Thailand’s Post-Election Foreign Policy Chatter Kicks Off with Myanmar Challenge
Plus what Vietnam's new power plan could mean for international partnerships; overcoming "sea blindness" in maritime governance and much more.
Welcome back to ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief! This week we’re looking at Thailand post-election foreign policy chatter; the potential impact of Vietnam’s new power plan on the country’s international partnerships; maritime security governance in Southeast Asia and much more.
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Let’s dig in!
This week’s WonkCount: 2,503 words (~12 minutes reading time)
Thailand’s Post-Election Foreign Policy Chatter Kicks Off with Myanmar Challenge
Post-election comments by Thailand’s Move Forward Party (MFP) leader Pita Limjaroenrat on Myanmar, coupled with a cyclone hitting parts of the neighboring country, has kicked off the chatter on the broader question of how Thailand’s post-election foreign policy will shape up, even as it will take months for the dust to settle on the country’s domestic politics (see table above for a quick summary of some key stated approaches from MFP’s pre-election policy platform).
What’s Behind It
In comments since winning the Thai election, Pita has signaled that Thailand under his leadership would take a more active approach on the Myanmar issue, with robust humanitarian efforts in the headlines following deadly Cyclone Mocha and a focus on human security considerations that is in line with ASEAN and the international community.
The comments come in the context of a wider focus on how Thailand’s post-election foreign policy could shape up. As noted before on AWB, while Thailand has been among the ASEAN countries engaging the Myanmar junta following the coup to secure its own interests, some have also been calling for a more principled response. Thailand has also adopted a more hedged approach to the Russia-Ukraine War, including select abstentions in UN General Assembly resolutions, and has pursued greater cooperation with China extending across the security realm even as it recalibrates its alliance with the United States following a downturn following the 2014 military coup.
Why It Matters
Move Forward’s victory in the Thai elections has already kicked off post-election speculation on the country’s foreign policy, even if little is yet known and the dust is yet to settle. While Pita himself has been quite consistent in relaying domestic priorities – be it the so-called “3Ds” of demilitarize, demonopolize and decentralize, or the approach to military conscription – the foreign policy tendencies that have been mentioned to date are notable but also less specific, including a greater focus on principles like human rights in the region and the world in the face of issues like Myanmar and the Russia-Ukraine War, or a more active approach in boosting Thailand’s competitiveness in areas like tourism, climate and trade.
More broadly, irrespective of how Thailand’s post-election landscape shapes up, the country faces a challenging regional and international environment. Apart from the situation in Myanmar, which shows few signs of improving anytime soon, China’s growing influence in mainland Southeast Asia, which also alters subregional dynamics that Thailand has historically wanted to more actively shape; lingering uncertainties about ASEAN as an institution; and a more competitive and uncertain economic environment; all make the future of Thailand’s foreign policy approach a broader question beyond just post-election domestic political management.
Where It’s Headed
Moving forward, the country’s future foreign policy prospects still hinge on post-election domestic political dynamics that have yet to be sorted. At this stage, despite a considerable margin of victory, even if MFP is able to cobble together the 376 seats needed for it to lead a coalition (a majority accounting for both 500 seats in the lower house and 250 appointed seats in the upper house), there are still questions about whether some form of military or judicial intervention could stand in the way of a progressive-led coalition governing the country.
That lingering domestic political uncertainty will not detract from continued speculation on potential foreign policy continuity and change. Beyond headline-grabbing issues such as U.S.-China competition or Myanmar, of particular note will be issues that periodically arise in the coming weeks with policy differences that also weigh more directly and heavily on the Thai public, as we have already seen with the choking transboundary haze and developments in the country’s telecommunications sector.
Mapping Southeast Asia’s Potential Flashpoint Stances; Ticking Clock on the Philippines and Reed Bank; Overcoming “Sea Blindness” in Maritime Governance
“[I]ndonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam – have very strong traditions of nonalignment and display no evidence of being willing to volunteer to join a war that does not directly involve them,” notes a new RAND Corporation report looking at partner and ally views with respect to scenarios related to major U.S. combat operations in the Indo-Pacific (see table above from the report). The report assesses that Thailand, one of two U.S. treaty allies in Southeast Asia, has seen its geopolitical perceptions affected by “strong Chinese advances” and that the Philippines, the other treaty ally, would “have few assets to devote to a major fight” with support limited to some stability operation scenarios with limited assets. It concludes that the more decisive factors in these responses are not those such as U.S. commitment, but basic national strategic posture, national interests, stakes in a conflict and risk of Chinese retaliation.
“Our lack of secure access to Reed Bank is not just about the right to exercise our sovereign rights in our own EEZ. More importantly, it is about the country’s energy security, which migrates to existential issues involving our way of life: employment, living standards, food security, etc. According to prior surveys, more than 80% of Filipinos wants the government to assert our rights over the WPS. We should listen to them. Time is not our friend,” notes a piece published over at Rappler looking ahead to key issues in Philippine maritime security and its ties with China, the United States and other partners as the Malampaya gas field is expected to be depleted by 2027.
“[T]he importance of maritime security as an important foreign policy tool has often been overlooked; some countries have historically suffered from sea blindness, which is the inability or disinclination to connect with maritime issues, either at an individual or political level, and stems from either a lack of maritime tradition and seagoing history, or precedence of prioritizing security concerns on land,” notes a brief on maritime security sector governance and reform in Southeast Asia released by the Geneva Center for Security Sector Governance. The brief includes recommendations for international bodies, national governments and civil society (see the accompanying report graphic on maritime security actors above). You can read the full publication here.
What Does Vietnam’s New Power Plan Mean for its Foreign Partnerships?
