodia.
“[I]'m just hoping that whatever the Chinese give to Cambodia is not about short-term gain at the expense of the long-term benefit of Cambodia.”
That's the only thing I'm requesting. If I may say, we need to also be very careful when we're using Chinese money and that our long-term benefit in being a good member of the international community is not diluted: an effective member of ASEAN is not being diluted. And I don't think my government is turning that option away. It's just that you also have to see from the Chinese angle: why is it that China focuses so much on Cambodia? So I stop here just to make sure that you understand, and it takes two to tango.
China also engages Cambodia very earnestly, I mean, of course, in my view, benefiting China a lot, but also not to undermine the Cambodian desire to be a friend to every country in the world. So those countries who want to be friends with Cambodia, I suggest that they have to make Cambodia know that they are prepared to offer, in a constructive way, to help develop the Cambodian economy, to help Cambodia become a good standing member of the international community, to increase Cambodia's voice in international affairs. In other words, engage Cambodia constructively. I don't think that the government of Cambodia will say no. So I stop here.
INTRAREGIONAL COMPETITION AND TENSIONS IN THE MEKONG AND MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA
ASEAN Wonk: Thanks Ambassador. And you made a good point there about making sure that we understand this in terms of the risks and opportunities that Cambodia sees in its relationships – whether it's with China or with other countries – and how does that balance between the short term and the long term. One other piece of what you said in your initial response was Cambodia's relationships with its neighbors in mainland Southeast Asia. And as you know, this has been a consistent theme all the way from the Khmer Empire to some of the events in Cambodia's history like Vietnam's former occupation of Cambodia, and so on and so forth. We've also seen quite a few changes in the neighborhood in mainland Southeast Asia. We have a new Thai Prime Minister since Hun Manet came into office. We've had a couple of leadership changes in Vietnam, some reshuffles in Laos. So it's a very interesting and very dynamic time in mainland Southeast Asia. We also did see, as I mentioned earlier, some regional conversations about the Funan Techo Canal, the plans for that as well. And we've had well-known Cambodian officials like Sun Chanthol, for example, try to reject some of the criticisms that this is something that is going to be a challenge regionally within the sort of environmental challenges, the social challenges, which, as you referenced, also tie into broader dynamics like on the Mekong River. So I'm wondering how you assess Cambodia's neighborhood relationships in the subregion in terms of the challenges there and then also some of the successes in this respect? Because I think like many other states in Southeast Asia, we can talk about major powers as we will do later in our conversation, but the neighborly relationships are extremely important in how these countries navigate their foreign policy
Ambassador Pou Sothirak: Yeah, another very outstanding question…