For this iteration of ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief, we are looking at:

• Assessing the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of the lost Philippines UN Security Council bid amid Manila’s ASEAN chairmanship;

• Mapping of regional developments, including major dispute pivot as well as new declared summit wins;

• Charting evolving geopolitical, geoeconomic and security trends such as new anti-scam center; big defense first and counting geoeconomic disruption;

• Tracking and analysis of industry developments and quantitative indicators including megaproject blow; media ban; anti-disinformation bid and more;

• And much more! ICYMI, check out our ASEAN Wonk review of a new book mapping out futures for Asia’s geopolitical and geoeconomic outlook.

This Week’s WonkCount: 2,147 words (~10 minutes)

Major Dispute Pivot; Summit Win Declarations & More

Countering Coercion; Satellite Futures & Partnership Prospects

• “There is growing awareness in the Philippines and in Taiwan of common security challenges, but differences in perception, capability, and political constraints continue to influence their responses,” notes a report by NGO We Protect our Seas (WPS) on countering maritime aggression which offers recommendations on future steps in this realm (link).

Graphic Outlining Chinese Vessel Activity Documented By Philippine Coast Guard

• “Deployment is accelerating…yet affordability remains a barrier for the communities that would benefit most, and the technology is moving faster than the policy frameworks needed to govern it,” notes a policy brief on Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite technology in the Indo-Pacific by the Lowy Institute think tank (link).

Status of Starlink Availability Across the Indo-Pacific

• “Notably, attitudes in Thailand towards Vietnam have also changed significantly,” observes an op-ed published in The Bangkok Post on the prospects for Thailand-Vietnam relations which were in the spotlight with the recent visit by communist party chief President To Lam to Thailand (link).

What Does Lost Philippines UN Security Council Bid Signal?

What’s Behind It

• The Philippines loss of its United Nations Security Council seat bid has sparked speculation around the factors behind it and what it means for Manila’s wider global engagement1. In the weeks leading up to the vote, officials began privately signaling a close state of play despite Manila’s past efforts which had included President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. delivering a special address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York just a few months ago in March2. And while Kyrgyzstan’s bid had its own merits and the Philippines is not unfamiliar with the challenges of securing support for some past bold bids rooted in international law — including the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling on the South China Sea marking its 10th anniversary this year — diplomats also noted the role of vote-winning strategies that played out across multiple ballots alongside the role of powers such as China, the United States and Russia in supporting the bids3.

Select Key Recent Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Developments in Southeast Asia

• The bid loss also came amid other continued gains on this score over the past week for the Philippines as part of its wider foreign and security policy. This included the sending off of a Philippine Coast Guard vessel for its inaugural participation in the U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise that Washington publicizes as the world’s premier maritime exercise — previously occurring at an observer level — and announced conclusion of negotiations on a delayed first-of-its-kind sectoral regionwide Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) under its ASEAN chairmanship year which officials say is set to be signed by leaders at the next round of summitry later this year4.

Why It Matters

• The dynamics also spotlighted datapoints to watch with wider implications (see originally generated ASEAN Wonk table below on notable areas to monitor and additional specifics. Paying subscribers can read on for more on what to expect and future implications in the rest of the “Why It Matters” and “Where It’s Headed” sections, along with paid-only sections of the newsletter as usual).

Future Policy Datapoints to Watch, Alongside Major New Developments and Select Key Partners

Read more

WonkCount: 1,297 words (~6 minutes)

Review: Asia Crucible Future in Geopolitics and Geoeconomics

Context

“We must work together to reduce undue dependencies and ensure that progress is not held hostage to disruptions or to coercion,” Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said in framing his historic remarks to a joint session of Japan’s parliament earlier this month1. Marcos’ comments captured the difficult tradeoffs Indo-Pacific states are experiencing in managing the challenges and opportunities emerging from a shifting geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape, some of which have been playing out publicly in ongoing regional fora including the latest iteration of the annual Shangri-La Dialogue that took place this past week2.

Select Key Recent Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Developments in the Indo-Pacific

A new book Asian Crucible by scholar Nick Bisley attempts to map out future scenarios for Asia’s geopolitical and geoeconomic outlook3. In doing so, it adds a scholarly account to the recent series of books that have attempted to shed light on regional futures and their implications for subregions like Southeast Asia as well as wider conceptions such as the Indo-Pacific. These include ones by current and former policymakers that we have reviewed here on ASEAN Wonk such as Malaysia Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s Rethinking Ourselves and the former permanent secretary of Singapore’s foreign ministry Bilahari Kausikan’s The Myth of the Asian Century. “The greatest period of stability in modern Asia’s history has given way to a risky and dangerous future,” the book notes before sketching out future scenarios4.

Analysis

The book also highlights key datapoints to watch on potential futures (see originally-generated ASEAN Wonk table below for a summary of important contours. Paying subscribers can also read the rest of the “Analysis” section and “Implications” section looking at how these dynamics play out in the future).

Policy Datapoints to Watch, Along With Key Outlook Orientations And Future Scenario Labels

Read more

For this iteration of ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief, we are looking at:

• Assessing the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of announcements and outcomes from the just-concluded Shangri-La Dialogue security summit;

• Mapping of regional developments, including North Korea speculation and new summit upgrade talks;

• Charting evolving geopolitical, geoeconomic and security trends such as big digital milestone; information control regime; and infrastructure disruption;

• Tracking and analysis of industry developments and quantitative indicators including quiet pilot program; energy security guidance; intel pact and more;

• And much more! ICYMI, check out the latest episode of the ASEAN Wonk Podcast featuring a council chief’s forecasting of Indo-Pacific and Southeast Asia geoeconomic futures beyond Middle East conflict fallout.

This Week’s WonkCount: 2,027 words (~9 minutes)

North Korea Speculation; Summit Upgrade Talks & More

Conflict Assessment; Legal Warfare & Turning Point Intersection

• “The Asia-Pacific has seen major cross-border conflicts between Thailand and Cambodia, India and Pakistan, and Pakistan and Afghanistan just in the past year alone,” notes the latest iteration of a chapter in the annual regional security assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) released in conjunction with Shangri-La Dialogue (link).

  

• “Taiwan must be cautious not to give the CCP a pretext for war by making a legal misstep…a single error at a crucial moment could result in Taiwan being isolated internationally, argues a new report released by the Global Taiwan Institute that attempts to provide a framework for “legal warfare” (link).

• “India and Africa are each, in their own ways, at a turning point…Africa is the world’s fastest-growing demographic bloc. India has goodwill and is largely seen as a partner of choice rather than of necessity,” notes a publication by think tank Gateway House released amid a postponed India-Africa Forum Summit (link).

Shangri-La Dialogue 2026 Kicks Off New Underwater GUIDE Pact

What’s Behind It

• A new GUIDE framework on critical underwater infrastructure (CUI) was among the developments that headlined this year’s iteration of the Shangri-La Dialogue defense summit in Singapore1. The deliberations took place amid evolving storylines on major power engagements. This included U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s attempt to reinforce U.S. prioritization of Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific following recent initiatives by Washington as well as official responses to the absence of China’s defense minister for the second year running (even though this did not prevent other Chinese participants at the SLD from raising Beijing’s familiar allegations around Japan “militarism” and intrusions into Beijing’s waters and airspace)2.

• The engagement also saw a series of security-related announcements on its sidelines. Much of the attention was on publicized updates such as one issued on the AUKUS trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States after the three convened in Singapore, despite other practitioners pointing to lingering concerns on this front3. There was also scrutiny on ministerial remarks around future defense-related deals involving Indo-Pacific states, in addition to ongoing preparations for security developments on the calendar for later this year after events this past week such as an Indian Ocean defense conference hosted in Australia4.

Select Key Recent Geopolitical-Related Developments Amid 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue

Why It Matters

• The dynamics also spotlighted datapoints to watch with wider implications (see originally generated ASEAN Wonk table below on notable areas to monitor and additional specifics. Paying subscribers can read on for more on what to expect and future implications in the rest of the “Why It Matters” and “Where It’s Headed” sections, along with paid-only sections of the newsletter as usual).

Notable Additional Details Along With New Defense Datapoints And Select Key Countries

Read more

INTRODUCTION

ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the ASEAN Wonk Podcast, where we bring you expert insights and regional perspectives on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics. I’m your host Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. If you haven’t already, do subscribe to the ASEAN Wonk platform at www.aseanwonk.com so you don’t miss our full posts.

Our guest today is Dr. Kaewkamol “Karen” Pitakdumrongkit, who is the executive director at the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) that plays a very important role in some of the regional geoeconomic conversations including in APEC. We start our conversation talking through some of the perceptions of current challenges in policymaking, including the Middle East conflict fallout. Be sure to stay tuned as we go through a range of other subjects, including China’s evolving APEC agenda for its chair year this year and what to expect in the future regional economic agenda in a context where Vietnam will be chairing APEC in 2027 as Singapore will be chairing ASEAN.

Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always!

STATE OF CURRENT REGIONAL GEOECONOMIC DYNAMICS

ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the podcast, Karen, and let’s start, if we could, on where we are now with respect to the regional geoeconomic policy conversation. You were recently at the senior officials meeting with respect to APEC. Your organization also does a number of surveys on an annual basis with respect to these geoeconomic perceptions. What is your sense in terms of these senior officials meetings and conversations with officials about where the regional dynamics and geoeconomic policy conversations are? It seems like a lot of the focus is around the Iran war and some of the geoeconomic fallout, and very interested in your perceptions about what you’re sensing from policymakers.

Dr. Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit: Thank you so much Prashanth for having me. Yes I am the executive director of PECC, but just want to make a quick note here that what I’m going to say is my own view: it doesn’t represent PECC’s view of positions. So yes, we just came back from the senior officials meeting in Shanghai. I and my colleagues were there and we had a lot of activities, like organizing some workshops or a general meeting which is our annual conference we do for ourselves and for APEC policymakers. The sentiments during the SOM-2 (senior officials meetings) and related meetings are concerning because we know we are in the midst of rising protectionism as well as energy shocks and also some energy issues – you know, the spillover from conflict in the Middle East. This actually seeped into the discussions during APEC. So we talked a lot about the implications of energy problems as well as geopolitics. But the atmosphere at APEC is very open because APEC is a nonbinding platform. So it’s actually open for discussion and sharing ideas, best practices and concerns. I think I feel that overall, the discussion was stimulating, and people there, APEC officials, are butting heads to try to figure out how to lessen the impact of external factors, external shocks like energy shocks on the region. I think we’re trying to find what would be the collective action that we can put forward to help the region navigate in this challenging time.

HOW CHINA IS SHAPING THE AGENDA

ASEAN Wonk: China is chairing APEC this year and PECC provides support for APEC and some of these big geoeconomic conversations. Obviously a lot of this is in the shadow of the superpower summitry between the United States and China, and there’s a lot of focus about how the leaders of the United States and China will be meeting multiple times potentially this year: we’ve just seen the recent summit meeting happen between the two countries. Being in the room at these senior officials’ meetings, how do you sense that these meetings are going within China’s APEC agenda, which is much broader than just the US-China relationship?

Dr. Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit: Yeah. That’s a great question, Prashanth. Yes. APEC, as you know, is the organization with twenty-one member economies: definitely it’s bigger than China and US. China is doing very well on APEC so far. The theme is building an Asia Pacific community to prosper together. And this year, China chose to focus on three priorities. One is openness, two is innovation, and three, cooperation.

Openness, the focus now is on how can we show our support for multilateral trading system; how we can work toward a rule-based economic system that make it more predictable, make it more viable for businesses to operate. There is also a lot of discussion on openness about how to strengthen supply chain resilience and connectivity. There are a lot of APEC initiatives that we are seeing headway on like connectivity projects in three pillars – physical, institutional and people-to-people. For example, paperless trade: how can we make sure that electronic certification that could facilitate trade better. That’s about openness.

So the second priority is called innovation. So for this one, China focuses on artificial intelligence (AI) applications and also how to promote the interoperability of data standards or other standards across economies. Innovation also talks about how to enhance digital infrastructure as well as workforce digital literacy and AI skills. So we are trying to make inroads as we have a lot of focus on the digital economy. And the last one which just got endorsed by our leaders is called the APEC AI initiative. So it’s about shoring up cooperation within APEC on AI.

And last but not least, the third priority is cooperation. So under cooperation, it covers variety of things. It covers sectoral cooperation like on SMEs, human resources, energy, food security, public health, etc. So this one is broad but it’s actually very useful because cooperation focuses on how can you ensure that growth and development in the APEC region is inclusive. So because we have some groups that are falling behind – disadvantaged groups, women, etcetera. So that cooperation will ensure that these groups are benefiting from the growth and development in APEC.

NEW GEOECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES AMID CHALLENGES

ASEAN Wonk: Some of these priorities you mentioned are important and carry on from chair to chair, like artificial intelligence which was prioritized as well when South Korea chaired last year, or aspirational developments like the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) countries have been working towards for a long time. There are also a number of opportunities in areas like trade pacts with RCEP and CPTPP or sectoral agreements, in spite of the challenges we’re seeing as well. As somebody who’s very active in these conversations, how are countries balancing the opportunity side of this relative to challenges?

Dr. Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit: Definitely. Yes, we talk about challenges…we also talk about opportunity as well: how can we ensure that opportunities are complementary and also how can we work toward more promotional benefits. So in terms of opportunity, yes, we have, for example, under openness, we look at openness about how to support the multilateral trading system fostering the rule-based international economic system. We talk about FTAAP as well…to try to add more value to the conversation that has been going on the trade front. You mentioned TPP and also CPTPP, right? There’s a lot of free trade agreements being signed and being implemented. For example, RCEP…the project that APEC is trying to do is how can we construct or develop FTAAP. I just want to refer back to our state of the region report in 2022, where we had a question asking officials about how do you envision this FTAAP: do you think this could be a standalone negotiation or could we use existing FTAs as building blocks to develop the FTAAP? The overwhelming majority said that we should use existing FTAs like CPTPP or RCEP and perhaps expand them – add more members and that could help us build up to the larger Asia FTA covering Asia Pacific economies. That’s one thing that APEC discussion and also APEC inputs have added value to regional economic development.

Also, on innovation, yes, you mentioned about some progress being made so far to China. The there was a plan on some discussion right now to talk about whether we should do something that actually has additional progress. As you know, there was an APEC AI initiative endorsed by the leaders last year. So we are discussing whether we can have some high-level statement like this coming up at the end of the year [at APEC summit engagements in] Shenzhen. Would that be possible? So it’s still in the process of deliberating and discussion.

But…I think the sentiment is that we need…some message from the high-level people, like leaders’ level, to actually propel the progress of AI so far. And for AI, I just want to maybe add a few things about PECC work that we have been doing to support on the AI/innovation front. We have a project on artificial intelligence, which has advanced discussion on many aspects of AI cooperation that includes SMEs, AI transformation that would include capacity building as well as AI safety and governance. So we hope that it would help feed into the APEC discussion and help them come up with ways to cooperate better on the AI front.

LOOKING AHEAD TO THE COMING 2027 GEOECONOMIC AGENDA

ASEAN Wonk: We’re going to be leading into some of the summit engagements later this year that China will be hosting, and then in terms of upcoming geoeconomic dynamics, Vietnam will be chairing APEC next year as one of the world’s most active users of trade agreements with the chair position moving back to Southeast Asia after being in Northeast Asia with China. How do you see geoeconomic dynamics manifesting in terms of the proceedings that we’ll see later this year and then into 2027?

Dr. Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit: Yes, this is…

[Note: This is the end of a free preview podcast, with the full version in an earlier post published on May 28, 2026 available to our paying subscribers. This is not meant to serve as new content and is part of our free preview content within the dedicated website podcast section].

ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the ASEAN Wonk Podcast, where we bring you expert insights and regional perspectives on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics. I’m your host Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. If you haven’t already, do subscribe to the ASEAN Wonk platform at www.aseanwonk.com so you don’t miss our full posts.

Our guest today is Dr. Kaewkamol “Karen” Pitakdumrongkit, who is the executive director at the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) that plays a very important role in some of the regional geoeconomic conversations including in APEC. We start our conversation talking through some of the perceptions of current challenges in policymaking, including the Middle East conflict fallout. Be sure to stay tuned as we go through a range of other subjects, including China’s evolving APEC agenda for its chair year this year and what to expect in the future regional economic agenda in a context where Vietnam will be chairing APEC in 2027 as Singapore will be chairing ASEAN.

Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always!

STATE OF CURRENT REGIONAL GEOECONOMIC DYNAMICS

ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the podcast, Karen, and let’s start, if we could, on where we are now with respect to the regional geoeconomic policy conversation. You were recently at the senior officials meeting with respect to APEC. Your organization also does a number of surveys on an annual basis with respect to these geoeconomic perceptions. What is your sense in terms of these senior officials meetings and conversations with officials about where the regional dynamics and geoeconomic policy conversations are? It seems like a lot of the focus is around the Iran war and some of the geoeconomic fallout, and very interested in your perceptions about what you’re sensing from policymakers.

Dr. Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit: Thank you so much Prashanth for having me. Yes I am the executive director of PECC, but just want to make a quick note here that what I’m going to say is my own view: it doesn’t represent PECC’s view of positions. So yes, we just came back from the senior officials meeting in Shanghai. I and my colleagues were there and we had a lot of activities, like organizing some workshops or a general meeting which is our annual conference we do for ourselves and for APEC policymakers. The sentiments during the SOM-2 (senior officials meetings) and related meetings are concerning because we know we are in the midst of rising protectionism as well as energy shocks and also some energy issues – you know, the spillover from conflict in the Middle East. This actually seeped into the discussions during APEC. So we talked a lot about the implications of energy problems as well as geopolitics. But the atmosphere at APEC is very open because APEC is a nonbinding platform. So it’s actually open for discussion and sharing ideas, best practices and concerns. I think I feel that overall, the discussion was stimulating, and people there, APEC officials, are butting heads to try to figure out how to lessen the impact of external factors, external shocks like energy shocks on the region. I think we’re trying to find what would be the collective action that we can put forward to help the region navigate in this challenging time.

HOW CHINA IS SHAPING THE AGENDA

ASEAN Wonk: China is chairing APEC this year and PECC provides support for APEC and some of these big geoeconomic conversations. Obviously a lot of this is in the shadow of the superpower summitry between the United States and China, and there’s a lot of focus about how the leaders of the United States and China will be meeting multiple times potentially this year: we’ve just seen the recent summit meeting happen between the two countries. Being in the room at these senior officials’ meetings, how do you sense that these meetings are going within China’s APEC agenda, which is much broader than just the US-China relationship?

Dr. Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit: Yeah. That’s a great question, Prashanth. Yes. APEC, as you know, is the organization with twenty-one member economies: definitely it’s bigger than China and US. China is doing very well on APEC so far. The theme is building an Asia Pacific community to prosper together. And this year, China chose to focus on three priorities. One is openness, two is innovation, and three, cooperation.

Openness, the focus now is on how can we show our support for multilateral trading system; how we can work toward a rule-based economic system that make it more predictable, make it more viable for businesses to operate. There is also a lot of discussion on openness about how to strengthen supply chain resilience and connectivity. There are a lot of APEC initiatives that we are seeing headway on like connectivity projects in three pillars – physical, institutional and people-to-people. For example, paperless trade: how can we make sure that electronic certification that could facilitate trade better. That’s about openness.

So the second priority is called innovation. So for this one, China focuses on artificial intelligence (AI) applications and also how to promote the interoperability of data standards or other standards across economies. Innovation also talks about how to enhance digital infrastructure as well as workforce digital literacy and AI skills. So we are trying to make inroads as we have a lot of focus on the digital economy. And the last one which just got endorsed by our leaders is called the APEC AI initiative. So it’s about shoring up cooperation within APEC on AI.

And last but not least, the third priority is cooperation. So under cooperation, it covers variety of things. It covers sectoral cooperation like on SMEs, human resources, energy, food security, public health, etc. So this one is broad but it’s actually very useful because cooperation focuses on how can you ensure that growth and development in the APEC region is inclusive. So because we have some groups that are falling behind – disadvantaged groups, women, etcetera. So that cooperation will ensure that these groups are benefiting from the growth and development in APEC.

NEW GEOECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES AMID CHALLENGES

ASEAN Wonk: Some of these priorities you mentioned are important and carry on from chair to chair, like artificial intelligence which was prioritized as well when South Korea chaired last year, or aspirational developments like the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) countries have been working towards for a long time. There are also a number of opportunities in areas like trade pacts with RCEP and CPTPP or sectoral agreements, in spite of the challenges we’re seeing as well. As somebody who’s very active in these conversations, how are countries balancing the opportunity side of this relative to challenges?

Dr. Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit: Definitely. Yes, we talk about challenges…we also talk about opportunity as well: how can we ensure that opportunities are complementary and also how can we work toward more promotional benefits. So in terms of opportunity, yes, we have, for example, under openness, we look at openness about how to support the multilateral trading system fostering the rule-based international economic system. We talk about FTAAP as well…to try to add more value to the conversation that has been going on the trade front. You mentioned TPP and also CPTPP, right? There’s a lot of free trade agreements being signed and being implemented. For example, RCEP…the project that APEC is trying to do is how can we construct or develop FTAAP. I just want to refer back to our state of the region report in 2022, where we had a question asking officials about how do you envision this FTAAP: do you think this could be a standalone negotiation or could we use existing FTAs as building blocks to develop the FTAAP? The overwhelming majority said that we should use existing FTAs like CPTPP or RCEP and perhaps expand them – add more members and that could help us build up to the larger Asia FTA covering Asia Pacific economies. That’s one thing that APEC discussion and also APEC inputs have added value to regional economic development.

Also, on innovation, yes, you mentioned about some progress being made so far to China. The there was a plan on some discussion right now to talk about whether we should do something that actually has additional progress. As you know, there was an APEC AI initiative endorsed by the leaders last year. So we are discussing whether we can have some high-level statement like this coming up at the end of the year [at APEC summit engagements in] Shenzhen. Would that be possible? So it’s still in the process of deliberating and discussion.

But…I think the sentiment is that we need…some message from the high-level people, like leaders’ level, to actually propel the progress of AI so far. And for AI, I just want to maybe add a few things about PECC work that we have been doing to support on the AI/innovation front. We have a project on artificial intelligence, which has advanced discussion on many aspects of AI cooperation that includes SMEs, AI transformation that would include capacity building as well as AI safety and governance. So we hope that it would help feed into the APEC discussion and help them come up with ways to cooperate better on the AI front.

LOOKING AHEAD TO THE COMING 2027 GEOECONOMIC AGENDA

ASEAN Wonk: We’re going to be leading into some of the summit engagements later this year that China will be hosting, and then in terms of upcoming geoeconomic dynamics, Vietnam will be chairing APEC next year as one of the world’s most active users of trade agreements with the chair position moving back to Southeast Asia after being in Northeast Asia with China. How do you see geoeconomic dynamics manifesting in terms of the proceedings that we’ll see later this year and then into 2027?

Dr. Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit: Yes, this is…

CONTINUED TRANSCRIPT AND FULL VIDEO PODCAST EPISODE FOR PAYING SUBSCRIBERS

Read more

For this iteration of ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief, we are looking at:

• Assessing the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of a launch of the inaugural iteration of a new artificial intelligence ministerial;

• Mapping of regional developments, such as a coming international nuclear review and new maritime consultations;

• Charting evolving geopolitical, geoeconomic and security trends including military overhaul call; new strategy update; and delayed corridor boost;

• Tracking and analysis of industry developments and quantitative indicators such as trade disruption fear; shadowy energy aid; digital scrutiny and more;

• And much more! ICYMI, check out our ASEAN Wonk review of a new book by a former division chief forecasting geoeconomic futures triggered by a “doom loop” and its global and Indo-Pacific implications.

This Week’s WonkCount: 2,039 words (~9 minutes)

New Maritime Consultation; International Nuclear Review & More

Warring Europe Futures; Counterinsurgency Challenges & Scam Center Spotlight

• “Before 2030, the EU and its member states should deepen strategic ties with key middle powers, using trade, investment, standard-setting, and security cooperation as complementary instruments,” notes a policy brief by Bertelsmann Stiftung describing geopolitical scenarios for Europe in 2035 (link).

Graphic Depicting Extreme Europe Scenario Implications

• “Until a new counterinsurgency strategy is defined, the stalemate and the violence will continue,” notes a commentary by Stratsea on the long-running Southern Thailand insurgency. The piece analyzes trends in political and military strategy that has maintained the conflict over decades (link).

• “What has historically remained unexamined is how these activities fit within

  a broader pattern of convergent transnational organized crime with links to the Chinese Communist Party,” warns a newly-released U.S. congressional committee report on transnational crime which includes a focus on scam centers in Southeast Asia (link).

A New Artificial Intelligence US-ASEAN Ministerial Boost?

What’s Behind It

• A new artificial intelligence ministerial kicked off between the United States and ASEAN countries amid other Indo-Pacific engagements1. India is scheduled to host a foreign ministers’ meeting of the Quad this coming week after bilateral engagements with visiting U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio2. Details also continued to surface on the outlines of an Iran deal alongside separate and wider regional diplomatic activities, including the visit of Pakistan’s premier to China and further rounds of meetings under the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum which expressed concern around the impasse on some pressing global geoeconomic agenda items3.

Select Key Recent Indo-Pacific and Global Geoeconomic and Geopolitical Developments

• The new ministerial signaled the growing importance of artificial intelligence as a domain in engagements. This was reinforced by other developments by other major powers over the course of the past few weeks both in Southeast Asia as well as in the wider Indo-Pacific region. One notable case in point was the scheduled inauguration ceremony for a new China-ASEAN artificial intelligence innovation center — a key agenda item which Beijing has been playing up in its engagements at the ASEAN level in Southeast Asia which also featured the attendance of the ASEAN secretary general4.

Why It Matters

• The dynamics also spotlighted datapoints to watch with wider implications (see originally generated ASEAN Wonk table below on notable areas to monitor and additional specifics. Paying subscribers can read on for more on what to expect and future implications in the rest of the “Why It Matters” and “Where It’s Headed” sections, along with paid-only sections of the newsletter as usual).

Notable Policy Priorities To Watch, Along With Select Major Areas And Key Sector Dimensions

Read more

WonkCount: 1,427 words (~5 minutes)

Review: Doom Loop in Indo-Pacific and Global Geoeconomics?

Context

“Now if this continues into 2027…then we have to expect a much worse outcome,” the head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Kristalina Georgieva warned earlier this month regarding the uncertain global geoeconomic landscape1. Her outlook — which included an admission that the IMF’s “reference scenario” released just a few weeks ago “is further and further behind in the rearview mirror” compared to more adverse futures — was illustrative of the deep challenges policymakers face in navigating and forecasting evolving geoeconomic dynamics, including in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific2.

Select Key Recent Global and Indo-Pacific Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Developments

A new book The Doom Loop by former IMF division chief Eswar Prasad forecasts the future of a destructive “doom loop,” spiraling disorder and its wider implications for Indo-Pacific and global geoeconomics3. The book is the latest in a series of works that address the uncertain geoeconomic outlook and its regional and global implications, including ones we have reviewed here on ASEAN Wonk recently such as How to Win a Trade War by Chad Bown and Soumaya Keynes4. “It is not foreordained that negative currents will dominate, but breaking out of the doom loop will take herculean effort,” the book argues before delving into recommendations for how countries can do so in the coming years amid shifting global futures5.

Analysis

The book also highlights key datapoints to watch on potential futures (see originally-generated ASEAN Wonk table below for a summary of important contours. Paying subscribers can also read the rest of the “Analysis” section and “Implications” section looking at how these dynamics play out in the future).

Future Policy Pathways To Watch Along With Key Priority Areas And Major Pillars

Read more

For this iteration of ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief, we are looking at:

• Assessing the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of the latest round of BRICS meetings and regional implications;

• Mapping of regional developments, including China diplomacy beyond the G2 hype and North Korea voyage;

• Charting evolving geopolitical, geoeconomic and security trends such as minerals discontent; megaproject drama; and connectivity initiative boost;

• Tracking and analysis of industry developments and quantitative indicators including new military law; electric vehicles pivot; quiet dispute and more;

• And much more! ICYMI, check out our ASEAN Wonk review of a new book which details future survival strategies for countries to navigate “wolf world” conflict futures and “law of the jungle” realities.

This Week’s WonkCount: 2,147 words (~9 minutes)

China Diplomacy Amid G2 Hype; North Korea Voyage & More

Tracing Shadow Alliances; Crossregional Maritime Anxieties & Stalemate Breaking Bid

• “China has used illicit networks to extend its reach, particularly in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America,” notes a report by the Center for the Study of Democracy on the rise of “hybrid warfare” and a so-called “shadow alliance” between Russia, China, and Iran and their activities globally (link).

  Map Of Latin America Noting Logistics And Trade Corridors Used For Hybrid Warfare

  

• “The situation in the Strait of Hormuz can also happen in the South China Sea if China doesn’t dial down its excessive maritime and its regional ambition,” cautions a publication released by the Stratbase-ADR Institute on the impact of the US-Iran conflict on global dynamics (link).

• “The urgency of initiating direct negotiations with Pyongyang should not detract from the necessity of first ensuring US-ROK alignment on this shift to a stable co-existence basis for talks, “ argues a paper by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network on nuclear risk management in the Korean Peninsula which offers recommendations for policymakers in the United States, South Korea as well as China (link).

BRICS Meet Reveals Global South Clash, Southeast Asia Stakes

What’s Behind It

• A key BRICS meet this past week highlighted the grouping’s evolving agenda and regional partnerships including with several countries from Southeast Asia following a previous expansion round1. The meeting came alongside speculation surrounding complex evolving dynamics within the grouping beyond the wider banner of the Global South, with direct calls from officials that it ought to intensify its drive to transcend a global landscape dominated by “polarization.”2 This included the level of Chinese representation at the India-hosted engagement amid U.S.-China summitry in Beijing and the true nature of Russia’s recent perceived regional inroads that have sparked concern among some officials and diplomats privately and publicly3.

Select Key Recent Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Developments Amid BRICS Ministerial Meeting

• The engagement also revealed key agenda items of relevance within the broader Indo-Pacific and global institutional landscape. The evolving agenda highlighted tensions within the BRICS grouping on how to manage the long list of post-expansion items that remain to be addressed while also not losing sight of reforming global governance where, in one sober framing of the stakes at play, “continued delay carries a high cost.”4 Indian officials also had to contend with the fallout that followed the non-issuance of a joint statement and disagreements that spilled over into the public domain despite working level engagements that continue across dozens of meetings and multiple issue area tracks5.

Why It Matters

• The dynamics also spotlighted datapoints to watch with wider implications (see originally generated ASEAN Wonk table below on notable areas to monitor and additional specifics. Paying subscribers can read on for more on what to expect and future implications in the rest of the “Why It Matters” and “Where It’s Headed” sections, along with paid-only sections of the newsletter as usual).

Future Policy Datapoints Along With Select Key Issues And Major Priorities

Read more

WonkCount: 1,247 words (~6 minutes)

Review: Wolf World Conflict Futures Loom Past Trump Xi Hype

Context

“The reality in this changed world is that there will be more volatility – we will be facing storm after storm,” Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong warned earlier this month capturing the future confronting regional countries beyond the immediate the focus on U.S.-China summit deliberations this week1. The remarks, which included a call to step up preparations for geoeconomic pressures “likely to intensify” in the coming months and prolonged fallout even after the Strait of Hormuz is fully reopened, spoke to anxieties echoed in some other key Indo-Pacific capitals as well as in regional engagements on the future global outlook2.

Select Key Recent Global Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Datapoints and Developments

A new book Geopolitical Conflict in the Wolf World by analyst Marc Saxer details future survival strategies for countries to navigate law of the jungle realities amid rising competition and order collapse anxieties3. The book articulates these strategies in the face of what it sees as an increasingly predatory world, drawing on the “wolf” image of Man famously recalled by English philosopher Thomas Hobbes where “the law of the jungle rules and man is a wolf to man.”4 In doing so, it adds to a series of new books drawing attention to shifting regional and global order dynamics, including ones we have reviewed recently here on ASEAN Wonk. “What makes this historical juncture special is that, for the first time in centuries, non-Western powers will have a decisive say in how the next world order will take shape,” the book notes before laying out competing visions for the next world order and varying approaches that key powers can adopt moving forward5.

Analysis

The book also highlights key datapoints to watch on potential futures (see originally-generated ASEAN Wonk table below for a summary of important contours. Paying subscribers can also read the rest of the “Analysis” section and “Implications” section looking at how these dynamics play out in the future).

Future World Order Visions, Major Governance Features and Notable Policy Characteristics

Read more

For this iteration of ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief, we are looking at:

• Assessing the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of outcomes from the latest round of ASEAN summitry and related regional engagements;

• Mapping of regional developments, such as geoeconomic pact expansion announcement and twin new partnership upgrades;

• Charting evolving geopolitical, geoeconomic and security trends, including new transshipment scrutiny; flashpoint perceptions; and information rankings;

• Tracking and analysis of industry developments and quantitative indicators including emergency supply agreements; new bilateral trade mechanisms; cross-border rail dynamics, and much more!

This Week’s WonkCount: 2,107 words (~9 minutes)

Twin New Upgrades; Geoeconomic Pact Expansion & More

Last Mile Challenge; Assessing Mekong Risk & Foreign Policy Debate

• “The challenge lies in ensuring that the “last mile” of reform…matches the ambition of the high-level trade agreements India has signed,” according to a new article published by Project Syndicate on challenges and opportunities in India’s shifting geoeconomic role in the evolving global order (link).

• “[T]he province’s proximity to the Thai and Vietnamese borders, growing

  trade infrastructure, Chinese-linked investment and rich biodiversity make it vulnerable to exploitation,” argues the latest iteration of the Mekong Risk Monitor published by the Australian government and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime which examines the role of Khammouane province in Laos and links to global scam networks (link).

• “A more active president does not signify a weaker ministry…it calls for a ministry that operates with greater precision and speed, and that is a challenge this institution is facing,” notes an op-ed published in The Jakarta Post by Indonesia’s foreign minister Sugiono responding to recent criticism surrounding the country’s foreign policy (link).

New Maritime Center and Stockpile Push at 2026 ASEAN Summit

What’s Behind It

• Southeast Asian states discussed a series of regional measures including a new maritime center and a stockpile push alongside ongoing bilateral engagements with key powers1. Japan continued the brisk pace of its recent regional diplomacy by signing a new defense agreement with Indonesia — following ones Jakarta has previously inked with Australia and the United States within the past year — while India advanced cooperation with Vietnam in key areas as part of a scheduled diplomatic upgrade in relations between the two countries2. Meanwhile, Russia President Vladimir Putin‘s engagements over the past week included meetings with Malaysia’s king Sultan Ibrahim and Laos President Thongloun Sisoulith in the latest of a series of high-level interactions between the Kremlin and Southeast Asian states in 20263.

Key Regional Geopolitical And Geoeconomic Developments Amid ASEAN Summit Engagements

• The engagement also highlighted some of the intraregional dynamics at play. While officials have not publicly disclosed concrete next steps, Southeast Asian states have been working on paths to both reengage Myanmar’s government at higher levels as well as contend with ongoing Cambodia-Thailand tensions, with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. as this year’s holder of the rotating ASEAN chairmanship presiding over a trilateral summit on the latter front and announcing planned steps such as a mandate extension for a regional observer team.4 Details are also continuing to be publicized around China’s influence operations in the Philippines during Manila’s ASEAN chairmanship, including recruitment of spies and connections to the South China Sea.5

Why It Matters

• The dynamics also spotlighted datapoints to watch with wider implications (see originally generated ASEAN Wonk table below on notable areas to monitor and additional specifics. Paying subscribers can read on for more on what to expect and future implications in the rest of the “Why It Matters” and “Where It’s Headed” sections, along with paid-only sections of the newsletter as usual).

Future Policy Datapoints Along With Key Cooperation Areas And Select Priority Sectors

Read more

For this iteration of ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief, we are looking at:

• Assessing the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of a new European Union ministerial and shifting Europe Southeast Asia links;

• Mapping of regional developments, including new essential supplies pact signing and maritime boundary talks futures;

• Charting evolving geopolitical, geoeconomic and security trends such as new AI regional hub; coming investment pact and local geoeconomic heft;

• Tracking and analysis of industry developments and quantitative indicators including China land corridor; trade scrutiny; and first sector pact and more;

• And much more! ICYMI, check out our post earlier this week thanking the ASEAN Wonk community following the announcement of a new book Mandalas of Multialignment.

This Week’s WonkCount: 2,057 words (~9 minutes)

New Essential Supplies Pact Signing; Maritime Boundary Talks & More

Robotics Transformation; Supply Stockpiling & Gaming Security Futures

• “China’s industrial robotics industry is catching up to foreign competitors in both innovation and deployment,” notes a report published by the MERICS think tank about China’s progress in building humanoid robots (link).

Graphic Depicting Select Humanoid Robot Components

• “The recommendations of President Marcos position stockpiling as a core pillar of ASEAN’s resilience against supply shocks,” summarizes a policy brief by ERIA about the core message of Philippines President Marcos’ address to ASEAN leaders on how the region should respond to rising geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions with Manila chairing the grouping this year (link).

Comparison Of Stockpiling Status Across ASEAN Nations

• “The turbulence in the Taiwan Strait and the Strait of Hormuz sends a clear message: unless Korea fundamentally restructures its energy architecture, it will remain perilously exposed to external shocks,” notes a commentary published by the RAND Corporation on findings from a simulation exercise which included a blockade along the Taiwan Strait if tensions were to escalate following the presidential election in 2028 (link).

New EU Ministerial and Shifting Europe Southeast Asia Links

What’s Behind It

• The European Union and ASEAN held a ministerial meeting highlighting the future prospects for ties in a changing geoeconomic and geopolitical context1. The engagement — to be followed by several sectoral meetings officials are preparing to convene as well in the next few weeks — took place alongside other notable developments, with a case in point being Japan’s publicized update of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) during Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s visit to Vietnam, components of which Tokyo had been rolling out in the past few weeks in other parts of the region as well as we have been noting on ASEAN Wonk2.

Select Key Recent Indo-Pacific Partner Related Developments in Southeast Asia

• The engagement also spotlighted the shifting state of Europe Southeast Asia relations as both sides look to further develop ties out to 2027. In recent weeks, Russia has intensified efforts to position itself as a partner for Southeast Asian states in areas like energy amid Middle East conflict fallout even as it wages war against Ukraine, and private and public engagements have continued into this week as well3. While European officials have not publicly chastised individual regional states for doing so, it has nonetheless complicated a narrative where the EU could more explicitly position itself as an alternative to China and the United States — which are themselves adjusting their own regional engagements as well — given that this also affects wider major power dynamics as well4.

Why It Matters

• The dynamics also spotlighted datapoints to watch with wider implications (see originally generated ASEAN Wonk table below on notable areas to monitor and additional specifics. Paying subscribers can read on for more on what to expect and future implications in the rest of the “Why It Matters” and “Where It’s Headed” sections, along with paid-only sections of the newsletter as usual).

Future Policy Datapoints To Watch Along With Key Priority Sectors And Major Cooperation Areas

Read more

Background

We’re briefly breaking from our regular schedule which will continue later this week as usual to announce the publication of a new book Mandalas of Multialignment: Hedging Bets in Southeast Asia Grand Strategy Spheres, Foreign and Security Policy Webs, and Global Geopolitics and Geoeconomics. The book articulates a new and connective balance of alignment model to explain and forecast shifts in grand strategy and foreign and security policy derived from an approach known as neoclassical realism; regional cases over nearly a century; and hundreds of conversations with policymakers across all 11 countries in Southeast Asia.

Some early kind words on the book from practitioners and scholars:

“Prashanth Parameswaran…has captured more accurately than any other theorist I know, how Southeast Asian states actually adapt”

– Bilahari Kausikan, former permanent secretary of the Singapore foreign ministry

“A nuanced framework for understanding the challenges Southeast Asian nations face in their alignments”

– Scot Marciel, former US ambassador to ASEAN, Indonesia and Myanmar

“A clear analytical model from one of the best-informed observers of Southeast Asia’s complexities…”

– Professor Brantly Womack, author, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry

“A timely and indispensable resource for understanding Southeast Asia’s future”

– Dindo Manhit, founder and managing director, Stratbase Group Philippines

“Prashanth Parameswaran advances neoclassical realism in a contested region”

– Professor Jeffrey Taliaferro, author, Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy

Before offering a snapshot of what the book details below, first and foremost our sincere thanks to the ASEAN Wonk community for the support over the years! As readers will note, the book draws on insights shared here including podcast dialogues, book reviews and conversations with regional policymakers across Southeast Asia along with key Indo-Pacific capitals.

Significance

The book argues that given Southeast Asia’s diverse and evolving historical experience with tighter and looser alignments that transcend more rigid versions of any one single approach – be it non-alignment, balancing, bandwagoning or hedging – forecasting how Southeast Asian states will seek to exercise agency in the future requires a connective “inside-out” perspective on the full breadth of alignments going back decades, rather than an “outside-in” perspective of how they think about one or two powers at a single point. This reframing of alignment shifts the focus from how countries navigate major power competition to how countries shape grand strategy spheres and weave alignment webs within their own “North Stars” in geopolitics and geoeconomics. As Malaysia Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim put it at the last Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore as ASEAN chair, Southeast Asia’s status as a “crossroads” — from ancient trade routes of the past to data centers of the present — is contingent upon the preservation of an ability “to act on our own terms.”1

Yet as the book notes, the ability to act on one’s own terms today and tomorrow is a contested one as it has been through much of the region’s history. The majority of Southeast Asia’s 11 countries have learned the risks of previously pursued tighter alignments relative to the looser ones that dominate the region today including strategic partnerships, with cases in point such as Vietnam’s tighter alignment with the Soviet Union reoriented after the latter’s demise or the Philippines under President Rodrigo Duterte’s (ultimately failed) U.S.-China shift bid. And even in the days of precolonial Southeast Asia, intraregional conceptions such as “mandalas” that frame the book — a Sanskrit term that can be used to represent a looser governance model with power radiating from the center through concentric circles – are important reminders that alignments need to be carefully calibrated even among neighbors. Six decades ago, Singapore’s founding premier Lee Kuan Yew captured the connectivity between alignments succinctly when he said amid Britain’s withdrawal from Southeast Asia that “the stage is set for local big fish to settle terms with small fish and small fish with shrimps.”2 More recently, Vietnam’s communist party chief To Lam noted recently on the wider risks from intensifying geopolitical competition and global disorder, given that “pressures to take sides…have reemerged in more sophisticated forms” including in geoeconomic areas such as strategic supply chains, technological standards and critical minerals, the question of autonomy for countries like Vietnam who fiercely won their independence “is a matter of life and death.”3

The approach suggests three insights relevant for shifting policy dynamics…

Read more

For this iteration of ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief, we are looking at:

• Assessing the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of China’s new high-level 2026 Southeast Asia tour and Beijing’s shifting regional influence;

• Mapping of regional developments, including coming Indo-Pacific summitry watch and Malacca Strait maritime clarification;

• Charting evolving geopolitical, geoeconomic and security trends such as emergency transfers; hidden 2027 APEC race and membership checkpoint;

• Tracking and analysis of industry developments and quantitative indicators including maritime threat; green pact chatter; investment deep dive and more;

• And much more! ICYMI, check out our ASEAN Wonk review of a new book which puts a rare spotlight on Asia’s aging security dilemma timebomb.

This Week’s WonkCount: 2,427 words (~11 minutes)

Coming Indo-Pacific Summitry Watch; Malacca Strait Clarification & More

Supply Chain Resilience; Grid Building & Aid Futures

• “[S]upply chain resilience should be paramount,” notes a new paper assessing the Japan’s efforts in the semiconductor industry and the pursuit of economic security within the country’s wider policy landscape (link).

Graphic Depicting Market Shares of Advanced Logic IC Manufacturing Countries, 2023

• “[W]hat it lacks is the governance architecture to fully unlock it,” argues a new commentary published over at East Asia Forum on overcoming challenges in building the ASEAN Power Grid in Southeast Asia (link).

• “Within the broader financing landscape, ODA should remain focused on core development investment, consistent with its defining purpose,” according to a new brief published by the Center for Global Development (link).

What Did China Really Gain in New 2026 Southeast Asia Tour?

What’s Behind It

• China announced new inroads with Southeast Asian states following foreign minister Wang Yi’s three-country regional tour1. The inroads occurred alongside regional engagements by other key powers. While the focus this past week was on the publicizing of new U.S. steps against giant scam networks including those targeting Chinese nationals, other powers including the European Union were also taking steps of their own on a global challenge2. The outcomes following South Korea President Lee Jae Myung’s Vietnam visit also highlighted Seoul’s role in a wider mix of powers engaging in geoeconomic areas such as nuclear power plants amid the long list of agreements touted by both sides3.

Select Key Recent and Related Developments Amid Latest China Southeast Asia Tour

• The tour occurred amid scrutiny on the regional flashpoint landscape. Ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump’s trip to China, a senior official suggested that Washington had “more of an advantage” over Beijing in terms of economic vulnerability despite suggestions of mutual economic destruction4. Beyond the focus on China’s reactions to increasingly multinationalized U.S.-Philippines Balikatan exercises and implications for the South China Sea, the delayed issuance of an ASEAN chair statement on Myanmar also reinforced differences within the evolving intraregional conversation that some officials privately say has also been visible in the handling of Middle East conflict fallout thus far5.

Why It Matters

• The dynamics also spotlighted datapoints to watch with wider implications (see originally generated ASEAN Wonk table below on notable areas to monitor and additional specifics. Paying subscribers can read on for more on what to expect and future implications in the rest of the “Why It Matters” and “Where It’s Headed” sections, along with paid-only sections of the newsletter as usual).

Future Policy Datapoints to Watch, Alongside New Major Developments and Key Partners

Read more

WonkCount: 1,347 words (~6 minutes)

Review: Will Asia’s Aging Security Dilemma Timebomb Explode?

Context

“[L]ike many advanced economies, our population is rapidly aging,” Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong cautioned in a recent address to the nation on longer-term challenges to manage beyond the immediate focus on what he termed “the end of the global order that we had long operated in.”1 The comment was just the latest among many that capture the complex challenges individual Indo-Pacific countries face beyond the aggregate reality of the region’s growing geoeconomic heft, with implications for everything from defense spending to economic planning.

Select Key Recent Security-Related Developments in the Indo-Pacific Region

A new book Asia’s Aging Security by scholar Andrew Oros book puts rare spotlight on a critical underexamined security challenge in the Indo-Pacific with implications for subregions such as Southeast Asia2. In doing so, it adds a regional perspective to a series of country-focused book-length works on the subject amid a period of intensified geoeconomic change and engagement3. Asia’s Aging Security forecasts possible futures in what is termed an “aging security dilemma” in Asia — with longstanding conflict flashpoints continuing and aging states deploying new technologies and weapons to maximize security4. “Asia’s aging security…should be brought to the forefront when designing new security architecture and strategies for regional and global peace in the coming decades,” the book argues as it specifies pathways for doing so out to 2050 and beyond5.

Analysis

The book also highlights key datapoints to watch on potential futures (see originally-generated ASEAN Wonk table below for a summary of important contours. Paying subscribers can also read the rest of the “Analysis” section and “Implications” section looking at how these dynamics play out in the future).

Major Future Datapoints to Watch, Alongside Priority Variables and Key Strategic Components

Read more

For this iteration of ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief, we are looking at:

• Assessing the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of a newly revealed billions support bid and its wider Indo-Pacific and global implications.

• Mapping of regional developments, including new critical supplies pact talks and Europe summitry spotlight;

• Charting evolving geopolitical, geoeconomic and security trends, such as new supply chain hub; flashpoint forecast futures; and mining crackdown;

• Tracking and analysis of industry developments and quantitative indicators including a new regional trade agreement addition; quiet maritime transfer; major resource shortfall disclosure and more;

• And much more! ICYMI, check out the latest episode of the ASEAN Wonk Podcast featuring a former White House senior official on forecasting US Asia strategy futures and wider Indo-Pacific implications;

This Week’s WonkCount: 2,237 words (~10 minutes)

New Critical Supplies Pact Talks; Europe Summitry Spotlight & More

Great Power Perceptions in Global Competition Dynamics; Evolving 2026 ASEAN Agenda & New Defense Strategy Assessment

• “China, Russia, and Iran are gaining ground in perceived legitimacy, though…publics are not uniformly supportive,” according to data released from Arab Barometer on regional public views of the United States and China amid global great power competition in select countries in the Arab world alongside recent developments such as the Gaza war and Iran conflict fallout (link).

US vs. China on Maintaining Regional Security (% Saying the Following Statements)

• “Within ASEAN’s agenda for 2026 and beyond, food security should be elevated as a core focus,” argues a new commentary published by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. The piece argues that greater attention should be placed on the human concerns of vulnerable groups, including bridging knowledge and skill gaps in digital technologies (link).

• “The defense strategy and investment program released this week is the largest step Australia has taken to confront the 21st-century strategic realities in a world of disorder and conflict,” according to a new article published over at The Sydney Morning Herald on Australia’s newly released defense strategy. The article suggests areas where key questions remain unanswered, including on the U.S.-Australia alliance, drone technology and the involvement of non-government stakeholders in conflict preparedness (link).

Japan Reveals New Southeast Asia Billions AZEC Bid Support

What’s Behind It

• Japan unveiled a new multibillion-dollar sectoral support plan covering Southeast Asian states in the latest iteration of an expanding regional initiative1. The meeting occurred amid several other initiatives at play by key powers, including new sectoral pacts highlighted in Australia Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s Southeast Asia tour and Russia’s continued rhetorical pledges when receiving regional leaders, with the latest being Indonesia President Prabowo Subianto this past week2. The calibration between addressing severe domestic challenges while also building out wider regional engagement has been a recurrent theme, and even Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi had to clarify that assistance would not have “any adverse effect” on domestic needs3.

Select Key Recent and Relevant Regional Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Developments

• The initiative also shed light on the wider evolving geoeconomic and geopolitical context and its effects on how powers are engaging. While powers like Japan have continued to be active conveners in 2026 both on their own as well as with partners in this realm, there is also a recognition even in some internal assessments that others including China are gaining significant regional ground4. That said, officials also note that these more high-profile comparisons also belie quieter, first-of-its-kind sectoral advances in other domains, including the addition of new defense positions in regional diplomatic posts5. Meanwhile, in a more global context, wider geoeconomic uncertainties were also a recurrent theme among senior officials who attended this past week’s iteration of the spring meetings by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank ahead of an annual meet set to be convened in Thailand later this year6.

Why It Matters

• The dynamics also spotlighted datapoints to watch with wider implications (see originally generated ASEAN Wonk table below on notable areas to monitor and additional specifics. Paying subscribers can read on for more on what to expect and future implications in the rest of the “Why It Matters” and “Where It’s Headed” sections, along with paid-only sections of the newsletter as usual).

Major Policy Actions to Watch, Alongside Priority Pillars and Select Key Cooperation Areas

Read more

INTRODUCTION

ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the ASEAN Wonk Podcast, where we bring you expert insights and regional perspectives on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics. I’m your host Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. If you haven’t already, do subscribe to the ASEAN Wonk platform at www.aseanwonk.com so you don’t miss our full posts.

Our guest today is Dr. Michael Green who worked at the National Security Council on Asia policy and is now the CEO of the US Studies Center at the University of Sydney. We’ll start our conversation talking about contemporary US Asia policy dynamics. Be sure to stay tuned as we also look ahead on other subjects, including what to expect with respect to future US policy in the region and the dynamics we might expect with upcoming midterm elections.

Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always!

US ASIA STRATEGY TODAY IN PERSPECTIVE

ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the podcast, Mike, and let’s start if we could on US Asia strategy more generally, with the caveat, of course, that we are in the midst of Iran war fallout and a president who has some of the greatest latitude we’ve seen in terms of policymaking in recent history. You’ve written what I would say is the most extensive book on the subject of US Asia strategy By More Than Providence, and that looks at US Asia strategy even before the founding of the United States all the way up to some of the contemporary dynamics that we’re sort of talking about. With the second administration of US President Donald Trump, there’s a lot of focus on some of the personalistic dynamics. I’m hoping that we can get beyond that and talk a little bit more about some of the structural realities and some of the measures of continuity and change. If you talk to administration officials, they point out that there are still some gains and signs of continuity in terms of security networking with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, and some of the things that we saw in the first Trump administration like the Development Finance Corporation, some of the rebranded minilaterals like Pax Silica. At the same time, if you look at some of the big broader trends in terms of trade, in terms of values, and in terms of some of the aspects of the policy ecosystem, there’s some really dramatic change there as well. So having long been a professor yourself and also written a book on this subject, how would you grade the administration’s approach to Asia so far?

Dr. Michael Green: Well thanks Prashanth. It’s great to be an honorary ASEAN wonk for an hour and to spend time with a CSIS alum. How would I grade them? Gosh. I would send them to the school counselor for examination is the honest answer, but I wouldn’t expel them from school because there are, as you suggest, some real points of continuity. We’re in this strange situation where there has perhaps never been as much consensus on Asia, the importance of Asia, the nature of the strategic challenge from China, and the criticality of alliances. There hasn’t been this much consensus – and this consensus has been around for eight, ten years now – in the whole postwar era, but we haven’t had a president who is as disinterested or almost hostile to that consensus as we have with Donald Trump. So when my book came out, it was 2017, so it was the first year of the Trump administration. And the reviews were all generally very good, but some reviewers said, well, you know, that’s been a fine explanation for the last two hundred and forty years. But now that Donald Trump is president, America doesn’t have a foreign policy or strategy anymore. And, you know, actually, in the first Trump administration, they did. The National Security Strategy put out by the Trump administration was the first to say that our focus has got to be on strategic competition with China and with Russia. Officials like Steve Biegun at state, Matt Pottinger at the NSC, General Mattis, the secretary of defense, and a lot of others really built a kind of balance of power – what my old boss Condoleezza Rice used to call a balance of power that favors freedom – upgrading the Quad, strengthening the alliance with Japan. And the first Trump term gets reasonably high marks in places like Tokyo and the Philippines. Then the Biden administration continued a lot of it. The Quad, for example, which was made a foreign minister’s summit by Secretary Mike Pompeo, the Biden administration made a presidential level summit. They didn’t undo basically anything that the Trump administration done in Asia.

But then the second Trump administration turned out to be much more of a departure from that trend. And a lot of it is because President Trump himself clearly believes that he now has the authority and the experience and maybe even the mission to do big things. And what those big things are, it kind of changes from day to day. And so, you know, he’s not strategic at all, he’s extremely tactical. It’s day to day. He is interested in enhancing his ways and means, his reputation, his power, his tools. But what for is never clear, and I don’t buy these arguments that he believes in spheres of influence or that we are in a neo-monarchical [state], I think that’s just basically kind of the vibe or the mood or as he puts it his gut on any given day. So that makes it very hard to sustain strategy, and he’s appointed a lot of people who frankly think that the enemy of America is within. That’s not the best frame of mind to deal with strategic competition from without. So there’s a lot more uncertainty. But underneath it all, as you suggested in your intro, if you look at congressional views including Republicans, if you look at public opinion, if you look at military alliances in Asia, there’s far more continuity than change underneath the surface. And we can talk about how much the surface matters. It matters. But I don’t see us on a new trajectory. I see us in a period of incredible turbulence, but not a fundamental change in the way that the American system is going to be viewing competition in Asia for the coming decades.

RECONSIDERING “PIVOT” DYNAMICS AND CONTEMPORARY REALITIES

ASEAN Wonk: So another point you referenced earlier Mike is that there’s chatter with respect to this US episode with Iran in terms of “we’ve seen this playbook before” with respect to the war on terrorism and the Bush administration which you were in as well. My issue with that is that the world has changed pretty fundamentally in the last twenty years. We’ve had a war in Ukraine that has reinforced connectivity between different regions, rather than this notion that we were in the Obama administration of a pivot or rebalance to Asia. And in fact, some of the advocates of the pivot, including Kurt Campbell, have actually admitted that these realities are actually much more sophisticated relative to where they were twenty years ago. The US position is also quite different in terms of hydrocarbons from where it was twenty years ago. And the China challenge is a much more fundamental challenge today than it was twenty years ago as well. So how would you sort of think about this notion of the sort of evolution from the pivot and rebalance to where we are at now, where we’re seeing a lot more focus on hemispheric and homeland concerns. When I look back further at U. S. history, whether it’s the Cuban Missile Crisis or the Monroe Doctrine, these things are not exactly new. It seems like a rebalancing of US interests on Asia relative to the rest of the world.

Dr. Michael Green: Yeah. None of this is new in a way. I started my book By More Than Providence in 1783 because that’s when Thomas Jefferson sent a letter to the commander of US forces in the frontier, which was somewhere in Pennsylvania at the time, warning that our spies in London had learned that the British were planning an expedition across Canada to find a fast route to the Pacific Northwest and access to the Pacific Ocean. And Jefferson said to Colonel Clark, we need to find a way to get there first, which, of course, was a big part of the Lewis and Clark expedition. It was geopolitical. So geopolitics is in the American DNA even if it’s sloppy and contested and inconsistent. I was actually surprised to find that when I did my research. What was going to be a two-year project became a seven-year project because there’s so much rich strategic debate about the Pacific in Congress, in congressional hearings, among men of letters. And so that’s one of the reasons, frankly, why I think we have to look at the Trump era not as a new unprecedented trajectory in American foreign policy, but a period of turbulence. And how much damage the turbulence does, we can discuss.

I don’t think I put this in my book, I use it in class, but there’s a great cartoon by Herb Block, the famous Washington Post cartoonist you’re old enough to remember: he had a cartoon in the 1940s during World War Two, and it shows General MacArthur who commanded in the Far East meeting with General Marshall, the chief of staff of the army. And MacArthur has brought in a globe of the world to discuss strategy, and the globe is a cube, and East Asia’s on top. And Marshall says, well, you know, general, here, we prefer to use a round globe. And it was making fun of the fact that MacArthur wanted everything in North Africa and Europe put in second place or dropped to pivot military resources to the Pacific. And I do that at Georgetown in my class because I don’t want people who major in Asian studies to think that good Asia strategy is neglecting the rest of the world, and especially for the US, which is a global power, a two-ocean power, and all the rest.

And so I was in the White House on 9/11, I was in the White House during Afghanistan and Iraq. I did not go into meetings and say: we can’t be doing any of this. We’ve got to focus on Asia. I thought, how do we — and I was hardly alone in this [Richard Armitage] and many others — but how do we basically take advantage of this crisis to strengthen our alliances and partnerships in Asia? And I think sometimes advocates of Asia strategy think we can hit pause on the Middle East or on Europe, but especially on the Middle East because it’s such a quagmire. You keep trying to get out, you get pulled back in. But as Lee Kuan Yew said, Americans think geopolitics is a video game and you can hit pause in one part of the world and then come back, and nothing will have happened while you’re dealing with another. And Lee Kuan Yew actually recognized the US and Singapore’s and Asia’s interests had to tend to security in the Middle East, had to tend to security in Europe.

So I’m not an advocate of just ignoring Iran. And there’s a lot that the Trump administration did wrong with the Iran war in terms of their assumptions, poor planning, complete disregard for allies and for the congress and the American public. It’s a pretty long list. But the underlying challenge for Iran was not created by Donald Trump. The missile program in particular was potentially heading towards ten thousand ballistic missiles in a few years. Unacceptable. So you can’t just hit pause in the Middle East and hope everything will be fine. It’s going to take some level of resources. Now maybe more resources than we needed because of the way the war’s been prosecuted. We’ll see. But you have to have an Asia strategy within a global strategy. And I don’t know if you want me to talk more about Trump’s lack of strategy or what we see as continuity, but, obviously, one big feature of his second term is going to be Iran. And it’s undoing his presidency. You can see it in public opinion in the fights in MAGA. The effect on Asia is not – you know, people who say this is that he’s Bismarck and this is brilliant are wrong, obviously – but people who say this is a complete destruction of interest in Asia are also wrong. It’s a mixed picture, and I think you have to be balanced in how you look at it.

DEFENSE PERIMETER, ISLAND CHAIN STAKES AND SECURITY FUTURES

ASEAN Wonk: One of the things you mentioned with respect to MacArthur is the conversation around the defense perimeter and how the United States is looking at its worldview and its vision for the region. Some of the chatter around the narrowing of the administration’s approach to the first island chain, for example, and the implications for – if you’re looking at, say, Vietnam and the South China Sea, for example – there are some elements of change there and concern, which I understand. There are also some elements of continuity that I see as well: in the last couple of administrations, the Philippines has really cemented its role in terms of the US security architecture around the alliances, but also Guam, Hawaii, and so on and so forth with respect to Japan, Australia: the networking there is pretty intense. What’s your view on this notion of the defense perimeter and the forward defense line relative to what we’ve seen in other periods in history, including MacArthur, the Korean War, and so on: is it as much of a change, or do you see more continuity there with respect to the security aspect?

Dr. Michael Green: You know, drawing your defense perimeter – put it another way, where you’re willing to fight or risk war – is one of the hardest things in grand strategy. And in my book it’s a conundrum for American strategists for 250 years. In the book I wrote after that on Japan’s current strategy called Line of Advantage, it’s a conundrum. Where do you draw the line? Where do you decide you’re going to take risk? John Lewis Gaddis, in his book on strategy, says you need the discipline to sit inside the castle walls and listen to the villagers being burned alive or something like that. He’s obviously an advocate of clear defensive perimeters and being disciplined. And one of my old bosses, Steve Hadley, to say, you keep drawing red lines and you don’t defend them, you end up creating a red carpet. I love that line. And so it’s very, very tricky. I think one problem US strategists make sometimes is, to quote Homer Simpson, the great geopolitical thinker, sometimes they make the mistake of saying the loud part soft and the soft part loud. So when Dean Acheson in January 1950, after a review within the State Department of how to protect our interests and contain communism after the fall of mainland China to Mao, decided, well, don’t worry – it was a political thing as much as it was strategic for the Democrats – he said, don’t worry. We’ve got this very strong defensive line with the first island chain, which was all thinking in American geopolitics. And he had that famous line between Japan and Korea in January 1950, which was a red carpet. It was an invitation to Mao, Stalin, and Kim Il Sung to test containment and allow Kim Il Sung to attack six months later, June 1950. That was a mistake to draw that defensive perimeter so clearly. Of course, the Vietnam War had the flip problem, which is they didn’t know where the defensive perimeter was. So, you know, strategy is basically about reconciling two mutually contradictory goals. If you didn’t have mutually contradictory goals, you wouldn’t need to think about it: you just pursue your interests. But sometimes the goals compete.

But I do think we are guilty in the United States sometimes of drawing the line too crisply, too clearly sometimes, and too much. So to give you more recent examples – the National Defense Strategy that came out. It was a dog’s breakfast, as they say in Australia – it had all kinds of stuff in it, some of it was ridiculous – but it did have a very clear and very historic focus on, as you said, on defending the first and second island chain in the Western Pacific. But it was very reductionist, and this sort of follows Bridge Colby’s thinking about Taiwan being the major central front. It was very reductionist. So everything’s about Taiwan. And this is also a mistake because the defense of Taiwan is not just – and certainly not in the first instance – about military deterrence in North Asia and in the first island chain. I mean, that’s absolutely core to the strategy, but Beijing’s strategy is to win without fighting. So if you overly focus on the military deterrence piece – which is critical – but if that’s all you’re worried about, you neglect, for example, diplomacy and development in Southeast Asia or the transatlantic alliance. And the flavor of the National Defense Strategy, Bridge’s thinking is – I mean, he’s a smart guy, and he’s very focused on the core problem – he’s worried about U.S. resources. But the danger of being overly reductionist and drawing a very clear line around what you’re willing to fight for too much is you end up ceding in Phase Zero – in peacetime – strategic influence in Southeast Asia that allows China to flank you from the south with their own power projection or prevent U.S. access to the archipelagic southern flank, which is critical for access basing overflight and dealing with a PLA campaign strategy that’s the entire first and second island chain.

And it’s not a simple matter of deterrence as you know well from your work. It’s much more complicated. It’s about development. It’s about diplomacy. It’s about soft power. It’s about partnering with Australia, Japan, and others. It’s not a kind of John Mearsheimer simple war and peace, black and white issue. It’s complex. And if you get it wrong, you make it easier for China to fight without winning. And in a similar way, the transatlantic relationship: it is way too reductionist to say the central problem we have – the pacing threat – is dealing with the PLA on the Taiwan contingency so we don’t have time for Europe. And then to gratuitously sort of beat up Europeans and tell them we don’t want your ships in Asia. Life’s not that simple, and strategy is not that simple. And Beijing would love to have Europe remain neutral, NATO remain neutral in a Taiwan contingency.

And it’s not whether the order of battle changes because the Dutch send a frigate. It’s about the geopolitical dissuasion effect, the geopolitical cost imposition that NATO can impose on China. And so, like losing interest in the IP-4 – the Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand summits with NATO – the gratuitously fighting with Europe, especially right now, is just an onside goal. So yes, as a historian and a geography nut, I love the focus on the first and second island chain, you’re absolutely right. But don’t reduce the whole strategic problem to the military equation in the first island chain. Got to get that right. But if you get only that right, you lose anyway. So kind of a long answer. But a strategy, you know the famous dime construct, you need diplomacy, informational, military tools and economic. And I think part of the problem there is continuity for sure on the military side. For sure, we can talk about it. But the dime construct overall, we’re not performing on the d and i and the e in Asia. We’re doing a lot of good stuff on the m, and there’s a lot of continuity, which is why the alliances will survive. But in terms of strategic competition, we are not using our toolkit fully.

FORECASTING US ASIA STRATEGY AND POLICY FUTURES BEYOND TRUMP II

ASEAN Wonk: And on that Mike, just looking ahead, the conversation that we will get to as the midterms loom closer, diplomats and officials from the region will be asking including in allied capitals: how do we think about this question of Trumpism or America First after Trump in terms of US Asia policy? And what is that going to look like in terms of that sort of new bipartisan consensus around strategic competition, China, but also the famous DIME construct – and the very difficult balance that policymakers have to make between the security and military inroads where the United States has always led, and the difficulties on the economic, diplomatic, and informational aspects that we’ve seen?

Dr. Michael Green: Well…

[Note: This is the end of a free preview podcast, with the full version in an earlier post published on April 16, 2026 available to our paying subscribers. This is not meant to serve as new content and is part of our free preview content within the dedicated website podcast section].

ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the ASEAN Wonk Podcast, where we bring you expert insights and regional perspectives on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics. I’m your host Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. If you haven’t already, do subscribe to the ASEAN Wonk platform at www.aseanwonk.com so you don’t miss our full posts.

Our guest today is Dr. Michael Green who worked at the National Security Council on Asia policy and is now the CEO of the US Studies Center at the University of Sydney. We’ll start our conversation talking about contemporary US Asia policy dynamics. Be sure to stay tuned as we also look ahead on other subjects, including what to expect with respect to future US policy in the region and the dynamics we might expect with upcoming midterm elections.

Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always!

US ASIA STRATEGY TODAY IN PERSPECTIVE

ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the podcast, Mike, and let’s start if we could on US Asia strategy more generally, with the caveat, of course, that we are in the midst of Iran war fallout and a president who has some of the greatest latitude we’ve seen in terms of policymaking in recent history. You’ve written what I would say is the most extensive book on the subject of US Asia strategy By More Than Providence, and that looks at US Asia strategy even before the founding of the United States all the way up to some of the contemporary dynamics that we’re sort of talking about. With the second administration of US President Donald Trump, there’s a lot of focus on some of the personalistic dynamics. I’m hoping that we can get beyond that and talk a little bit more about some of the structural realities and some of the measures of continuity and change. If you talk to administration officials, they point out that there are still some gains and signs of continuity in terms of security networking with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, and some of the things that we saw in the first Trump administration like the Development Finance Corporation, some of the rebranded minilaterals like Pax Silica. At the same time, if you look at some of the big broader trends in terms of trade, in terms of values, and in terms of some of the aspects of the policy ecosystem, there’s some really dramatic change there as well. So having long been a professor yourself and also written a book on this subject, how would you grade the administration’s approach to Asia so far?

Dr. Michael Green: Well thanks Prashanth. It’s great to be an honorary ASEAN wonk for an hour and to spend time with a CSIS alum. How would I grade them? Gosh. I would send them to the school counselor for examination is the honest answer, but I wouldn’t expel them from school because there are, as you suggest, some real points of continuity. We’re in this strange situation where there has perhaps never been as much consensus on Asia, the importance of Asia, the nature of the strategic challenge from China, and the criticality of alliances. There hasn’t been this much consensus – and this consensus has been around for eight, ten years now – in the whole postwar era, but we haven’t had a president who is as disinterested or almost hostile to that consensus as we have with Donald Trump. So when my book came out, it was 2017, so it was the first year of the Trump administration. And the reviews were all generally very good, but some reviewers said, well, you know, that’s been a fine explanation for the last two hundred and forty years. But now that Donald Trump is president, America doesn’t have a foreign policy or strategy anymore. And, you know, actually, in the first Trump administration, they did. The National Security Strategy put out by the Trump administration was the first to say that our focus has got to be on strategic competition with China and with Russia. Officials like Steve Biegun at state, Matt Pottinger at the NSC, General Mattis, the secretary of defense, and a lot of others really built a kind of balance of power – what my old boss Condoleezza Rice used to call a balance of power that favors freedom – upgrading the Quad, strengthening the alliance with Japan. And the first Trump term gets reasonably high marks in places like Tokyo and the Philippines. Then the Biden administration continued a lot of it. The Quad, for example, which was made a foreign minister’s summit by Secretary Mike Pompeo, the Biden administration made a presidential level summit. They didn’t undo basically anything that the Trump administration done in Asia.

But then the second Trump administration turned out to be much more of a departure from that trend. And a lot of it is because President Trump himself clearly believes that he now has the authority and the experience and maybe even the mission to do big things. And what those big things are, it kind of changes from day to day. And so, you know, he’s not strategic at all, he’s extremely tactical. It’s day to day. He is interested in enhancing his ways and means, his reputation, his power, his tools. But what for is never clear, and I don’t buy these arguments that he believes in spheres of influence or that we are in a neo-monarchical [state], I think that’s just basically kind of the vibe or the mood or as he puts it his gut on any given day. So that makes it very hard to sustain strategy, and he’s appointed a lot of people who frankly think that the enemy of America is within. That’s not the best frame of mind to deal with strategic competition from without. So there’s a lot more uncertainty. But underneath it all, as you suggested in your intro, if you look at congressional views including Republicans, if you look at public opinion, if you look at military alliances in Asia, there’s far more continuity than change underneath the surface. And we can talk about how much the surface matters. It matters. But I don’t see us on a new trajectory. I see us in a period of incredible turbulence, but not a fundamental change in the way that the American system is going to be viewing competition in Asia for the coming decades.

RECONSIDERING “PIVOT” DYNAMICS AND CONTEMPORARY REALITIES

ASEAN Wonk: So another point you referenced earlier Mike is that there’s chatter with respect to this US episode with Iran in terms of “we’ve seen this playbook before” with respect to the war on terrorism and the Bush administration which you were in as well. My issue with that is that the world has changed pretty fundamentally in the last twenty years. We’ve had a war in Ukraine that has reinforced connectivity between different regions, rather than this notion that we were in the Obama administration of a pivot or rebalance to Asia. And in fact, some of the advocates of the pivot, including Kurt Campbell, have actually admitted that these realities are actually much more sophisticated relative to where they were twenty years ago. The US position is also quite different in terms of hydrocarbons from where it was twenty years ago. And the China challenge is a much more fundamental challenge today than it was twenty years ago as well. So how would you sort of think about this notion of the sort of evolution from the pivot and rebalance to where we are at now, where we’re seeing a lot more focus on hemispheric and homeland concerns. When I look back further at U. S. history, whether it’s the Cuban Missile Crisis or the Monroe Doctrine, these things are not exactly new. It seems like a rebalancing of US interests on Asia relative to the rest of the world.

Dr. Michael Green: Yeah. None of this is new in a way. I started my book By More Than Providence in 1783 because that’s when Thomas Jefferson sent a letter to the commander of US forces in the frontier, which was somewhere in Pennsylvania at the time, warning that our spies in London had learned that the British were planning an expedition across Canada to find a fast route to the Pacific Northwest and access to the Pacific Ocean. And Jefferson said to Colonel Clark, we need to find a way to get there first, which, of course, was a big part of the Lewis and Clark expedition. It was geopolitical. So geopolitics is in the American DNA even if it’s sloppy and contested and inconsistent. I was actually surprised to find that when I did my research. What was going to be a two-year project became a seven-year project because there’s so much rich strategic debate about the Pacific in Congress, in congressional hearings, among men of letters. And so that’s one of the reasons, frankly, why I think we have to look at the Trump era not as a new unprecedented trajectory in American foreign policy, but a period of turbulence. And how much damage the turbulence does, we can discuss.

I don’t think I put this in my book, I use it in class, but there’s a great cartoon by Herb Block, the famous Washington Post cartoonist you’re old enough to remember: he had a cartoon in the 1940s during World War Two, and it shows General MacArthur who commanded in the Far East meeting with General Marshall, the chief of staff of the army. And MacArthur has brought in a globe of the world to discuss strategy, and the globe is a cube, and East Asia’s on top. And Marshall says, well, you know, general, here, we prefer to use a round globe. And it was making fun of the fact that MacArthur wanted everything in North Africa and Europe put in second place or dropped to pivot military resources to the Pacific. And I do that at Georgetown in my class because I don’t want people who major in Asian studies to think that good Asia strategy is neglecting the rest of the world, and especially for the US, which is a global power, a two-ocean power, and all the rest.

And so I was in the White House on 9/11, I was in the White House during Afghanistan and Iraq. I did not go into meetings and say: we can’t be doing any of this. We’ve got to focus on Asia. I thought, how do we — and I was hardly alone in this [Richard Armitage] and many others — but how do we basically take advantage of this crisis to strengthen our alliances and partnerships in Asia? And I think sometimes advocates of Asia strategy think we can hit pause on the Middle East or on Europe, but especially on the Middle East because it’s such a quagmire. You keep trying to get out, you get pulled back in. But as Lee Kuan Yew said, Americans think geopolitics is a video game and you can hit pause in one part of the world and then come back, and nothing will have happened while you’re dealing with another. And Lee Kuan Yew actually recognized the US and Singapore’s and Asia’s interests had to tend to security in the Middle East, had to tend to security in Europe.

So I’m not an advocate of just ignoring Iran. And there’s a lot that the Trump administration did wrong with the Iran war in terms of their assumptions, poor planning, complete disregard for allies and for the congress and the American public. It’s a pretty long list. But the underlying challenge for Iran was not created by Donald Trump. The missile program in particular was potentially heading towards ten thousand ballistic missiles in a few years. Unacceptable. So you can’t just hit pause in the Middle East and hope everything will be fine. It’s going to take some level of resources. Now maybe more resources than we needed because of the way the war’s been prosecuted. We’ll see. But you have to have an Asia strategy within a global strategy. And I don’t know if you want me to talk more about Trump’s lack of strategy or what we see as continuity, but, obviously, one big feature of his second term is going to be Iran. And it’s undoing his presidency. You can see it in public opinion in the fights in MAGA. The effect on Asia is not – you know, people who say this is that he’s Bismarck and this is brilliant are wrong, obviously – but people who say this is a complete destruction of interest in Asia are also wrong. It’s a mixed picture, and I think you have to be balanced in how you look at it.

DEFENSE PERIMETER, ISLAND CHAIN STAKES AND SECURITY FUTURES

ASEAN Wonk: One of the things you mentioned with respect to MacArthur is the conversation around the defense perimeter and how the United States is looking at its worldview and its vision for the region. Some of the chatter around the narrowing of the administration’s approach to the first island chain, for example, and the implications for – if you’re looking at, say, Vietnam and the South China Sea, for example – there are some elements of change there and concern, which I understand. There are also some elements of continuity that I see as well: in the last couple of administrations, the Philippines has really cemented its role in terms of the US security architecture around the alliances, but also Guam, Hawaii, and so on and so forth with respect to Japan, Australia: the networking there is pretty intense. What’s your view on this notion of the defense perimeter and the forward defense line relative to what we’ve seen in other periods in history, including MacArthur, the Korean War, and so on: is it as much of a change, or do you see more continuity there with respect to the security aspect?

Dr. Michael Green: You know, drawing your defense perimeter – put it another way, where you’re willing to fight or risk war – is one of the hardest things in grand strategy. And in my book it’s a conundrum for American strategists for 250 years. In the book I wrote after that on Japan’s current strategy called Line of Advantage, it’s a conundrum. Where do you draw the line? Where do you decide you’re going to take risk? John Lewis Gaddis, in his book on strategy, says you need the discipline to sit inside the castle walls and listen to the villagers being burned alive or something like that. He’s obviously an advocate of clear defensive perimeters and being disciplined. And one of my old bosses, Steve Hadley, to say, you keep drawing red lines and you don’t defend them, you end up creating a red carpet. I love that line. And so it’s very, very tricky. I think one problem US strategists make sometimes is, to quote Homer Simpson, the great geopolitical thinker, sometimes they make the mistake of saying the loud part soft and the soft part loud. So when Dean Acheson in January 1950, after a review within the State Department of how to protect our interests and contain communism after the fall of mainland China to Mao, decided, well, don’t worry – it was a political thing as much as it was strategic for the Democrats – he said, don’t worry. We’ve got this very strong defensive line with the first island chain, which was all thinking in American geopolitics. And he had that famous line between Japan and Korea in January 1950, which was a red carpet. It was an invitation to Mao, Stalin, and Kim Il Sung to test containment and allow Kim Il Sung to attack six months later, June 1950. That was a mistake to draw that defensive perimeter so clearly. Of course, the Vietnam War had the flip problem, which is they didn’t know where the defensive perimeter was. So, you know, strategy is basically about reconciling two mutually contradictory goals. If you didn’t have mutually contradictory goals, you wouldn’t need to think about it: you just pursue your interests. But sometimes the goals compete.

But I do think we are guilty in the United States sometimes of drawing the line too crisply, too clearly sometimes, and too much. So to give you more recent examples – the National Defense Strategy that came out. It was a dog’s breakfast, as they say in Australia – it had all kinds of stuff in it, some of it was ridiculous – but it did have a very clear and very historic focus on, as you said, on defending the first and second island chain in the Western Pacific. But it was very reductionist, and this sort of follows Bridge Colby’s thinking about Taiwan being the major central front. It was very reductionist. So everything’s about Taiwan. And this is also a mistake because the defense of Taiwan is not just – and certainly not in the first instance – about military deterrence in North Asia and in the first island chain. I mean, that’s absolutely core to the strategy, but Beijing’s strategy is to win without fighting. So if you overly focus on the military deterrence piece – which is critical – but if that’s all you’re worried about, you neglect, for example, diplomacy and development in Southeast Asia or the transatlantic alliance. And the flavor of the National Defense Strategy, Bridge’s thinking is – I mean, he’s a smart guy, and he’s very focused on the core problem – he’s worried about U.S. resources. But the danger of being overly reductionist and drawing a very clear line around what you’re willing to fight for too much is you end up ceding in Phase Zero – in peacetime – strategic influence in Southeast Asia that allows China to flank you from the south with their own power projection or prevent U.S. access to the archipelagic southern flank, which is critical for access basing overflight and dealing with a PLA campaign strategy that’s the entire first and second island chain.

And it’s not a simple matter of deterrence as you know well from your work. It’s much more complicated. It’s about development. It’s about diplomacy. It’s about soft power. It’s about partnering with Australia, Japan, and others. It’s not a kind of John Mearsheimer simple war and peace, black and white issue. It’s complex. And if you get it wrong, you make it easier for China to fight without winning. And in a similar way, the transatlantic relationship: it is way too reductionist to say the central problem we have – the pacing threat – is dealing with the PLA on the Taiwan contingency so we don’t have time for Europe. And then to gratuitously sort of beat up Europeans and tell them we don’t want your ships in Asia. Life’s not that simple, and strategy is not that simple. And Beijing would love to have Europe remain neutral, NATO remain neutral in a Taiwan contingency.

And it’s not whether the order of battle changes because the Dutch send a frigate. It’s about the geopolitical dissuasion effect, the geopolitical cost imposition that NATO can impose on China. And so, like losing interest in the IP-4 – the Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand summits with NATO – the gratuitously fighting with Europe, especially right now, is just an onside goal. So yes, as a historian and a geography nut, I love the focus on the first and second island chain, you’re absolutely right. But don’t reduce the whole strategic problem to the military equation in the first island chain. Got to get that right. But if you get only that right, you lose anyway. So kind of a long answer. But a strategy, you know the famous dime construct, you need diplomacy, informational, military tools and economic. And I think part of the problem there is continuity for sure on the military side. For sure, we can talk about it. But the dime construct overall, we’re not performing on the d and i and the e in Asia. We’re doing a lot of good stuff on the m, and there’s a lot of continuity, which is why the alliances will survive. But in terms of strategic competition, we are not using our toolkit fully.

FORECASTING US ASIA STRATEGY AND POLICY FUTURES BEYOND TRUMP II

ASEAN Wonk: And on that Mike, just looking ahead, the conversation that we will get to as the midterms loom closer, diplomats and officials from the region will be asking including in allied capitals: how do we think about this question of Trumpism or America First after Trump in terms of US Asia policy? And what is that going to look like in terms of that sort of new bipartisan consensus around strategic competition, China, but also the famous DIME construct – and the very difficult balance that policymakers have to make between the security and military inroads where the United States has always led, and the difficulties on the economic, diplomatic, and informational aspects that we’ve seen?

Dr. Michael Green: Well…

CONTINUED TRANSCRIPT AND FULL VIDEO PODCAST EPISODE FOR PAYING SUBSCRIBERS

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For this iteration of ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief, we are looking at:

• Assessing the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of looming global headwinds after a new regional ministerial meeting;

• Mapping of regional developments, such as Kremlin partnership chatter and supply chain resilience boost;

• Charting evolving geopolitical, geoeconomic and security trends including critical minerals alternative talk; biggest China launch and maritime boost;

• Tracking and analysis of industry developments and quantitative indicators such as high-speed rail first; rare earth futures; twin new pacts and more;

• And much more! ICYMI, check out our ASEAN Wonk review of a new book earlier in the week by a former official on a new strategy against geoeconomic weaponization and implications for the Indo-Pacific region.

This Week’s WonkCount: 2,316 words (~10 minutes)

Supply Chain Resilience Boost; Kremlin Partnership Chatter & More

US-China Southeast Asia Survey Headline; Hemispheric Dynamics & Coming Trade Review

• “Reversing last year’s trend, a slim majority of ASEAN respondents selected China (52.0%) over the US (48%) if the region were forced to align itself with one of the two strategic rivals,” according to a new iteration of an annual Southeast Asia survey report published by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. Among other report toplines, global scam operations and the South China Sea are also identified as being among the biggest regional geopolitical concerns (link).

Graphic Depicting Shifting Southeast Asia Perceptions With Respect to China and the United States

• “The…general review must be treated as a high-stakes strategic opportunity,” argues a new brief released by CSIS Indonesia on the review of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade agreement. The brief suggests provisions that should be considered as part of the process, including those covering supply chain resilience and the digital and green economy (link).

• “China’s AI influence on the global stage has only grown, aided by increasingly capable models, dramatically cheaper end-user pricing, and leverage of the global open-source developer community,” according to a new commentary published over at The Cipher Brief on China-U.S. competition in the artificial intelligence domain. The piece suggests “rethinking the parameters” of competition is critical to shifting dynamics in this space (link).

Global Headwinds Loom After New 2026 ASEAN Ministerial Meet

What’s Behind It

• The future outlook on looming global headwinds was front and center in the latest round of key regional ministerial meetings. The engagements took place amid a series of flashpoint-related developments. Dozens of countries — including a majority from Southeast Asia —issued a new call spotlighting the serious issue of peacekeeper security after several deaths in the Middle East, while China and Russia earlier vetoed a United Nations resolution on the Strait of Hormuz with U.S.-Iran conflict futures still playing out1. And though a senior official candidly told top policymakers and experts to prepare for some near-term “pain” in global geoeconomic outlooks, ASEAN’s growth story was cited as an example of rare optimism in terms of longer-term foundations to build on2.

Select Key Recent Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Developments Amid Recent ASEAN Regional Meets

• The wider geopolitical and geoeconomic dynamics have also dominated major power engagements. Among key powers, Australia Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s engagements in maritime Southeast Asia have been carefully watched given the conversations around supply chain resilience, as evidenced by new inroads announced such as a previously mulled legally binding protocol on economic resilience as Middle East conflict fallout continues3. On the flip side, regional leaders and senior officials headed to the capitals of major powers this week including China, Russia and the United States have had to weigh in on how their activities are addressing immediate geopolitical and geoeconomic impacts, including Indonesia President Prabowo Subianto with Russia unsurprisingly playing up energy and other diplomatic gains ahead of the voyage4.

Why It Matters

• The dynamics also spotlighted datapoints to watch with wider implications (see originally generated ASEAN Wonk table below on notable areas to monitor and additional specifics. Paying subscribers can read on for more on what to expect and future implications in the rest of the “Why It Matters” and “Where It’s Headed” sections, along with paid-only sections of the newsletter as usual).

Key Policy Datapoints to Watch, Alongside Major Pillars and Select Focus Areas

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WonkCount: 1,568 words (~7 minutes)

Review: Will China Weaponization Fuel More Asia Resistance?

Context

“China will take any additional punitive measure if deemed necessary in the future,” China’s foreign ministry spokesperson noted last week following Beijing’s announcement of new sanctions against a Japanese lawmaker over visits to Taiwan1. The development was just the latest datapoint in evolving responses to the growing use of geoeconomic weaponization in the Indo-Pacific region including by China and the United States as two leading powers in the international system to varying degrees, with cases in point within the past year alone including expanded rare earth export controls and adjusted trade tariffs2.

Select Key Recent China-Related Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Developments

A new book China’s Weaponization of Trade co-authored by former official Victor Cha charts out a new approach for managing geoeconomic weaponization in the Indo-Pacific and beyond3. In doing so, the book, co-authored with think tankers Ellen Kim and Andy Lim, adds to a series of new works by practitioners on evolving geoeconomic dynamics, including ones we have reviewed here on ASEAN Wonk such as How to Win a Trade War by Chad Bown and Soumaya Keynes4. China’s Weaponization of Trade argues that measures adopted by governments to date — be it sectoral groups like Pax Silica or newly-inked critical minerals deals — are too “piecemeal and defensive” to meaningfully address this challenge5. The book lays out a new approach by leveraging first-of-its-kind data across hundreds of cases of economic coercion impacting dozens of governments, companies and individuals, along with granular analysis on country-specific geoeconomic vulnerabilities including for China itself6. “[T]he means of countering trade weaponization thus far concocted by governments is deficient…new strategies are needed,” the book argues before detailing what these strategies could look like7.

Analysis

The book also highlights key datapoints to watch on potential futures (see originally-generated ASEAN Wonk table below for a summary of important contours. Paying subscribers can also read the rest of the “Analysis” section and “Implications” section looking at how these dynamics play out in the future).

Key Datapoints to Watch, Alongside Major Domains and Select Policy Focus Areas

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For this iteration of ASEAN Wonk BulletBrief, we are looking at:

• Assessing the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of new plurilateral collaboration futures and their wider strategic implications;

• Mapping of regional developments, such as force deployment futures and peacekeeper death fallout crisis;

• Charting evolving geopolitical, geoeconomic and security trends such as China setback reversal; big pact termination talk; and scam center tracking;

• Tracking and analysis of industry developments and quantitative indicators including cyber law scrutiny; quiet sectoral pact networking; new foreign talent goals and more;

• And much more! ICYMI, check out our ASEAN Wonk review earlier this week of a new book published by a renowned prime minister on rethinking the Global South script for a “postnormal” age.

This Week’s WonkCount: 2,336 words (~10 minutes)

Peacekeeper Death Fallout; Rotational Force Spotlight & More

Global Trade Pulse Check; Nuclear Scenario Futures & Geoeconomic Statecraft Fusion

• “The opportunity is that WTO members finally grasp the nettle and figure out a reform agenda fit for purpose… decisions by subsets of members…may yet spur recognition that times have truly changed,” argues a new commentary published by the Hinrich Foundation assessing the latest ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization, which saw some members proceeding with the implementation of a key e-commerce agreement. The commentary argues that opportunities in agreements by subsets of members also comes with risks that could sideline the body in global trade rules (link).

• “The exercise reveals gaps in nuclear-security crisis literacy among Southeast Asian diplomatic-policy stakeholders as well as the absence of alternative mechanisms to address a broader range of nuclear-related regional security crises,” according to a paper drawing on insights from a crisis-simulated exercise published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The exercise surrounds a hypothetical scenario involving a missing nuclear-armed submarine in Indonesian waters in 2031 and how it sparked broader military tensions between China and the Australia–UK–US (AUKUS) partnership (link).

• “[A]ustralia doesn’t lack tools…rather, it lacks an architecture that sufficiently integrates them,” according to a new report on economic statecraft to adjust to Indo-Pacific and global changes published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The report notes that Australia’s challenges in this respect are also arguably shared by middle powers in the Indo-Pacific as well as in other regions of the world such as Europe (link).

Top Australian Imports At Risk From Critical Minerals Disruption by China

New Geoeconomic FIT-P Call Amid Growing Middle East Fallout

What’s Behind It

• Founding members of a key geoeconomic grouping issued a new call for future sectoral collaboration amid rising global Middle East conflict1. The call comes as policymakers react to risks radiating across regions including the Indo-Pacific. One widely-circulated estimate suggesting that more prolonged conflict could result in Indo-Pacific impacts approximating the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis, with Southeast Asia and the Pacific being among the worst region hit in terms of both growth and inflation projections2. Officials also privately concede that the spotlight on narrower dealmaking around maritime access through the Strait of Hormuz in the public domain has also amplified the need by governments to ramp up communications to address questions such as what exactly deal terms might be and what is being traded3.

Select Key Recent and Relevant Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Developments

• The call is one of several regional datapoints on how flashpoint dynamics are reshaping Indo-Pacific geoeconomic collaboration. To take just one example, while the newly upgraded Indonesia-South Korea “special comprehensive strategic partnership” extends across a wide range of areas, both leaders at a summit this past week made specific reference to crisis-induced “resource security” as being an unfortunate reality, with Indonesian officials earlier also announcing a postponement in convening a geoeconomic grouping that the country is chairing4. The Philippines as ASEAN chair has faced questions on how it will stabilize growing fallout even after the declaration of a state of emergency, while Thailand — Southeast Asia’s second-largest economy — has been consumed with handling the scrutiny on the security of its vessels and citizens, with multiple media briefings to address a single incident in this respect even as the new government is taking shape5.

Why It Matters

• The dynamics also spotlighted datapoints to watch with wider implications (see originally generated ASEAN Wonk table below on notable areas to monitor and additional specifics. Paying subscribers can read on for more on what to expect and future implications in the rest of the “Why It Matters” and “Where It’s Headed” sections, along with paid-only sections of the newsletter as usual).

Notable Policy Commitments, Alongside Major Strategic Pillars and Select Key Priorities

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